"Optimizing Coalition Interoperability"
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TRANSITION PLANNING HANDBOOK

ABCA Publication 371
Amendment 1

2013

AMENDMENTS

Amendment No	Date	Details
1	11 June 2013	The inclusion of the Health Addendum

Another thing – and something that I believe has not been emphasized sufficiently and publicly at home - is that the Government of Germany should, at the very earliest practicable moment, pass to a civilian organization…the War Department consistently holds that the control and supervision of Germany, on a long-term basis, is a civilian function, operating through German civil organizations… The change to Civilian control will not, in itself, lessen the need for occupational troops, nor will it imply any limited term of occupation.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower in a letter to General George C. Marshall dated 13 October 1945

General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Allied Chiefs planning WW2 operations in Europe.

TRANSITION PLANNING HANDBOOK

CONTENTS

AIM AND SCOPE

Introduction

1.   The purpose of this handbook is to fill an identified gap in doctrine relating to Transition to Host Nation (HN) government control on operations involving ABCA nations. Current operational practice sees Transition being conducted according to distinct national plans within defined national areas of interest (AI), but set within the context of an overall theater-level campaign plan. This has resulted in Transition methodology being developed independently where a more coherent approach would be mutually advantageous to ABCA nations.

2.   Independent national development of Transition methodology can also lead to inconsistency when integrating other government agencies (OGAs) and non-government organizations (NGOs), many of whose activities will span more than one national AI. A common Transition methodology is therefore also consistent with the acknowledged requirement for a comprehensive, integrated or whole of government (WOG) Approach.

Aim

3.   This handbook aims to present clear, basic guidance for planning the Transition of security functions within a coalition environment.

Context

4.   The decision to initiate Transition is political and, as such, requires a WOG effort. Transition is not solely a military activity, although the military may well set the conditions within which governance and development organizations are able to progress further down their Lines of Effort[1] (LoE). To be fully effective, planners must fully comprehend the complexities of the human terrain and the Transition process must be considered as part of a comprehensive campaign plan from the outset of planning.

Target audience

5.   This handbook is intended for commanders and their staffs deployed to national and coalition headquarters from battle group to theater HQ level. It is designed to assist with planning the military aspects of

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[1] Lines of Effort: The linking of activities with similar goals throughout the campaign resulting in

Transition within a WOG approach. It has been written based on the practical experience of operational planners who have deployed into coalition headquarters in a number of theaters and across various levels of threat.

Structure

6.   The topics covered are thematic. The handbook begins by placing Transition operations into the broader context, describing the other non-military **LoE** associated with Transition. It then provides some basic **principles** for planners. A chapter on **timing**, including initiating the Transition and managing its progression, builds on this conceptual approach. The planning process is then separated into **phases** to provide a practical framework. **Obstacles** to Transition and some of common challenges are discussed before the final chapter moves on to address some evaluation and assessment criteria designed to assist in the tracking of the process as a whole. A series of **case studies** are provided as annexes to illustrate the practical application of the methodology described. Finally, there are some **definitions** of terms particular to Transition in coalition operations. It should be noted that both Logistic and Influence considerations are integrated throughout the publication.

7.   What the handbook will not do is act as a planning guide for the withdrawal of forces, nor will it cover the detailed process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Wide spectrum of operations

8.   The handbook is written to be applicable to a full spectrum of joint operations, from aid to the civil community through to sustained high intensity operations. Case studies provide examples of how the framework and principles of Transition planning have been applied across this spectrum.

Other publications

9.   This handbook should be read in conjunction with ABCA Publication 369 - **Security Force Capacity Building Handbook (Edition 2)**. Other publications the planner may wish to refer to are:

   a.   Coalition Operations Handbook (ABCA Publication 332).

   b.   Coalition Logistics Handbook (ABCA Publication 323).

c.   Coalition Intelligence Handbook (ABCA Publication 325).

d.   ABCA Report 152 – Influence Activities.

CHAPTER 1

TRANSITION LINES OF EFFORT

Overall context

1.   Before starting to plan for Transition, it is necessary to place the activity into a wider context. This includes what is happening from the planner's own national perspective, and what is happening in the Area of Interest (AI). From the perspective of a military operation, Transition often looks like the handing over of security responsibility to rejuvenated or recently raised and trained local forces. It is however, important to remember that security responsibility is merely one Line of Effort (LoE) within the campaign, and the military campaign is one strategy within a comprehensive national foreign policy (Figure 1.1). Other government agencies (OGAs) may call these 'tracks', 'branches' or 'pillars', but what is important, is that they are concurrent and inter-related.

Figure 1.1: Transition Lines of Effort

2.   Transition as part of an exit strategy may involve a number of stages. Moreover, as one of many coalition foreign policies, Transition will

invariably be complex, dependent on many variables, and non-linear. The requirement for each national government to adjust priorities within the Transition process requires military planners to be flexible throughout.

3.   Regardless of context, Transition will always fulfill a political objective first. This means that the timing, tempo and nature of Transition may appear to be inconsistent with other military activities, and difficult to achieve with limited and often decreasing resources. It may be a Transition of military operations only, with other national government strategies (e.g. economic, governance and development support), continuing in the future; or it may involve a complete disengagement from the AI.

4.   At the center of each Transition is a supporting and supported party. The relationship between the two is interdependent; however, planners must establish early on the degree of involvement each party is to play in planning, and at what stage the plan is distributed for review. Consequently, the success of the operation will be viewed from the different perspectives of each party. It is also important to remember that national caveats will dictate the specific nature of each state's individual contribution, and the Host Nation (HN) will maintain different relationships with each nation. These will become important planning considerations when synchronizing the plan with other coalition nations.

5.   The end result of Transition may bear no resemblance to the status of the country before the crisis; that said, the end state cannot be imposed by the coalition and must reflect local solutions to local issues. It will almost certainly involve compromise and the achievement of mutually agreed standards which are 'good enough' in a HN context; it will almost certainly be fragile for some time. Transition is not just a 'hand-over' nor is it just a straightforward 'hand-back'.

The military campaign in context

6.   The military campaign will involve LoE which cover all areas in which the military has been involved. In some circumstances, this may just be security and infrastructure development; but in others, a military force may have provided a comprehensive package of medical care, transport, engineering, close personal protection and security sector development. All of these functions need to Transition to normalized practices which are enduring and sustainable for the HN.

7.   The transfer of lead security responsibility (TLSR) is fundamental to achieving the stable condition which allows other Transition LoE to progress. However, TLSR may not be given the highest priority by all parties involved, despite the fact that it often carries great psychological significance for the HN and the greatest risk of failure. Before security responsibility is handed over, the coalition will have to create a security environment which the HN security force (HNSF) can manage. This will not necessarily mean a total defeat of any insurgent group, but may comprise the reduction of the insurgent threat to a manageable state. Failure may be perceived if there are existing domestic tensions which appear to be exacerbated by the transfer of responsibility, and if the Transition itself creates tension between the population and HN internal security elements.

8.   The withdrawal of troops is a significant outward sign of security transition. Foreign military presence and posture are the signs of intervention most visible to the population, and remind the population that they do not have ultimate authority in matters of law and order. This may have a detrimental or reassuring effect on the population depending on their confidence in the capability of the HNSF. Transition should involve incentives for both the international community and the HN for it to be successful.

9.   TLSR may be executed in a number of ways. It will often occur incrementally with significant events identified as operational and public milestones. These increments may be divided by geographic area (one district at a time), institutions (police academy, range, communications center), functions of the security sector (border protection, maritime protection, intelligence), or all three. What is important to all such Transitions is that they must maintain momentum. More detail on the framework of the Transition by phase and the importance of preconditions for each phase is contained in Chapter 4.

Transition tempo

10.   The government strategies dictating disengagement from an AI will reflect their own national interests and timelines. However, Transition will need to be supported by a coalition diplomatic effort to coordinate, maintain coalition unity and ensure commitment to the full term of the process. The combined strategic priorities may at the same time look like a rush to exit the AI, or a gradual departure. It may mean that different member states of a coalition Transition at different times. Nevertheless, the different lines of operation move simultaneously and are contingent on

each other, and because the military Transition involves the security LoE, it will set the conditions for the other lines and probably be the focus of the military effort.

11.   Cues to trigger each phase of TLSR may come from agencies outside the military. For instance specific legislation might need to be in place before HNSF assume control, aid funding streams may have to be established, and facilities may have to be built and accredited. Some of these are not within the military planner's control and therefore affect planning tempo. Regular communications, shared planning and a mutual understanding of the environment with the other agencies responsible for these achievements will help to maintain momentum.

Stakeholders

12.   The AI will be a multi-stakeholder environment. Stakeholders can be drawn from OGAs, non-government organizations (NGO), international organizations, nonprofit organizations, private companies and individuals. In stabilization and nation building, their activities may be complimentary to military activities, and in ideal circumstances, will be mutually supportive. Stakeholders may also include the United Nations (UN), regional groupings (e.g. the African Union), third party states and bilateral/multinational police forces, diplomatic staff, government agencies, NGOs (in areas of health, religion, human rights, rights of children, agriculture and engineering), international organizations (the World Bank and World Health Organization), private contractors (e.g. security, logistics, construction and health), private corporations and well intentioned individuals. This potential 'web of assistance' must be understood and, where possible, incorporated into the Transition process.

