JRTC

AMERICA'S PREMIER COMBAT TRAINING CENTER

Briefing Classification: UNCLASS//FOUO

SPECIAL FORCES
RANGER
AIRBORNE

INTELLIGENCE TRENDS
MAJ (B02) SR BCT Intel OCT

FORGING THE WARRIOR SPIRIT

Purpose

The purpose of this brief is to provide an overview of intelligence trends at JRTC in support of BCT Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) and Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT) Rotations.

FORGING THE WARRIOR SPIRIT

Agenda

- **TOP 5 IWFF Challenges**

- **SFAT IWFF Challenges**
  - **Intel Enabling and Advising to ANSF**
  - **Intel Support to Situational Awareness**
  - **Intel Support to Force Protection**

- **Questions**

FORGING THE WARRIOR SPIRIT

TOP 5 IWFF Challenges

INTEL Running Estimate (IRE)

Don't understand use

Doesn't include all necessary products

Don't use as a tool for collaboration / communication

Doesn't communicate current and future assessments

No SITTEMP or BCT Threat COP (T-COP)

ISR

Reactive ISR ISO OPS

No specific collection plan

Poor ISR integration w/S3

Unclear PIR-NAI-DP linkage (No EVENTTEMP)

Not synched, No wargame

No plan of spt for "before, during, and after" phases of OPS

No plan for receiving & analyzing information "ISR Feedback"

TSE

No communication of unit process in plan

No emphasis as an "after" phase of ISR

No TSE SOP identifying proper process

No exploitation feedback mechanism to COs

No priority placed by S3 or CDR

POOR INTELLIGENCE

Not utilizing the SOP (To include digital SOP)

Proficiency on Intel systems (DCGS, TIGR, BATS)

Poor understanding and/or implementation of Intel Architecture (Knowledge Management)

No BN S2 standards and expectations of CoIST

No Standardized Products

No Standardized PACE

Info passed via multiple means w/ no consolidation

MICO role not clearly identified

Failure to include Foreign Security Forces

Not understanding targeting process

Intel products lack detail or do not support the process

Weak assessments, fail to include Nonlethal Threats

No inclusion of Bottom Up Assessments (CO to BCT)

No EVENT template, No SITTEMP, little predictive analysis

Fail to utilize or incomplete IRE

No assessment support to all LOEs (focus on Security LOE)

IWFF SOP / DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES

INTEL SUPPORT TO TARGETING

SFAT IWFF Challenges

Major Observations (12-04 and 12-05):

- **1/3** of SFAT Intel positions are held by non-Intel MOS. This requires additional TNG and self study (recommend CoIST MTT TNG)

- Although SMEs were value added, SFATs still generally lack knowledge of ANSF IWFF processes and capabilities

- FDR/FDO processes and limitations must be understood by all team members

- An essential task is to diagram out who the SFAT/BSO Intel rep is to your left, right, higher and lower, and how you can communicate with them: critical for Situational Awareness

- Must follow up ANSF partner reporting via SFAT/BSO channels

- Combined Intel analysis and product development takes time and patience, but are keys to success

Questions

FORGING THE WARRIOR SPIRIT

Intelligence Running Estimate (IRE)

OBSERVATION: It is the responsibility of each staff section to create a staff running estimate that defines current status of their respective Warfighting function and future assessments of their respective Warfighting function. This allows commanders and staffs to maintain full situational awareness.

