

DIRECTORATE FOR COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES



DCIED is the nucleus for TRADOC's ability to deliver **resource-informed, outcomes-based, and integration-focused** CIED solutions to the Army.

Useful Links:

- [Army Training Network](#)
- [Center for Army Lessons Learned\(CALL\)](#)
- [DCIED AKO Website](#)
- [Defense Language Institute](#)
- [FORSCOM Pre-Deployment Training Guidance](#)
- [Joint IED Defeat Organization](#)
- [IEDES FAQ](#)
- [MilGaming](#)
- [Rapid Transit](#)
- [ROC-IED Web Version](#)
- [TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity \(TRISA\)](#)
- [USCENTCOM Training Guidance](#)

Home Station Training Lane Bulletin (HSTL)

February 2012 Issue 17

▶▶▶ VMR2 Minehound Training Videos and Documents

VMR2 Minehound training videos, references, manuals and briefings can be found on the PM Countermine EOD AKO site [here](#). The following links will take you directly to the training videos:




- [Alert Modes](#)
- [Auto M Soil Comp](#)
- [Battery Status Tones](#)
- [Calibrate](#)
- [GPR & Amp; MD Ops](#)
- [GPR Ops](#)
- [GPR Setup](#)
- [MD Auto Chan Selection](#)
- [MD Manual Chan Selection](#)
- [MD Ops Buried HM Target Using PC](#)
- [MD Ops Buried LM Targets Using PC](#)
- [MD Ops Buried LM Targets Using PC1](#)
- [MD Ops Surface Exposed Target](#)
- [MD Setup](#)
- [MD Volume](#)
- [Pinpoint Update](#)
- [Pinpoint1](#)
- [Prep for Ops](#)
- [Proper Sweep](#)
- [Recall GPR Settings](#)





Links for VMR2 manuals, references, and briefs:

- [VMR2 Quick Reference Guide](#)
- [VMR2 Hip Pocket Class](#)
- [VMR2 Minehound Dual-Sensor Detector Intro Brief](#)
- [VMR2 Operational Manual](#)
- [VMR2+ Operational Manual](#)



▶▶▶ C-IED Awareness Report (Green Hash)

Joint Task Force Paladin has recently released three Green Hash reports. The reports cover: IEDs emplaced in Qalat walls, Improvised Explosive Devices in and around Karez irrigation systems and Low Metal Content (LMC) Anti-Personnel (APERS) Mines. The LMC APERS mines mentioned in the Green Hash Report are similar in size to a PMN mine but, have no external fuses. They are constructed entirely of non-metallic components (except for a small aluminum disk inside). The mine has NO SAFE-TO-ARM FEATURE; consider it ARMED at all times.



▶▶▶ Army CIED Strategy released January 2012

The Strategy provides the Army outline for a C-IED effort that:

- ◆ Anticipates new, emerging IED threats and proactively seeks solutions to resolve them.
- ◆ Collaborates its activities with related efforts across the entire C-IED community of practice.
- ◆ Integrates new C-IED solutions with the warfighting capabilities already present in Army units.
- ◆ Synchronizes the development and delivery of C-IED capabilities in support of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and urgent operational requirements.
- ◆ Adapts to new IED challenges by rapidly changing Army TTP and migrating lessons learned into training activities supporting all phases of ARFORGEN.
- ◆ Assesses C-IED capabilities deployed to the Army to make informed decisions about which capabilities to retain, improve, or discontinue.

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▶ ▶ ▶ ENEMY IED THREAT MODEL AND FACTORS AFFECTING IT

The following is an extract from ATTP 2-91.4 Intelligence Support to Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: Volume I (U), dated July 2011.

Intelligence analysts use the enemy IED threat model to determine how the IED threat operates in a current operational environment. Understanding and applying the model assists in refining intelligence research, collection, and analysis. These considerations should be used when designing scenarios for CIED training.

The enemy IED threat model is a seven-step non sequential process developed from observations and lessons learned:

- Step 1: Plan.
- Step 2: Resource.
- Step 3: Build and/or assemble.
- Step 4: Reconnoiter (select target and location).
- Step 5: Transport and emplace.
- Step 6: Detonate.
- Step 7: Exploit.

Although "exploit" is not a required step to the basic effort, exploitation has become common and effective practice and is now included in the IED threat model.


The intelligence support goal is to provide specifics on the *who, what, where, when, how, and why* of the enemy IED threat. Answers to these questions help identify the IED threat's critical requirements and vulnerabilities. This helps units determine the CIED tasks that would be effective against these vulnerabilities.

▶ ▶ ▶ TASC General Information

THOR III Surrogates- TASC are currently in the process of receiving THOR III surrogates and training from PEO STRI. THOR III Surrogates will be available for training in the near future. Contact your local TASC for more information.

IEDES Squad Boxes-IEDES Non-Pyro Squad boxes have been shipped to your local TASC. Contact your local TASC for details. The Program Manager is continuing work on providing a safe increase to audible and visual signature of the non-pyro technique capability.

ANPSS-14 Sweep Monitoring System (SMS)- SMS are available at your local TASC. The system can be used with any of the hand held detectors currently in use at Home Station Training. A Power Point presentation on the use of the SMS can be downloaded [here](#).



▶ ▶ ▶ **Threat TTPs:** [click for complete CIED HSTL IED Profile](#)

General TTPs: There have been no significant changes to the threat TTPs.

Mounted attacks

- ◆ RCIEDs continue to be employed

Culverts

- ◆ Booby traps placed in front of culvert openings
- ◆ Devices are placed at approaches to culverts
- ◆ Culverts are altered to give the appearance that a denial system is in place


Underbelly Attack

- ◆ Main charge is off-set from the triggering device. Offset distances are based on tire/track width, and roller stand off. Victim operated devices are the weapon of choice
- ◆ Low metallic VOIED pressure plate
- ◆ Victim Operated and command detonated (dual initiation devices)
- ◆ HME and UBE in a Yellow Palm Oil Container (YPOC). Plastic containers are easy to transport and conceal
- ◆ Lamp wire, twin flex wire or copper coated enamel wire generally laid 500-800 meters to the trigger point
- ◆ Command wire submerged in low water crossings, canals and laid through structured walls
- ◆ Aiming markers usually emplaced

Dismounted attacks

- ◆ Majority of IEDs are 5-25lbs HME in YPOC jugs, DFCs and pressure cookers
- ◆ Previous IED engagement area is a likely location for a repeat attack
- ◆ Placed along foot paths, crossing areas, compound entrances and doorways
- ◆ Complex attacks incorporating direct fire
- ◆ Secondary and tertiary devices
- ◆ Hoax devices
- ◆ Enemy remnants of war booby trapped

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
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