13.   Within the logistic environment, familiarity with strategic and operational partners' techniques, plans and procedures is crucial. A working knowledge of the key stakeholders including what they provide for coalition forces (CF) and how to leverage their capabilities is essential. Undertaking this engagement at an early stage will assist in setting the right conditions for Transition and help to maintain momentum.

14.   This web will present new challenges to a Transition operation which include the complexities of operating under different objectives, timelines, appreciations of the situation and a variety of funding streams. Inter-departmental tasks forces specifically designed for 'nation building' or 'emergency relief' may also develop over time and the need to remain cognizant of the requirement for logistic support for all entities throughout

the process remains central. Among these external stakeholders, common ground needs to be identified early in the planning process to enable the different LoE to be mutually supportive. Although different groups might have different ultimate goals, Transition may well include similar steps as external assistance is decreased.

15.   Communication and coordination of these milestones underpins the success of the Transition. Engagement between all stakeholders at all levels is vital to achieving unity of purpose and one of the ways to achieve this is through the extensive use of liaison officers embedded in the relevant stakeholders' HQs. Facilitating this engagement will be a requirement of the commander and the planning team.

CHAPTER 2

PRINCIPLES

Introduction

1.   This chapter provides some basic principles applicable to all levels of Transition, from short term disaster relief to regime change after a major conflict. Although planning considerations will vary based on the conditions predicating Transition, this basic list is recommended as a start point for staff.

2.   Planning can be based on the following principles:

Figure 2.1: Sustainable Transition

3.   **Transition is conditions, not time, based.** As transition is a process rather than an event, it sits within the context of other environmental factors. These factors determine the best method of executing each stage of Transition in order to maintain momentum. It is acknowledged that there will usually be political imperatives[2] to exit the theater, and planners must understand that these political imperatives, whether they be Host Nation's (HN) or coalition, are likely to shape any conditions-based approach. However, the Transition will only be successful if it is synchronized with milestones within the HN's

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[2] These may be generated from individual troop contributing nations, across the coalition or from the HN. Planners have very little control over these issues and therefore their plans require flexibility and continual review.

(re)development (for example, the deployment of recently formed police and military units) and if the HN's governance and development is sufficiently advanced to permit effective and sustainable Transition across all Lines of Effort (LoE).

4.   **Start at the bottom.** Building a solid foundation of ownership across all LoE at the local level will establish a baseline from which to continue the Transition process. Starting transfer of authority and responsibility at local level is both visible to the population, easier to measure and cultivates a sense of self-determination. This is equally applicable to situations where the HN population had previously held authority and responsibility but subsequently lost it during the crisis, and where the population is taking on authority and responsibility for the first time.

5.   **Thin out, don't hand off.** As another party assumes responsibility for a specific function or geographical area, a gradual, confidence building process will be required. A sudden, well publicized and ceremonial departure may degrade that level of confidence and undermine the plan. A thinning-out of assistance gives the impression that support is still being provided, supports the confidence building process and allows greater but graduated control to be assumed by the other party.

6.   **Maintain situational awareness and points of influence.** One of the greatest challenges through Transition will be the maintenance of situational awareness. As the numbers of coalition troops deployed, with their associated intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR)[3] assets, decreases so will their ability to understand the situation. This includes both the opposing forces and HN security forces (HNSF) activities. Proactive measures must be taken to guard against this, and linked to it will be a decreasing ability to influence HNSF as coalition forces (CF) and enablers reduce. Simply putting fewer troops on the ground means less interaction and less assets to offer the HN. Establishing structures that maintain linkages at the key levels of command and the ability to plug in coalition assets as required will be essential.

7.   **Transition institutions and functions as well as geographic areas.** The functioning of the HN is not limited to control of an operational environment or geographic areas. It takes into account national institutions, public services and fields of expertise. Often it is difficult to

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[3] ISTAR equates to information collection (IC) in US terminology

see just how much a supporting force is doing; a map will show *where* a CF has control, but rarely identifies *what* they are doing and *how much* impact they have. Consideration must be given to everything CF are doing and the impact that Transition will have on overall HN capacity. For example the delivery of tactical intelligence, the provision of aerial casualty evacuation, a search and rescue service, the organization of waste disposal, employment of locals or even the umpiring of local sporting events, all need to be handed over to the HN as part of the process.

8.   **Ensure enduring resources are not diverted simply to pursue Transition.** This demonstrates CF commitment to the mission as whole and sends a clear signal concerning CF intent to complete the mission to local and regional target audiences. CF must accept that they will continue to counter an aggressive insurgency throughout the process and premature re-focusing away from neutralizing insurgent elements could compromise Transition.

9.   **Always retain a HQ.** There will be pressure and inclination to disband HQ in a high-profile event leaving the logisticians behind to complete the close-down. This should be resisted. Retaining a HQ with an appropriate level of command will not only provide direction and discipline for the Transition process, but will also act as a focal point for external stakeholders. Often decisions of an operational or strategic level need to be made during Transition, and as a result sometimes the Transition tempo alters with little notice. A viable HQ with sufficient communications can staff such situations and adapt the plan accordingly.

10.   **Reinvest the dividends.** Each stage of the Transition will 'free up' some resource. In the time between the release of this asset and its extraction from theater, the asset can often be reinvested elsewhere in the AO (or process) to assist other parts of the Transition. This will help maintain momentum and efficiency particularly if this opportunity has been identified in sufficient time to permit the asset to reorganize, retrain and, potentially, redeploy.

11.   **Own and protect the influence campaign.** The physical Transition of authority from CF to HN must be underpinned by a progressive and comprehensive influence campaign which publicly highlights the successes of the HN as one of the main themes. Target audiences for this campaign are numerous and will require a variety of information operations (IO) and associated means to achieve success (see Figure 2.2 below). The narrative for the Transition process must be centrally coordinated, coherent across the whole force and spread across all LoE. The delivery

of the narrative is the responsibility of all involved parties.

Figure 2.2: A US example of using different media to communicate To various audiences

12.   Planning staff should also be aware that there may be a requirement to:

   a.   Improve the population's faith in HN civil and military security forces.

   b.   Implement identification programs to vet HN personnel, encourage participation in representative government, and validate professional credentials.

   c.   Assist local government in establishing procedures to resolve community disputes.

   d.   Support the delivery of free and fair elections for post-interim governance.

   e.   Support the restoration of basic services and other essential infrastructure.

f.   Improve economic development programs (i.e. local business and agriculture).

g.   Improve the economic forecast in the country (security, training, enterprise creation, financial literacy programs).

h.   Enhance relationships with local leaders and publicize coalition respect for key leaders and institutions; deference for HN successes, and (increasingly) HNSF in joint missions.

i.   Be prepared to provide assistance to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts by HN authorities and international organizations.

Logistic considerations

13.   Transition requires significant logistic effort in both planning and execution; the inclusion of logistic planners from the outset will help to maintain momentum. Critical to the logistic effort throughout the process will be the continuation of HN logistic capacity building. This involves developing logistic capacity through the provision of assistance and support and interaction with contractors/other agencies in enabling the necessary personnel skills and infrastructure requirements.

14.   Transition should not be considered as a stand- alone event but as a phase of the overall operation. For this reason, programs implemented during Transition are particularly vulnerable to failure after CFs reduce/re-roll/move into tactical overwatch or re-deploy, unless adequately supported and resourced. Evaluation of Transition is discussed in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 3

GETTING THE TIMING RIGHT

Introduction

1.   Although Transition from supporting nations to Host Nation (HN) signifies increasing stability within an area of operations, it should be recognized that any change is inherently destabilizing. There are those who will gain from change and those who will lose. Different visions of what is desirable and undesirable will exist and change may well be contested. In addition, change may create uncertainty and anxiety within the HN population. Those involved in any Transition will therefore wish to control or manage both the commencement of the change process and its progression. Ultimately, it must become the responsibility of the HN itself to manage the ongoing process of change. Part of any Transition, therefore, is the development of the state's capacity to manage both the actual Transition itself and the transfer of responsibility from external agents to its own entities.

2.   It is likely that such transfers will be staged or sequenced with some elements being transferred in their entirety at a specific time while other elements are transferred in part over a period of time. A HN government may, for example, take back responsibility for policy decisions from an intervening coalition on a certain day. However beneath this symbolic act, responsibility for lower level decisions may be transferred progressively, leading up to and following on from this date until the Transition process is complete.

3.   Even within the overall Transition process, transfer of lead security responsibility (TLSR) will be a political decision resulting in a complex cross grained operation in which ownership (and therefore control) of both the approach and the outcome gradually passes from one set of actors to another. Therefore, security Transitions are fundamentally different from other types of military or security operations and require a unique approach in planning and execution.

4.   Security Transitions are negotiated processes which can make them non-linear, asymmetric and dependent on political processes. In addition, interests will remain in a constant state of flux throughout, and as a result plans will change and flexibility throughout the planning, execution and assessment processes will be required in order to achieve success. Consequently the composition, posture and footprint of the force may need

to be rebalanced from a well-found campaign force to a more austere expeditionary force, which will have the ongoing effect of changing resource requirements. The effect on logistic support and enabler requirements will be a key consideration throughout this process.