DISCUSSION: S2s failed to understand the importance of the daily Intel Running Estimate. If produced, it would have provided better battle space SA/SU, saved valuable time creating the BCT S2 Threat Common Operating Picture (T-COP), and provided the base information required during the numerous targeting and other meetings attended by BCT S2s. Additionally, it would serve well as a tool during the S2's daily collaborative Intel meetings with subordinate BNs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Standardize the BCT Intel Running Estimate to include all products and information required for each BCT Intel Section. As new products are required or current products are adjusted to reflect current status or new product requirements, adjust the IRE. The IRE should include 4 basic subjects. Those subjects are current status of the BCT Intel Warfighting Function (i.e. Asset COP, ISM, PIR assessment, Architecture status, etc), current assessment of the threat (i.e. BN Threat assessments by AO, BCT Threat assessment, Enemy ML/MDCOAs, Threat assessments by LOE), future status of the BCT IWFF (i.e. future ISMs, recommended PIR changes based on current assessments, future task org changes, etc), and future assessments of the threat by AO.

TOP 5 IWFF Challenges

ISR Planning and Synchronization

OBSERVATION : The ISR/Collection managers do not completely understand proper ISR synchronization nor fully incorporate non-traditional collection assets (CLPs, Aviation, RCPs, Units, Soldiers, HNSF, STTs) into the ISR Plan. Additionally, the collection managers are not proactively involved in the planning process.

DISCUSSION: To gain SA/SU of the battlefield, the BCT ISR managers must include every available organic, joint and non-traditional asset in his/her ISR plan. The S2 and ISR manager have to fully understand the asset capabilities at their disposal and be able to leverage them to their maximum potential across the AO while at the same time communicating with higher and lower to ensure asset synchronization to answer the commanders PIRs and ensure mission accomplishment. Finally, the ISR manager is rarely involved in the MDMP and BCT targeting process and is reactive to any requirements coming from these processes as opposed to being present during the planning, allowing him/her to be proactive in identifying intelligence gaps, PIR, and recommended asset utilization for all phases of the operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Identify all available assets that the BCT can leverage for collection and ensure a feedback mechanism is developed so that those assets and Soldiers fully understand their tasks and the ISR manager can evaluate the effectiveness of the collection mission to determine if that operation needs to be "re-attacked" with ISR. Additionally, ISR managers should be involved in every assessment/mission analysis meeting and integrated into the BCT targeting cycle so that they clearly understand the identified intelligence gaps and PIR associated with the BCTs Lines of Effort (LOE) in order to plan proactive ISR.

TOP 5 IWFF Challenges

Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) and dissemination

OBSERVATION: TSE is exploited at the BN and BCT level successfully after BN operations; however, TSE often does not reach the BCT S2 section at a reasonable time that satisfied LTIOV and therefore missed follow-on target opportunities. The TSE not arriving in a timely manner or being incomplete upon arrival hampered the targeting effort in recommending timely follow-on targets

DISCUSSION: Often, BCTs do not establish a real time tracking mechanism for TSE to follow it from point of capture, to evacuation, to exploitation, to analysis, to dissemination. The BCT S2s rely on the BNs to process and evacuate the TSE that was taken during raids but the BNs often do not clearly understand the procedures or there was no defined BCT TSE process to start with. Additionally, the BCT needs to follow, understand and define the duties and responsibilities of any attached Multi Function Teams (MFT) or DOMEX Brigade Support Team WRT exploitation, analysis and dissemination of TSE.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: COISTs, BN S2s, and the BCT Staff need to understand the importance of TSE and the process to quickly collect, exploit, and disseminate this information. A written SOP, incorporation of this SOP into BCT Processes, and planning and dissemination of this information at every echelon from SQD to BCT is essential to the success of DOMEX and TSE within the BCT. An additional measure is to have the HCT or MFT supporting the Maneuver unit give TSE classes, explain the importance of and how DOMEX/TSE has the potential to impact the Maneuver mission and follow on targets.

TOP 5 IWFF Challenges

IWFF SOP w/ Duties and Responsibilities and IM/KM

OBSERVATION : Failure to fully understand and implement an effective SOP led to a lack of understanding of how Intelligence supports the MDMP process and what the IWFF, at every echelon, duties and responsibilities included. This ultimately led to a lack of support to the targeting cycle, lack of vertical communication (connecting the IWFF from COIST to BCT S2), as well as not understanding information processing / management (reporting, TSE processing, dissemination of exploitation, etc).

DISCUSSION: The IWFF has the demanding task of tracking the current fight, providing predictive analysis, planning and synchronizing of ISR assets, and continuous planning for Future Operations. The analysts and other intelligence disciplines do not fully understand each other's capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses and often underutilized BN and CO assessments. This led to redundancy of effort in certain tasks/responsibilities, while other tasks were not completed at all.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S2 must refine SOPs and regularly rehearse IWFF battle drills. The IWFF SOP should specifically address duties and responsibilities, processes, and communications requirements and must be detailed enough to outline requirements within any given TOC/TAC configuration and at every echelon (CO to BCT). The S2 (BN and BCT) should be providing guidance and direction in how intelligence is conducted, sets priorities of work, and establishes standards of intelligence IAW with what he/she expects from each element. This concept implies that the S2 empowers all Soldiers within the sections and COISTs to perform most of the tasks that the S2 usually shoulders. This concept allows the S2 to become future-focused, connects the IWFF at every echelon (CO to BCT) and empowers the sections to work as the intelligence hub for the entire task force.

Intelligence Support to Targeting

OBSERVATION : S2s and Fusion Cells often struggled with intelligence support to targeting along every Line of Effort (LOE). Intelligence support to targeting often focused solely on personality targeting and supporting the security LOE. Governance, Development, and Information Operations LOEs were often unsupported with intelligence support (IPB) or ISR planning. Often the BCT intelligence leaders were not involved in assisting with developing assessments along the Governance, Development, or Information Operations LOEs.

DISCUSSION: Intelligence support to targeting should begin with the assessment working groups in assisting with identifying current assessments and threats to that LOE. Intelligence Collection and Intelligence Fusion in support of all LOEs can assist in identifying threats, help in assessing current status of that LOE, and can place ISR in support of confirming or denying indicators that would lead to those threats. Placing an almost exclusive effort toward one area (i.e. Security LOE) allows other equally important LOEs to suffer and be incomplete.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To ensure continued success, S2s must be disciplined in their support to targeting process and apply equal emphasis of BCT resources along every LOE. Clearly defined Priorities of Work and duties and responsibilities within the S2 should be developed that supports every LOE. Fusion and Collection management cannot be solely focused along the Security LOE and personality targeting. Additionally, an S2 representative should be present for every working group associated with the BCT targeting cycle and provide value added. Once he or she completes that meeting, it is imperative to provide meeting summaries to the Fusion Cell clearly outlining requirements, current status, due outs, and homework for the next meeting. Understanding the current and future targets along every LOE will allow analysts to assist in the development and refinement of both lethal and non-lethal target packets to ensure mission success.

ISR Operations

Updated PIRs

PIRs

Develop Requirements

Update ISR Operations

Develop ISR Synch Plan

PLAN

PRODUCE

PREPARE

ISR Matrix

?

PROCESS

COLLECT

Assess ISR OPS and PIR

Support ISR Integration

Disseminate

?

BCT FRAGOs

BCT OPSYNC

BCT Collection Plan ISR Tasks

• How did we track, disseminate and refine collection?

Collection Plan

PIR Cross walk

ISM

BCT FRAGOS

- **How did we task BNs to answer the BCT CDR's PIRs?**
- **How did we use IST to task the BCT CDRs PIR?**

OCCR INTEL Shura

Attendees

- **OCCR S2 and SFAT S2**
- **201st G2**
- **NDS Chief**
- **4 of 8 OCCP**
- **2 of 3 ANA BDEs**
- **2/10 MTN REP (S2X)**
- **109th MI REP**

Purpose: Share information and gain an understanding of the threat against ANSF and the people of Afghanistan.