Logistic planning

The point at which the military campaign identifies the conditions to begin Transition operations will have a bearing on logistic effort to support coalition forces. It is crucial that logistic planners are included throughout the Transition planning process. This is so that the logistic effort can:

> a.   Continue to provide unbroken support to force elements and identify any risks that can be mitigated by coalition partners (e.g. the provision of healthcare).
> b.   Continue to build HN logistic capability through partnering and mentoring and ensuring the sustainability of their institutions and supply chain.
> c.   Begin the planning phase for the redeployment of the force either intra or inter-theater.

It is likely that the logistic effort will be indirectly proportional to the daily operational effort as the operation moves through the Transition process. With the reduction in combat elements, logistical effort is likely to switch towards the support of more bespoke capabilities such as ISTAR and joint fires assets.

Transition initiation

5.   The timing of the Transition is primarily a political decision and is more than likely to be driven by political imperatives. However, the decision to start the Transition process will be informed by the various components of the force responsible for enabling the HN to assume control of state functions; these include those promoting development and governance, as well as the military component. Therefore, a fundamental aspect of the campaign will involve identifying conditions for the initiation of and progression through the stages of the Transition process. The aim of correctly selecting the tipping point at which Transition should commence is to identify timings and dependencies which have implications for the Transition in both a positive or negative way. This should facilitate staging, sequencing, prioritization, resource allocation and highlight shifts in potential influence which could be used as opportunities to advance the Transition whilst guarding against potential threats to the process.

6.   Logistic planners should, however, attempt to pre-empt these conditions. Work should be conducted at the start of any operation such that it allows the tempo of Transition to continue when the tipping point has been reached. Examples of this early work could include:

      a.   Total visibility of assets (including personnel and equipment).

      b.   The accountability of materiel and commodities within theater.

      c.   Contractor and HN coordination.

7.   A premature Transition is one that occurs prior to the point where HN capacity is inadequate to provide the required security or where it places undue stress on the overall progress toward full normalization. This could result in a fragile security situation being reversed. This will be relative to the level of threat posed. Transition will always occur in less than ideal circumstances, but Transitioning too soon can result in a deterioration of security that may force a requirement for supporting nations to re-intervene. Symptoms of a premature Transition environment may include:

      a.   The absence of a political settlement or a path to achieving one.

      b.   A lack of balance across the system as a whole, for instance a lagging judicial or penal capacity within the security sector.

      c.   The absence of adequate capability within specific government functions, including oversight and accountability mechanisms.

8.   There is no single point in time when the balance of decision-making and capability shifts between parties. Even when a declared Transition date exists, this will normally mark a stage in a process. In some cases Transition will be forced by external political factors (a change in political appetite within the international community, possibly through domestic drivers), by one particular event (as occurred in 1993 in Somalia) or by the HN itself (Democratic Republic of Congo in 2010). It will however, most likely be dictated by a gradual shift in the situation on the ground and an effective campaign assessment process can help to identify these shifts in order to ensure that the Transition plan adopts the best sequencing for success.

Historical example of external political factors – Netherlands withdrawal from Afghanistan

The Netherlands first deployed troops to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2003. The war in Afghanistan never gained popular support with the Dutch population. Although it had intended to withdraw its troops earlier, a coalition government announced its decision to extend the Dutch commitment until 2010. In 2010, Christian Social Democrats within the Coalition proposed to extend the mission beyond 2010. This was opposed by the Labour members of the Coalition who resigned *en masse*, toppling the government, and leading to the Dutch withdrawal from the mission.

Historical example of critical event – United States participation in Somalia

The US troop presence in Somalia begun under President Bush was initially sent to alleviate an acute starvation crisis brought on by political upheaval; however under the Clinton administration the mission had crept to searching for warlords and providing security. In October 1993, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down over Mogadishu, killing 18 soldiers. The loss of American military personnel during this operation evoked a public response. Television images of the bodies of American soldiers being dragged through the streets by Somalis were deemed too graphic. The Clinton Administration responded by scaling down US humanitarian efforts in the region and ultimately withdrawing from the mission.

Historical example of HN request - Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Throughout the security sector reform effort in the DRC, the Congolese government has sought to multiply the number of bilateral agreements and had since 2007 publicly expressed its preference for bilateral dealings in the defense sector. These agreements tended to focus on more operational aspects such as training and equipment vice institutional reform. The Government saw the multi lateral efforts posed by the UN and EU with its aspects pertaining to oversight and command and control, as a threat to its control over the security forces. As a result, in 2010, President Kabila called for the withdrawal of the UN Peacekeeping Force by mid 2011. The UN remains in the DRC with a changed mandate.

9.   Grouping elements of the Transition may increase the potential for disruption, while dispersing and sequencing elements of Transitions over a period of time will mitigate risk. When considering methods to determine the timing for the commencement of any part of the Transition process, possible approaches to consider are:

   a.   **Time frame.** The setting of a time frame for Transition will be politically driven; ideally, a time frame should be based on conditions reached; however, there may be an anticipated time frame to which partners are working, outlined by a national security or development strategy, or an international mandate;

   b.   **Milestones.** Outline any established milestones that will affect a Transition. These may include, but are not limited to:

      (1)   Elections.

      (2)   Mandates.

      (3)   Funding cycles.

      (4)   Unit rotations (both HN and coalition).

      (5)   Resource constraints.

      (6)   Seasonal issues such as harvest and weather patterns.

      (7)   Religious or cultural festivals.

      (8)   International summits and conferences.

      (9)   Contractor support and expiry of contracts.

   These may also be represented by the achievement of a specific level of capability within the organization to which responsibility will be passed. Transition is inherently a time of instability with multiple Transitions across different domains taking place and can create gaps which may be exploited by those opposed to them.

   c.   **Sequence and duration.** Consider the order in which functions and geographic areas should be transitioned and how long such developments will take. The key to sequencing is drawing out

the interdependencies identified in the design and planning process. This includes those that may fall outside of the security Lines of Effort (LoE)and consideration of any potential impact on logistical or enabler requirements, e.g. transitioning an land force unit before a HN government is capable of transparent and prompt salary payments. In addition, as Transition occurs at multiple levels, accordance with the higher level plan must be kept in mind. From the logistic perspective, staff should aim to provide timely and pertinent information to help inform decision making at the appropriate level. Significant impediments or milestones must be included within the overall Transition plan as they could alter the sequence of an operation and, in turn, its duration.

Transition management

10.   **General.** Transition management refers to those efforts taken to control the Transition process; to shape its direction, to manage the risks and mitigate negative impacts ensuring that change becomes enduring. Any Transition process is the result of a wide range of internal and external influences many of which may be unforeseeable and beyond the control of both HN and intervening elements. As such, Transition management does not lend itself to rational planning methodologies that rely on an ability to predict and control dynamics; instead, a more dynamic or evolutionary approach is required that emphasizes the importance of learning and adapting. Taking a more adaptive approach to planning and enabling organizational learning are key considerations for Transition management. In addition, consideration of potential constraints such as lead times for change, budget cycles, etc must also be considered.

11.   **Aspects of security responsibility.** Responsibility can refer to decision-making or the delivery of a secure environment.

     a.   **Decision making.** Decision making may occur at various levels within the chain of command and should be delegated to the appropriate level. In some cases it may be at the operational level with responsibility for decisions to do with overall objectives, priorities and resource allocations being transferred. In others, it may be at the higher level where responsibility lies for decisions about how policy is made. Alternatively it could mean that responsibility for tactical level management decisions related to the implementation of an agreed plan or strategy are taken at the point of delivery.

b.   **Security delivery.** During TLSR, the assumption of increased responsibility by HN security forces (HNSF) may affect the way that other actors conduct themselves in this fluid environment.   Whilst the security end-state is clear, the route to achieving this in the early stages of Transition may require the establishment or increase in the number of other security providers (e.g. private security companies, HN authorized militias or local reserve police units etc). This needs to be monitored and, as the security situation normalizes over time, the additional security providers need to be normalized.

Whole of government[4] approach to planning Transition

12.   Planning must include the HN. Integrated planning from the beginning of the campaign helps ensure that the activities of multiple agencies in initiating and managing Transition are coherent, mutually reinforcing and where necessary, de-conflicted to pursue a common goal. It is a process which at best allows a common strategic aim and objectives to be agreed; shared assessment to be made; activity sequenced and prioritized; and the magnitude of required resources applied. The process does not replace or subordinate any single departmental planning process; it aims instead to achieve coordination with the minimum addition of new methodologies and processes. It rests heavily on work that those departments would conduct in preparing their own plans. Planning should be conducted by delegates from participating organizations (incorporating those who will be involved in implementation) and must include the HN government and key national and multinational stakeholders. For example, the assessment of the preconditions associated with governance and development will be conducted by a number of other government agencies (OGAs), non-government organizations (NGOs) and the international community in addition to the HN.

Security and the whole of government (WOG) approach

13.   Transition requires continuity of stability and security for the HN. While international military engagement may be focused on the more immediate protection of the population and of the state from both internal and external threats, any security Transition must be implemented within a broader and longer-term, sector-wide approach to security and justice. For instance, a competent police force will be unable to deliver security without

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[4] Whole of government/ comprehensive approach/ unified approach in accordance with national definitions.

the parallel development of capable judiciary, prosecution, defense, penal and other supporting systems.