(IAW OCC Standard Operating Procedures Version 2.0 Current as of 20111017)

- **How well did we share our assessment with our Partners?**
- **How did we capture the information gained from the Shura?**
- **Who else could have attended?**

SFAT Intel shared assessment *(12-05)*

- **What was our process to share our assessments with our ANSF Partners?**
- **How well did our assessments nest with our ANSF Partners?**

Common Operating Picture (COP)

OCC-R SIGACTs for 23 FEB

OCC-R ANA Intelligence Officer presenting COP at the 23 FEB close out

- How do you create an Afghan COP using analog communication systems?
- What were some of our challenges when helping our partners develop their COP?
- How well did we communicate the COP horizontal and vertically?

Example COP Figure 8 pg. 21

OCCs at both the P and R level are responsible to produce and disseminate a couple of standard products on a weekly basis, the Common Operational Picture (COP) and the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). These two products represent the most basic requirement for the OCCs to accurately synchronize and inform their "customer base."

(OCC Standard Operating Procedures Version 2.0, 17 OCT 11)

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HANDBOOK

No. 12-07   FEB 12

Inside
the Wire
Threats-
Afghanistan

Green
on
Blue

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

Cente
https://c

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
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
(U) Forms of Insider Threats	
Infiltration	Deliberate method of placing an individual(s) into positions that can be used to gather information or direct attacks
Co-Option	Recruit existing ANSF members to participate in INS activities through blackmail, appealing to religious or cultural views or leveraging familial or tribal ties
Mimicking	Impersonating ANSF through appearance to gain temporary close-in access to facilitate attacks
Independent Green-on-Blue	Violence not attributable to insurgents; stems from factors such as mental illness, drug use or strained professional relationships.

Majority of incidents

UNCLASS/FOUO

Insider Threat (12-05)

- **Who else needs to know?**

THREAT 1 (21 MAR)
ANA soldiers angry at Americans for burning Korans and killing civilians.

- 1400 21 MAR: Information is gathered during a source meeting indicating potential for "green on blue" violence. Information was from 1200 20 MAR.
- 1650 21 MAR: 2-10 BDE S2 sends out email to subordinate BN S2s only.
- 0447 22 MAR: IIR completed.
- 0917 22 MAR: IIR 6044307612 published on CIDNE.

Report was never captured in a BN/BCT INTSUM/GRINTSUM or shared with our SFAT teams.

THREAT 2 (24 MAR)
Unidentified ANA soldiers threatening Americans.

- 1745 24 MAR: HCT24 recieves information through a walk in source of a "green on blue" threat .
- 0930 25 MAR: 4-31 BNS2 is informed of the treat.
- 1135 25 MAR: OMT 46 confirms it is writing a IIR. No other Intelligence element is aware of the threat.
- 1449 25 MAR: IIR completed.
- 1827 25 MAR: IIR 6044704812 published on CIDNE.

Again the report was never captured in a BN/BCT INTSUM/GRINTSUM or shared with our SFAT teams.

- **How did we inform our SFAT Teams?**

SFAT Intel Training (12-04)

TM1 BTL CPT conducting SA Update Class

TM1 S2 conducting PA Wheel Class

- **How did we determine what to teach our ANSF partners?**
- **How did we get their buy in into the training plan?**
- **What was the goal of our long range training plan?**

- **How well did we assess our partners capabilities?**
- **What training plan did we develop with our partners?**
- **How did we capture our training for future reference?**
- **How effectively did we utilize the training tools that were available?**

- **100% OCC-R INTSUMs produced and on time**
- **Zero OCC-R INTSUMs translated**
- **Two OCC-P translated INTSUM (no English version until 25 FEB so the information was not captured in the OCC-R INTSUMs for 3 days)**

- **How did we involve our partners in the INTSUM process?**
- **What were some of our challenges?**
- **How well did we communicate the INTSUMs/OPSUMs horizontal and vertically?**

What were our partners tracking?

"Synching the Visualization of the Environment"

T-COP?

What were we tracking?

OCC-R

OCC-R Intel Shura

FM, JABR, CPOF, Ventrillo, VOIP, Adobe Breeze, BDE Portal, TIGR, BATs

AO KHEERS MLECOA/MDECOA

Sources of Information

Partner Input?

109th MI BN Reporting?

SFAT Reporting?

OSINT?

Single Source Reporting?

HIIDEs?

Debriefs/KLE?

Co / Bn Assessments?

SIGACTS?

Did we have a shared vision of the OE at every echelon?

109th MI BN Force Array

UNCLASSIFIED//OPSEC SENSITIVE//Display Only to AFG

AS OF 251900MAR12

TSE

Future Operations?

Prosecution?

What is the next step?

Info / Evidence Gained by DOMEX BST
-**Phone numbers and names of add'l associates**
-**Names of persons associated with HME supplies**
-**Financial Records**
-**DIV HVI meeting information**

HQ ISAF TARGET

IS03800

OBJECTIVE: PANTHERS

NOMINATING AGENCY: CJTF 21

LEAD AGENCY: CJTF 21

LAST FOLDER UPDATE: 22 MARCH 12
LAST REPORT DATE: 22 MARCH 12

Target Packet

Detainee Operations
Standard Operating Procedures

Tactical Site Exploitation
Standard Operating Procedures

2nd Brigade Combat Team
10th Mountain Division
Ft. Drum, NY

2-10 BCT TSE SOP

Continuous Process?

Timely?

Prosecution Packet?

Chain of Custody?

AGENDA

**AASLT CONOP BACK BRIEF
OPERATION PANTHERS**

TSE From OBJ

Is TSE / IQ the end of the mission or the beginning of the next?

What was the detainee and TSE plan?

Communication Flow

BN

- FM
- SiPR/NiPR
- CPOF
- Cell Phone
- VOIP
- CXI
- TACSAT
- BFT
- DGCS

BDE

- FM
- SiPR/NiPR
- CPOF
- Cell Phone
- VOIP
- CXI
- TACSAT
- BFT
- DGCS
- AFATDS
- BCS3

?

SFAT

- FM
- SiPR/NiPR
- CPOF
- SAT/Cell phone
- VOIP
- CXI

Product dissemination

How did we share our products?

PIR Cross-Walk

INTSUM / GRINTSUM

ISM

CONOPs

Horizontal

Vertical

PIR

Collection Plan

HVTL

TGT Packets

Did we use our HNSF partner product?

CoIST

1st Brigade
82d Airborne Division

20AUG2011

Company Intelligence Support Teams

Standard Operating Procedure

CoIST Leader
XO/FSO

CoIST Asst. Leader (Senior Analyst)
SGT or SSG

Enlisted   Enlisted   Enlisted

- Brief outgoing patrols
- Debrief incoming patrols
- Battle Track enemy SIGACTS
- Develop Company level HVIs
- *Brief Commander on the current situation at any given time*
- Cross talk with adjacent units
- Continuously populate all intelligence trackers and databases
- Conduct predictive analysis
- Analyze friendly trends from the enemy perspective
- Brief attachments and units operating within the AO
- Post updated intelligence information for easy reference
- Identify gaps in the Commander's situational awareness
- Ensure Company level TQ does not inadvertently become unlawful

The intent of the CoIST is to be manned to a sufficient level to sustain a continuous ability to perform the basic functions of receiving information in the form of patrol debriefs, intelligence reporting, and status of ISR assets; analyzing information; disseminating intelligence; and making recommendations to the commander.

Bottom up Assessments

Collaboration

BDE

1BCT/82nd ABN – INTSUM

INTEL UPDATE

SIGACTS AO

BN

D Co CoIST Assessment 21 Jan 2012

AO THUNDERBOLT SIGACTS – LAST 24 HOURS

Daily GRINTSUM

TF THUNDERBOLT

Dissemination

CoIST

From the bottom up…