14.   Security Transitions typically occur within multinational and inter-agency environments which lend a high level of complexity to planning and execution. There may be multiple foreign military forces, several policing support teams (such as United Nations, civilian police and multiple donors and agencies working within a HN on security, governance and rule of law. This environment creates dependencies between actors and no one actor will have the freedom to plan and execute a security Transition alone. Military actors should take particular care to work with those agencies involved in long term state-building processes which will outlast any significant military presence.

Preconditions

15.   Regardless of the method chosen to begin Transition, a set of preconditions to ensure a successful transfer of responsibility should be established. In line with adopting a comprehensive approach to operations in general, a set of minimum preconditions related to security, governance and development should be established, monitored and assessed before the transfer process is initiated. The assessment of preconditions, combined with professional and sound judgment from the chain of command, as well as other relevant stakeholders, will provide the basis for deciding when an area or function is ready for Transition. Setting the conditions for Transition can only be achieved with the firm commitment, cooperation and coordination of stakeholders. A representative list of some possible preconditions across security, governance and development Lines of Effort can be found in Table 3-1 below.

Line of Effort	Precondition
Security	- Coalition patrols possible with reduced force protection - Coalition support to HNSF only required in emergency - HNSF perceived by the HN population to be legitimate and capable. - HNSF demonstrates a sufficient level of capability in accordance with established milestones.
Governance	- HN political leadership is perceived by the HN population as legitimate. - Local leadership controls their respective security situation. - Corruption/crime within the public administration is reduced to a level acceptable to the population and in accordance with national standards. - Effective rule of law system is in place and effectively operating (arrest, charge, detention, trial, and incarceration) based on national/traditional norms.
Development	- Development planning as part of a national strategy is underway. - Minor projects as part of that strategy are contracted, funded and in progress. - Funding by donors is channeled through HN ministries/departments. - Local development councils are established and effective. - Private investors, both local and international, are investing in new construction and development for profit.

Table 3-1: Examples of possible preconditions

Approval process

16.   While establishing preconditions is important, neither the preconditions by themselves, nor the assessment on the progress related to those preconditions are to be considered as absolute conditions. Within

the context of the established preconditions, and based on the specific circumstances within the local area of operations, the transfer of responsibility by function or area may require tailoring. Professional judgment by commanders and their OGA partners and the HN is essential. Preconditions should be seen as guidelines to decision makers and should be used with a degree of flexibility. When the preconditions are met and an area is deemed to be ready for Transition, there must be an established process among the stakeholders to monitor the achievement of those preconditions, nominate the area for transfer and achieve a consensus for that transfer to take place.

17.   Although TLSR describes the process where the HN takes the leading role for security, a broader intent is that the benefits of improved security, governance and development influence the surrounding areas. This includes providing an example of the benefits of backing a physical security plan, but also economic benefits through improved markets or direct infrastructure development. To enhance this effect, additional enabling conditions may be developed. All conditions are related to the enduring effects from the campaign plan. This allows a measurement of progress that is linked to the periodic assessment of campaign effects. It also prevents duplication of effort and enables the use of the same measurement of effectiveness and procedures that are already established.

Communicating the plan

18.   Throughout the process it is important to understand that judgment will be used to understand the risk and potentially adjust the speed of TLSR to the HN; it is equally important to ensure that the HN is ready and willing to assume those responsibilities. Failure to do so could result in regression that could result in the perception of strategic failure at home and a loss of confidence by the HN population. Even successful transfer to the HN could be misunderstood as disengagement or forced withdrawal due to the circumstance in the area of operation. Transition must be accompanied by a detailed and multifaceted influence campaign that starts well in advance to indicate the rationale for the transfer and then to support the establishment of HN institutions and agencies as legitimate, credible entities. Expectation management is an important aspect of the overall influence campaign, it should be emphasized throughout that while the HNSF may not have all the capabilities of the coalition, they are capable of dealing with the remaining threats.

Post Transition

19.   Once TLSR has occurred, it may be necessary to continue to provide an appropriately scaled military support package to the HNSF as they progress to being independently capable. This process ends when the HN security forces reach full operating capability and take responsibility for all security functions. The desired endstate is *the disengagement of external military forces at the behest of the HN once a secure environment has been established*. This may not necessarily be the end of all military support as activities are likely to continue through normal peacetime military engagement or alliance obligations, such as the provision of long-term training teams.

Planning considerations

20.   Planning considerations for Transition include:

     a.   Who are the key stakeholders in the Transition process? Who are the potential promoters and detractors? How can these be leveraged or mitigated respectively?

     b.   What key political, environmental, cultural or religious milestones/ events could affect the Transition process? So what?

     c.   Which aspects of security are best transitioned as a complete function? Which are best done incrementally?

     d.   Has the security Transition been coordinated with the other Lines of Effort?

     e.   What are the dependencies within the security and other lines of operation that could be affected by Transition or could affect the Transition process? What risks or opportunities do these present? What does it mean for the coordination and sequencing of Transition of these responsibilities?

     f.   Has a comprehensive assessments of systems been established based on measureable preconditions? Has a process for the nomination and approval of Transition been established?

     g.   How will Transition affect the requirements to support the force with regard to logistics and force enablers?

h.   Has an influence plan been established to support the Transition plan? Does it address HN and coalition target audiences at the appropriate levels?

i.   What forces will be required to support the HN post Transition? What force structure may be required for a potential intervention to support the HN? What is the long term plan for the further development of HN capacity?

j.   Logistic staff should keep in mind their responsibility for the following considerations:

    (1)   The continued provision of unbroken support to force elements and the identification of any risks that could be mitigated by coalition partners.

    (2)   The need to continue the development of HN logistic capability and capacity through partnering/ mentoring and ensuring the sustainability of the HN institutions and supply chain.

    (3)   Begin the planning phase for the redeployment of the force either intra or inter-theater.

CHAPTER 4

THE PHASES OF TRANSITION – A FRAMEWORK

1.   **Introduction.** Transition to Host Nation (HN) government control will be part of the successful endstate for any stabilization operation. It is primarily a political and politically led process. It should be a factor in all planning from the start of any such operation; rather than being seen as a separate activity within it. Early understanding and consideration of the requirements to return full authority and responsibility to the government should guide campaign planning and the activities of coalition forces (CF); however, each operation will have unique characteristics, so whilst this chapter will look at some generic phases of Transition, these will need to be adapted to the situation.

2.   The aim of this chapter is to illustrate generic phases for Transition, which can provide a framework for coalition planning on future operations.

Transition model

3.   **Transition phases.** Transition can comprise two broad phases; assessment and implementation. Once the Assessment of an area is complete it will move to Implementation. However, it should be noted that assessment will need to continue, in order to manage progress through Implementation. It should be further noted that the areas will become ready for Implementation at different times. It is likely that the HN government will declare areas for Transition as they are assessed to be ready.

Phase 1 - Assessment

4.   **Assessment.** The assessment phase for Transition will draw on local assessment of conditions and progress across the Lines of Effort (LoE). CF, civilian agencies (such as coalition's government personnel deployed to develop and mentor indigenous governance and development capabilities, and provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan), Host Nation security forces (HNSF), local government and development personnel are all likely to be involved in this process. These assessments will then inform the HN government's decisions on when and where Transition progresses.

5.   **Metrics.** The metrics used to assess progress towards and through Transition will depend upon the specific circumstances of the operation. They are likely to cover all LoE and will need to be capable of both

capturing the detail of an area as well as providing analysis of likely trends. Some illustrative Transition assessment metrics are at Annex E and show the range of different factors that may be considered during Transition. The metrics should be a combination of objective assessments, based on measurable and definitive data, and the subjective assessment of commanders. Objective and subjective metrics both have strengths and weaknesses, which will need to be balanced in order to reflect the situation accurately. Planners should expand their range of metrics to reflect any change in activities. For example, a new metric may be created to track progress on a new initiative; or a new indicator may be added to an existing metric if a new source of information becomes available. Without consistency in metrics, it will be very difficult to know if operations are making progress. Figure 4.1 illustrates how areas could be assessed against the LoE in paragraph 4 to determine their readiness to enter Phase 2. - Implementation

Illustrative Condition Ratings   Readiness to Begin Transition

Figure 4.1: Strategic assessment

Phase 2 - Implementation

6.   **General.** Phase 2 of Transition is Implementation and it is likely to follow the process outlined in Figure 4.2 below. Before Implementation, areas will need to have undergone the Phase 1 assessment and will need to be postured correctly. In general terms Implementation will move from coalition-led security and governance, through partnered, supported, mentored, enabled and finally sustainable conditions. At each stage further assessment will be required to ensure that the conditions are in

place to allow progression. Whilst local failures can be absorbed as part of the process; significant failures that lead to the regression of a stage are likely to have severe strategic implications and must therefore be mitigated.

Figure 4.2: Implementation – Illustrative Stages

7.   Progress through Transition itself will need to be judged against all the LoE to maintain balance, again with the HN government's and the population's assessment being the deciding factor in decisions. It is likely to follow a similar process to Phase 1, with similar metrics. It should be further noted that progress within areas is likely to differ. This will require flexibility both in approach, force posture and in the allocation of resources. Some areas will need additional support, be that training, resources or security provision in order to reach the next stage. The conditions described in the following paragraphs illustrate what the effects and capabilities might look like during the stages.

8.   **Influence on HN.** One of the challenges the coalition will face, particularly at the tactical level, will be how to maintain influence on the HN as Transition moves through its stages and coalition presence alongside HNSF and capabilities to support them are reduced. The mentoring network will become increasingly important through the stages in order to achieve this influence. HNSF command nodes will inevitably become the focus for coalition efforts to influence HNSF actions, and to maintain coalition situational awareness.

Command nodes.   In Afghanistan District and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers, OCC-D and OCC-P respectively, were established prior to Phase 2 - Implementation. The Afghan Police held primacy within these locations, but with the Army manning joint operations rooms. These have provided a focus for intra Afghan National Security Forces cooperation, ISAF influence and ISAF situational awareness.

9.   **Stage 0 – Partner.** Stage 0 can be seen as the conditions required to initiate Transition.

a.   **LoE.** During this stage the key conditions will be as follows:

(1)   **Security.** CF and HNSF are fully partnered, including the planning and conduct of operations. Assets should be shared wherever possible, to maximize strengths and mitigate capability gaps. Development of HNSF capabilities will be as much a priority as tackling security threats.

(2)   **Governance.** The HN should ideally have the lead by this stage, but may not have developed a full capacity. Coalition assets, the international community (IC) and non-government organizations (NGOs) are likely to be building and training indigenous capacity at all levels.

(3)   **Development.** Military/civilian (including commercial) led Reconstruction Teams are likely to lead development efforts. Funding will be sourced through a combination of central government provision and direct from IC and NGO actors, which whilst aiding development represents an unsustainable solution.

b.   **Capabilities.** The key considerations against the functions Command, Act, Sense Shield and Sustain are as follows:

(1)   **Command.** Command and control responsibility is likely to remain with coalition commanders, within the agreed parameters of command and control within the country. Authority to conduct operations may be transferred to HNSF commanders during this stage, within a supporting coalition framework.

(2)   **Act.** Operations should be fully partnered whenever possible during this stage, including the appropriate cooperation between elements of the HNSF (e.g. Army and Police). This should include the planning, briefing, rehearsal and exploitation of any operation.   This may require flexibility from coalition commanders; the tempo, nature and objectives of operations should be decided in agreement with HNSF commanders. The provision of reserves already established

within the operation is unlikely to change during this stage, though the establishment of a joint reaction force at this early stage is likely to bring rewards during later stages.

(3) **Sense.** The full range of coalition intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance[5] (ISTAR) should be available during this stage. Development of HNSF ISTAR capability, understanding what, if any, equipments are to be transferred to them; developing likely areas of strength (e.g. human intelligence (HUMINT)) and avoiding HNSF reliance on coalition assets will be key considerations. This will be most apparent in the more technological capabilities and critically J2 areas.   CF should not allow themselves to underestimate the potential force multiplication of HNSF HUMINT and cultural understanding at this time, as they will have a considerably better understanding of their country that CF are unlikely to match.

(4) **Shield.** CF are likely to benefit from the availability of the full range of deployed capabilities, including joint fire support, protected mobility and logistic support. The risk of developing HNSF dependency on these capabilities needs to be mitigated against, noting this may include logistic dependency on CF. Partnered forces should look to develop HNSF capabilities as well as conducting joint operations.

(5) **Sustain.** CF logistic support is unlikely to change during this stage. The HNSF may be reliant on coalition support at this stage however, development of the HNSF ability to sustain themselves should be addressed as early as possible. It will be key to their ability to develop an enduring capability beyond the coalition 's withdrawal.

10.   **Stage 1 – Support**.

a.   **LoE.** During this stage the key conditions will be as follows:

(1) **Security.** HNSF will take more of a lead in security planning, with CF continuing to partner with them, however ratios are likely to reduce. The coalition is likely to continue to provide some key capabilities and enablers, although planning

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[5] ISTAR equates to information collection (IC) in US terminology.

will have commenced by this stage to withdraw those that will not remain post Transition.

(2)   **Governance.** HN governance should be in the lead by this stage, but still with substantial coalition support, which will be seeking to build capacity, and strengthen capacity, structures and procedures.

(3)   **Development.** Reconstruction and development efforts should be firmly civilian led by this stage, potentially jointly between HN and coalition, IC and NGO personnel. There may be a requirement for military liaison, advice and coordination. There should be an increased focus on central government funding lines, looking towards sustainable development program.

b.   **Capabilities.**

(1)   **Command.** HNSF commanders will be given responsibility for specific areas during this stage, with the authority to conduct operations. Careful consideration will need to be given to the mechanisms for the command and control of coalition assets that provide support. For example, it is unlikely that coalition fire support assets would engage a target without a coalition joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) observer, coalition mission space management (if CF are on the ground) and a coalition commander to authorize the engagement. This is a potential source of friction for HNSF commanders which will need to be resolved during the planning stages.

(2)   **Act.** HNSF commanders should be leading planning and execution of operations at this stage, though it is likely that coalition commanders will still need to be fully embedded with them, which will be the HNSF route to coalition enablers. CF will continue to partner and support HNSF operations where necessary, though it may be that some areas require only specialist assistance by this stage.   Areas will continue to require a credible reserve with the ability to re-intervene if required. The size of this element will depend upon the situation, though this is a possible re-investment task for coalition troops released from partnering. Ideally, in HNSF areas an HNSF reserve should be used first with CF only deploying to prevent mission failure.

(3)   **Sense.** The maintenance of situational awareness (SA) will become more difficult and crucial during this stage. As the partnering footprint reduces, the ability to maintain it for both friendly and enemy forces will be increasingly tested. Full integration with HNSF capabilities, remembering that they are likely to understand the local situation better than coalition forces, will be essential. Without an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the situation the coalition will not be able to fully support HNSF and critically judge where additional support or re-intervention may be needed.

(4)   **Shield.** CF protection assets, notably ground based ISTAR, may start to reduce during this stage as partnering ratios and therefore the ground footprint reduce. For example it may have been that each HNSF sub-unit was partnered during stage 0 but by stage 1 the coalition may only provide a sub-unit to partner an entire HNSF unit. This will need to be compensated for through alternative assets, for example increased use of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and air ISTAR platforms. Additionally, increased utilization of HNSF assets, and the trust to rely upon them, will enhance both the shield and sense capabilities.

(5)   **Sustain.** As the coalition ground footprint reduces there is likely to be a reduced number of well established coalition bases. This may mean a move back to more expeditionary logistic support, with some coalition forces accepting reduced levels of logistic support. Embedding with HNSF is a method of mitigating this. HNSF logistic support will be fully tested during this stage, they should be largely self-sufficient though may still receive coalition support to ensure their logistic chains are effective. Civilian logistic support contractors may also be used to assist HNSF supply chains. Additionally, as the coalition footprint reduces there will be scope to re-invest coalition assets to support HNSF. The reduction of the CF footprint will add additional pressure on the medical chain and this must be factored into planning at this stage.

11.   **Stage 2 – Mentor.**

a.   **LoE.** During this stage the key conditions will be as follows:

(1)   **Security.** The threat should have been contained to a level that HNSF are capable of containing without coalition

partners for an area to be declared ready for stage 2. The HNSF will have full responsibility for security within those areas that have moved to stage 2. During this stage coalition partnering forces are likely to move to a role of tactical overwatch, leaving only mentors, advisors and enablers providing advice, training and access to coalition capabilities as required. This will allow either a reduction in numbers within the theater or re-investment in capability development or areas and functions that require it.

(2)   **Governance.** The coalition role in governance should have transitioned to one of advice by this stage.   It is likely that mentors will work within local governance structures, but the governance of an area will be conducted by the local authorities.

(3)   **Development.** By this stage development activities should be in the most part locally led, with support and advice from coalition agencies, the IC and potentially commercial organizations.   Efforts will continue to strengthen HN public financial management, with funding from central government.

b.   **Capabilities.**

(1)   **Command.** By stage 2, HNSF commanders will have full responsibility for their areas. The relationship between coalition mentors or advisors and their HNSF principle will require personal investment and will be key to both developing enduring HNSF capability and informing the coalition assessment process.

(2)   **Act.** The HNSF will lead on all operations by this stage, with coalition forces providing mentors, advisors and enablers. HNSF force footprints should be moving towards their enduring locations; e.g. Police focusing on population centers and army units providing depth, possibly forward mounting from regional formation sized bases. If not already established, coalition forces should be providing a reserve in tactical overwatch by this stage. There should be able to deploy rapidly to support HNSF if needed, and will be a key element in the force protection of potentially isolated coalition mentors.

Local reserve – The size and composition of reserves at this stage will be threat dependant. An example might be a sub-unit, located in the district centre, and able to move independently to support HNSF or isolated coalition forces. Deployment authority between coalition and HNSF commanders will need careful consideration.

(3)   **Sense.** By stage 2 it is likely that the majority of ground based coalition ISTAR assets will have been withdrawn. This will lead to an increased reliance on coalition Air and HNSF assets. The releasability of coalition products to HNSF will need to be addressed. SA will remain the key requirement to monitor campaign progress and assess the need for re-investment or, in the worst case, re-intervention. The coalition mentor and advisor chain of command will be crucial for maintaining SA, especially on HNSF intent. It is likely that mentors will become aware of both future plans and ongoing incidents before the coalition chain of command. Robust communications and intelligent understanding of command relationships will be required.

(4)   **Shield.** The coalition ground footprint will have considerably reduced by this stage. Key mentors and enablers will remain with HNSF, and will to a large degree rely upon them for protection. This is likely to carry risk. The structure and capabilities of mentoring teams (e.g. communications, access to ISTAR, Joint Fires, protected mobility and Medical support) will need to be carefully considered against the threat in the area within which they are to operate.

(5)   **Sustain.** Those forces deployed outside main operating bases will need to be logistically sustainable. This is likely to require acceptance of more austere conditions and further embedding with HNSF. If the threat remains such that ground movement remains difficult, alternative means such as support aviation or logistic nodes will need to be established. HNSF should be logistically self-sustaining in the forward areas by this stage; coalition forces may still be supporting their rear area logistics and re-supply. It should be noted that at this stage the ratio of combat to logistic coalition forces may have changed significantly.

Vignette – Transition lessons from RC(N) in Apr 11

On 20 Mar 11 there was well reported coverage of the burning of Qu'rans by a Christian Church leader in the USA. As a result, there were rising tensions in Mazar-e-Sharif (MeS) leading to civilian demonstrations in early April.

Within MeS, the Afghan Police had primacy for security within the district though formal Transition had not occurred, with ISAF forces in a posture to reinforce the ANSF when required. By mid-afternoon on 1 Apr a large crowd of about 3500 Afghans had formed in central MeS. The Afghan Police were content that the situation was under control and an offer from ISAF to provide overt support was turned down as it was thought that this might escalate any unrest within the crowd. By late afternoon the UN compound in MeS was under attack with stones from the crowd. ISAF again offered support, but the Provincial Chief of Police was sure that the situation was under control. Shortly afterwards the UNAMA compound was overrun, resulting in 12 killd in action, including 7 members of UNAMA, and 21 civilians wounded. At no stage did the Provincial Governor, the ANSF or UNAMA seek assistance from ISAF troops, despite repeated offers.

The key lessons drawn from the incident by RC(N) are:

- As the Afghans take more of a lead, there needs to be better ISTAR for ISAF to maintain situational awareness.
- The decision-making process for ISAF to re-intervene, reinforce the ANSF or evacuate civilians/OGDs/NGOs needs to be more effective, and thoroughly rehearsed.
- Allowing the ANSF to take the lead for security before they are ready has significant risks. Mitigation measures include:
    - Effective mentoring at all levels: Governor, ANA, AUP (including OCC-D/P)
    - Reliable communications
    - ISAF postured to rapidly intervene
    - While ISAF retains the responsibility for security, it must retain the ability to intervene unilaterally should the commander decide it necessary.

12.   **Stage 3 – Enable.**

a.   **LoE.** During this stage the key conditions will be as follows:

(1)   **Security.** The security situation should be continuing to improve and moving towards a level that is considered manageable in the longer term. The HNSF will continue to have full responsibility for their areas. CF mentoring and advising will reduce to key posts only, likely to be main HNSF locations. CF are likely to move to a position of operational overwatch (see grey box below).

(2)   **Governance.** By stage 3 coalition efforts in support of governance should be focused on bolstering nationwide capabilities. Local governance structures should be well established, though key posts may still need advice and support.

(3)   **Development.** The HN's central government should be directing development efforts by this stage. They are likely to continue to require the international community's support and finance which is likely to be delivered through NGO and Consulates into central government funding lines for disbursement through the HN chain.

b.   **Capabilities.**

(1)   **Command.** As in stage 2, with the numbers of coalition advisors likely to have reduced to key posts only, these are likely to be at the operational level.

(2)   **Act.** HNSF will lead and conduct all security operations. CF may hold forces at readiness within theater for contingency operations at this stage.

> **Operational overwatch** – This may include the provision of a series of battle group sized reserves, located within theatre, at key main operating bases and able to deploy to support HNSF throughout the AO. Ideally, these will be fully partnered forces, on a notice to move of approximately 12 hours. Authority to deploy these forces is likely to lie at regional command level or higher.

(3)   **Sense.** National assets, airborne surveillance and HNSF will provide situational awareness by stage 3. The provision of detailed tactical understanding will rest with the HNSF, with the coalition remaining informed through the remaining mentors.

(4)   **Shield.** By stage 3 there will be few CF deployed outside main HNSF bases and the force protection of those that do deploy will require detailed planning. Additionally, the coalition may need to hold contingency plans (CONPLANs) to support NGOs that may be operating in support of the local population.

(5)   **Sustain.** As CF are likely to be located in main operating bases, and the logistic burden is likely to be relatively light by this stage.   Logistic effort, if not already, will need to focus on the re-deployment of coalition assets from theater.

13.   **Stage 4 – Sustain.**

a.   **LoE.** During this stage the key conditions will be as follows:

(1)   **Security.** The security situation should have stabilized to the extent that the HNSF are able to maintain order without coalition assistance, noting that security threats may persist but at manageable levels. Police forces will be focusing on local norms for policing duties, leaving the army to focus on any non-criminal security threats. CF will have moved to a position of strategic overwatch (see grey box below).   It is likely that mentors and trainers will remain to continue to develop long term capabilities, potentially through defense cooperation agreements, but these personnel are unlikely to be directly involved in operations.

(2)   **Governance.** The HN government will provide the full governance function at central and local levels. The IC is likely to continue to provide advice and funding through strategic partnerships, as with any developing country.

(3)   **Development.** Development will be entirely led by the HN government, although the IC is likely to remain a strategic partner, providing aid, enablers and advice as requested by the HN government.

b.   **Capabilities.**

(1)   **Command.** By this stage, command and control will rest entirely with HNSF and the government.

(2)   **Act.** Operations will be planned and conducted by the HNSF, with mentoring from coalition forces only at the highest levels, and for as long as they are requested. Re-intervention is likely to be a strategic level decision, requiring consultation across the coalition and, potentially, the IC. The coalition will maintain strategic overwatch for as long as the situation demands it.

> **Strategic overwatch** – The size and composition of a strategic reserve, able to re-intervene by stage 4 will be dictated by the assessed threats and available coalition forces. It is likely to be held out of theatre and be at least battle group in size. Its deployment is likely to require agreement from the HN government and the IC.

(3)   **Sense.** The situation will primarily be monitored by the government's own resources. National level assets may remain in overwatch to assist the government and monitor the situation.

(4)   **Shield.** CF will no longer be employed in operations by this stage, any mentors or trainers that are in theater will require risk assessment and appropriate security procedures; these are likely to primarily rely on HNSF.

(5)   **Sustain.** A limited logistic footprint is likely to be required to support any mentors or training staff that remain in the country.

Redeployment of the force

14.   **General.** Whilst redeployment from theater should be viewed as a separate operation to Transition, the two are likely to be closely linked. The logistic burden of removing coalition assets from theater, especially after a long term and well founded campaign will be considerable. Logistic timelines will therefore need to be established early. The political aspirations to draw down troop numbers in theater as a campaign moves to its close are likely to be a factor in this planning.

15.   **Key considerations.** Other factors for this phase of the operation could include:

a.   Early engagement with coalition partners to ensure synchronization.

b.   Equipment and materiel management to ensure total asset visibility.

c.   Awareness of the strategic policy for the sale, gifting, destruction or return of equipment.

d.   Understanding off the physical process of how personnel and equipment will be moved out of theater and the means for supporting this.

e.   Preparation of the Home (and/or staging) Base to receive personnel, equipment and materiel.

f.   Early engagement with contractors if there are changes to the requirement and thus try to alleviate any exposure to contractual costs.

16.   **Re-deployment timeline.** The timeline for the re-deployment of troops and assets from theater is likely to be both conditions and politically led. The pace at which re-deployment can occur will depend upon a number of conditions including size of the force, routes and methods of movement available, what, if any, enduring presence is to remain, what, if any, equipment is to be gifted to the HNSF or written off in theater.

17.   **Re-investment or surge task.** Preparing for re-deployment is likely to require surges of manpower, whether for specific specialties or general duties. This can either be a task for troops re-invested within theater or may require specific surges of specialists to meet a specific need.

CHAPTER 5

OBSTACLES

> *Transitions are difficult endeavors, and obstacles are numerous throughout the process. Differing interests, objectives and priorities are inherent to the process and pose unique challenges. Others are self-imposed. Organizations' cultures and firewalls, over classification and lack of information sharing, under resourcing, over resourcing, overly complex and counterproductive funding authorities, lack of or inadequate legal authorities, poor organizational structures and management practices, inadequate education and training, and resource competition are common examples of the latter. Less common are the problems associated with typical intervention and Transition mindsets. Often, outsiders' "best intentions" for the Host Nation create the greatest impediments to progress by focusing on unrealistic goals or corrupting the economy by an influx of inflationary resources. In a similar manner, too large a presence, regardless of the tactical good done, may be strategically counterproductive. The paradox of best intentions is that the whole is often less than the sum of its parts.*
>
> Harry R. (Rich) Yarger, Ph.D. Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute

Introduction

1.   This Chapter addresses the sources of instability that complicate Transition. While these unstable conditions can be viewed as obstacles, they must also be considered as planning considerations. Although Commanders and their staff plan for a smooth way forward to Transition, obstacles will be present and must be mitigated for the Transition to be successful. These obstacles, regardless of how superficial they appear should not be overlooked, because they have the potential to grow. When one challenge presents, others will follow. Commanders and their staff must deal with each case of instability in order to prevent a snowball effect which destabilizes the overall Transition.

Understanding root causes of instability

2.   Challenges can be generally classified as **contingency fractures** and **resolution fractures**.

3.   **Contingency fractures** are things which go wrong with one of the planned steps of the operation, and can therefore be anticipated and mitigated. Hence, they are able to be considered *as a contingency*. This kind of problem is most damaging when it evolves from the failure of a program designed to have an immediate and positive impact on the local population. In the logistic environment, this is most likely to involve the disruption of the force particularly if it involves a 3rd Party (e.g. a contractor or another country). The identification of these risks allows for mitigation and the formulation of contingency plans designed to prevent disruption to operations.

Potential roots of contingency fractures:

- A Host Nation (HN) population lacking faith in their organic security forces at the time of Transition.
- The assistance provided to a local leader in raising a local security force, which may succeed at the local level in providing legitimacy, security and trust; but undercut the national governments security initiatives.
- The awakening of dormant forces or the emergence of new hostile actors, which may reverse the progress brought about by the campaign, and possibly necessitate a future re-intervention.

4.   The most critical contingency fracture is a failure to provide security to the population. Without a solid security core, stabilization operations cannot build critical partnerships between security forces and the population. Civilian reconstruction efforts will not be deployed to maximum effect without freedom of movement in the impacted HN areas. Local governance will not be able to gain the trust of the populace to affect governance. Without access to the social sector, coalitions will find Transition extremely difficult.

Historical examples where contingency fractures were the single point failure in operations:

- Democratic Republic of Congo. Failure to recognize the importance of support to security sector reform in advancing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program resulted in paralysis of the DDR program.

- Haiti. The monitoring and evaluation program for DDR failed to define *objective* indicators. While the program was a success based on the subjective metrics utilized, ex-combatants were not actually reintegrated in a sustainable manner.

5.   Commanders and their staff must remember that these contingency fractures are not well defined breaking points, but splintering fissures that can reach across Lines of Effort (LoE) if left unchecked. Vulnerabilities that spring from these fissures are difficult to address during compressed Transition timelines and Commanders and staff are cautioned to consider carefully which risks they will accept, which ones will need to be mitigated and the associated operational impact. For example, a delay in improving transportation infrastructure may be a risk that commanders and staff are willing to accept due to timeline constraints. Commanders and staff might expect this decision to have ramifications only for the infrastructure LoE. However, and by means of an example, when the Kabul to Kandahar highway was restored in Afghanistan, evidence confirmed that the effort impacted positively on the security, diplomatic, economic, *and* governance LoE by:

    a.   Extending the government's influence locally (and internationally through media coverage).

    b.   Improving public opinion and ease of commute to workplaces.

    c.   Hindering insurgent force capability to move undetected or waylay civilians.

    d.   Growing the economic sector as suppliers extended their logistical reach and access to cities and markets.

6.   **Resolution fractures** are things which go wrong *outside* the planned steps of the operation, and can rarely be anticipated or mitigated. Often referred to as strategic shock, this kind of fracture may happen in the area of operations (an assassination), back at the coalition force's (CF) home country (failure of government), or in a neighboring area (natural disaster). For example, the volcanic eruption in Iceland in 2010 caused significant disruption to flights in and out of Europe and thus to the flow of casualties, personnel and equipment. Although this instance was unforeseen, the creation of contingency plans can go some way to mitigating the effect of these types of shocks.

Another example of this type of challenge is loss of coalition/ national will prior to the completion of stabilization or Transition. In such cases, coalition nations may have no choice but to Transition ahead of the planned timeline and without achieving stabilization objectives

- Stakeholders will be concerned that such an event might trigger a contingency fracture by increasing anxiety over the compressed Transition timeline
- Stakeholders may fear that ex-combatants or hostile forces will lay dormant until coalition forces depart

7.   While commanders and staff will have to determine the best response according to the merits of the situation and within tactical and doctrinal guidelines, the proactive use of Influence Activities (IA) will help mitigate against resolution fractures during Transition.

Communicating the Transition

8.   Effective implementation of a multi-facetted influence campaign will require access to civil affairs experts and media strategists, and a solid relationship with the public media - both local and international. While a successful media campaign cannot abbreviate the Transition process, IA can succeed in providing a more positive frame to the Transition.

9.   IA are a viable option for commanders and staff to better frame Transition events. CF can use IA campaigns to:

    a.   Increase visibility on HN successes.

    b.   Combat propaganda campaigns.

    c.   Improve outcomes for HN economic initiatives.

    d.   Counter rumors and negative publicity.

    e.   Alert the population to programs, services and incentives.

10.   The success of Transition lies not only in planning for the transfer of authority, but in the foundations laid by preceding operations. This means

that the best way to mitigate obstacles to Transition is by including Transition as part of the (open ended) initial campaign plan. Funding limitations, political pressures and HN inertia will combine to frustrate stabilization operations.   However, resources well invested in stabilization initiatives, buoyed by a good intelligence effort, will provide maximum return on investment. The more costly alternative, in both human and fiscal capital, is to proceed to Transition without assessing, recording, and engaging the challenges.

Obstacles

10.   Contingency fractures can include:

a.   HN security forces (HNSF) capacity.

b.   Elections fraud in post-interim government.

c.   Poor communication of the Transition plan to the HN.

d.   Loss of will of the international community.

e.   Continuation of armed violence.

f.   Economic instability.

g.   Legitimacy of HN government.

h.   Population expectations.

i.   Loss of momentum.

j.   Confusion about ownership of the process.

k.   Dependency.

l.   Lack of physical security.

m.   Corruption.

n.   Lack of HN engagement.

o.   Border disputes.

p.   Language barriers.

q.   Humanitarian flow on effects (displaced persons).

r.   HN and their interlocutors' agendas.

s.   Loss of access to bordering countries including their MSRs, ports, airfields or other infrastructure.

t.   Loss of, or interruption in, the supply of key bulk commodities (e.g. fuel and water).

11.   Resolution fractures can include:

a.   Sudden commitment of resources to another theater.

b.   Legal restrictions on freedom of action.

c.   Loss of financial backing.

d.   Loss of intelligence sharing.

e.   Changing missions in CF.

f.   Loss of real estate in HN.

g.   Contractor failure (HN and CF).

h.   Natural disaster.

i.   Change of government in CF states.

j.   Changes in government or attitudes in neighboring countries.

CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION OF TRANSITION

Transition

1.   As emphasized throughout this handbook, Transition is a process rather than an event, and must be constantly evaluated to ensure that it remains in line with the existing political framework, and keeps moving forward.

2.   To be effective, the nature of Transition requires close evaluation of the environment and all stakeholders. As the environment and stakeholders can change dramatically from one area to another in a country that has been destabilized through warfare, at each level of command the local environment and different factors will need to be included in the detailed plan released at that level.

3.   Military forces within a coalition are primarily responsible for the stabilization of the security situation. However, in order to make the security Transition sustainable in the long term, the Transition must be underpinned by adequate governance and development and the logistic capacity to support this. Any evaluation of the Transition process must therefore include an evaluation of governance, development and security and the associated means of support to ensure success through all stages of the Transition and this is best achieved by representatives from each of the Lines of Effort (LoE).

Conditions

4.   Ideally the Transition plan will outline a set of conditions that should be met before proceeding from one stage of the Transition to the next. These conditions will need to be at a level in each stage where they reflect a sustainable situation so that the Transition process will not regress. To ensure a sustainable and irreversible Transition, these conditions should be developed between the local government, the coalition and should, where possible, include all appropriate stakeholders. Critically, it should be the Host Nation (HN) that makes the final decision as to whether the conditions for the Transition process have been met, ideally through a consultative process. The conditions set must represent solutions that are both acceptable and sustainable to the HN.

5.   Each LoE is likely to advance at a different pace. Improvements in security LoE will generally set the conditions for advances in other LoE.

For example, the local security environment may need to be enhanced before a judicial system can be implemented to manage the policing of the population. However, the interdependent nature of the LoE in the overall Transition plan means that to ensure there is no dislocation, the conditions need to reflect the requirements of each stage. Some of the likely conditions are listed at the end of this chapter.

Metrics

6.   As well as outlining the conditions for each stage of the Transition, the plan must include the metrics used to measure each condition. These metrics will need to be developed in more detail as close to the point of delivery as possible. It is likely that each condition will have a number of metrics that will be used to measure the conditions. These will provide commanders with an awareness and a degree of ownership of the condition and how far it is progressing towards that required for the Transition plan to progress. An example is below in Figure 6.1.

District level police training for Stage 2 (Mentoring)

Condition
At the commencement of stage 2, police training should be established with facilities and programs that can be sustained by the local HN police trainers.

Metrics
The following metrics will be used to measure this condition:

- The number of HN police trainers – able to meet all course requirements and cover local sick and annual leave.

- The number of courses fully developed and resourced using local HN budgets.

- The number of police qualified on courses and operating at district and provincial level.

- The number of reported criminal activities.

- The number of arrested criminals.

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7.   This list is by no means exhaustive and should be developed with input from all stakeholders to ensure that the final metrics provide a picture that is acceptable to all. They should be developed early, continually reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted. They should be monitored/ tracked

by all stakeholders (both in theater and, using reach back, in home stations for long term continuity purposes). An illustrative assessment and metrics table for major LoE is at Annex E.

Objective and subjective metrics

8.   The identification of metrics is likely to include both objective metrics (those that can be measured), and subjective metrics (those where the final measurement is an opinion as much as a measurement). Ideally there should be more objective measurements as any subjective measurements can be misinterpreted and are subject to the personal bias of the reporter.

9.   Care must be taken when framing the metrics for measuring Transition as even objective measurements can give a subjective picture if they are not fully descriptive. For example a measurement of the number of police trained is a clear objective measurement, however if it is not linked into the level of the course and the employment once they are trained then it can give a false subjective impression. It is self evident that having 200 police trained to a low level and sitting in barracks is not nearly as effective for Transition as having 50 police trained to a higher level and operating within the towns and villages of the district.

10.   Planners need to examine the basic metrics, assess how these are perceived at the various levels and then consider what they mean to the Transition process as a whole. It may be that a particular metric affect more than one condition and this must be taken into account when considering the overall picture.

Review

11.   To ensure that the Transition plan continues to be effective and meet the requirements of all stakeholders it must be continually reviewed. This review must also include the evaluation of the metrics and conditions used to ensure its validity. An ongoing review should encompass all stakeholders and be applied across all LoE. Where a review identifies there is a requirement to change the Transition plan, this change must be reflected across the conditions and metrics of the plan as well.

Conditions which can be assessed and measured

12.   **Security.**

- State of the local insurgency.

- Violence levels and trends.

- Freedom of movement (local population, HN security forces (HNSF), coalition forces (CF) etc).

- Security of the population.

- HN military operational effectiveness.

- HN police operational effectiveness.

- HN military institutional capacity.

- HN police institutional capacity.

- Availability of enablers.

- Development of HNSF capabilities.

- Command and control abilities at different district/ provincial level.

- Command and control relationships with higher commands.

- District and provincial civil/ military coordination.

- Public perception of security.

13. **Governance.**

- Public confidence in the local government organizations.

- Rule of law initiatives.

- Levels of corruption.

- Local government capacity.

- Local government capabilities.

- Linking of local government with national government.

- Judicial capacity.

- Establishment of local institutions.

- Freedom of movement.

- Provision of basic services, (water, power, sewerage).

- Provision of other services (postal, rubbish collection, communications).

- Budgeting and compliance.

- Public perception of governance and democratic processes.

14. **Development.**

- Foundations for attracting private sector investment.

- Local engagement in development initiatives.

- Development of economic infrastructure.

- Level and origin of funding.

- Non-government organizations (NGO) and other government organizations (OGA) involvement.

- Program alignment with national priorities.

- Improved program development in key ministries.

- Public perception of development.

- Development of human capital (educational infrastructure, courses, teachers' salaries, school buses, colleges).

15. **Logistics.**

- Asset visibility of both personnel and materiel.

- Equipment visibility and its condition.

- HN logistic capability and capacity.

- Development of HN medical and health services.

- Ability to reconstitute force elements for either redeployment or the next operation.

HEALTH ADDENDUM TO TRANSITION PLANNING HANDBOOK

Introduction

1.   The purpose of this addendum is to outline the health specific issues that relate to transition planning. Current practice sees transition planning conducted within distinct national frameworks that are then nested within the overall theater level campaign plan. This has resulted in coalition operations being poorly aligned with a coherent coalition framework rarely established. Publication 371 is designed to provide an ABCA framework for the conduct of transition planning. This addendum will outline the health specific considerations to be incorporated into the overall transition plan.

2.   The development of a coherent ABCA methodology for the conduct of transition operations will also assist in the integration of other government agencies (OGA) and non-government organizations (NGO). Interaction between the military, OGA and NGO communities is rapidly increasing within the health space in contemporary conflict and the clear articulation of transition priorities and methodology will ensure scarce health resources are not wasted through duplication.

3.   The provision of health service support (HSS) to the local population is a contentious and potentially difficult consideration in most operations. Once established, however, HSS quickly becomes an integral service to the local population and heavily relied upon, sometimes at the expense of utilizing and further developing indigenous HSS capability. The removal and/or transition of coalition HSS during transition therefore needs to be carefully planned and deliberately executed. A significant level of 'expectation management' must be included in this planning as the sensitivity of HSS, irrespective of who provides it, exists from the tactical to the strategic level and is integral to protecting the influence campaign.

Aim

4.   The aim of this addendum is to provide clear guidance for planning the transition of health functions within a coalition environment.

Target audience

5.   This addendum is intended for commanders and their staffs deployed to national and coalition headquarters (HQ) from battle group to theater level. It is designed to assist with planning the military health aspects of transition within a whole of government (WoG) approach.

Other publications

6.   This addendum should be read in conjunction with the following ABCA publications:

        a.   Planning Handbook (ABCA Publication 371);

        b.   Security Force Capacity Building Handbook (Edition 2);

        c.   Coalition Operations Handbook (ABCA Publication 332);

        d.   Coalition Health handbook (ABCA Publication 256);

        e.   Coalition Logistics Handbook (ABCA Publication 323);

        f.   Coalition Intelligence Handbook (ABCA Publication 325); and

        g.   ABCA Report 152 – Influence Activities.

Transition lines of effort

7.   Successful transition requires planning across multiple lines of effort (LoE). The temptation for military planners to concentrate solely on the transition of security responsibilities results in decreased efficiency across concurrent LoE. Effective transition planning must synchronize multiple LoE such as development, economy, governance and security. Health planners are faced with additional complexity as the health LoE directly influences all concurrent LoE.

8.   Military health planners are also faced with the difficulty of transition planning being conducted in accordance with a political time imperative. The desired operational plan may not be politically expedient and may not align with the resources provided by coalition partner governments for completion of the military mission. Transition of the health LoE will also require greater interaction with host nation (HN), OGA and NGO participants to ensure the coalition military force remains supported whilst balancing the HN requirement to support the dependant population.

Principles

9.   The principles of transition assist health planners ensure they have considered the full spectrum of eventualities in relation to transition of the health LoE. Whilst the principles provide a sound framework all planning should be progressed taking the unique local situation into account. Health considerations against the principles of transition are:

        a.   **Transition is continuous, not time based.** Transition is a process rather than an event. Progression must be based on achievement of

prescribed conditions in relation to health infrastructure, equipment and training. Successful achievement of prescribed outcomes in these areas will ensure that the transition to HN will be conducted at a time when they are capable of achieving health support to the dependant population.

b.   **Start at the bottom.** Transition should occur from the lowest level and then build up. Transition of primary health care services at the local level will be:

(1)   highly visible to the local population;

(2)   utilizes a minimum of equipment, resources and training;

(3)   is easier to measure; and

(4)   cultivates a sense of self-determination amongst HN population.

This will then ensure HN engagement is maximized for future phases of transition.

c.   **Thin out, don't hand off.** A progressive transition of services helps to maintain public confidence and assists the developing health service provider grow capability. In alignment with the first principle of continuous transition the HN capability can assume greater responsibility for services as capability increases until full assumption of responsibility is achieved.

d.   **Maintain situational awareness and points of influence.** Information in relation to the geographic location of injuries to local nationals and coalition forces provides a valuable inject to the all-source intelligence fusion cell. As transition progresses, plans must be made to source this information from HN agencies or alternate intelligence gathering techniques need to be considered to ensure intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets are able to maintain level of situational awareness in support of the commander.

e.   **Transition institutions and functions as well as geographic areas.** Whilst the principle of starting from the bottom in transition has already been discussed it is essential to ensure in the later stages of transition the national institutions and public services required to support new capabilities into the future are also established. This is critical in ensuring clinical standards are appropriately governed to an agreed standard in all geographical regions within the HN.

f.   **Ensure enduring resources are not diverted simply to pursue transition.** Scarce health resources are sometimes targeted for priority support to coalition forces which reduces their ability to support transition

to HN health service providers. A steadfast commitment to maintaining steady levels of health support is critical to building HN confidence in the ability of the coalition to see through the mission until the end.

g.   **Always retain a HQ.** The temptation to disband HQ's elements during transition for political purposes must be resisted. A fully enabled HQ with control of requisite operational levers is essential to enabling the casualty regulation function for deployed forces. Any dilution or disbandment of HQ's elements may adversely affect casualty evacuation and the treatment continuum, which will significantly impact the morale of coalition soldiers.

h.   **Reinvest the dividends.** During transition heath capabilities will become available as their designated region/sector transitions to a host nation system. Prior to return to home location these assets can be used to advantage in regions/sectors that are transitioning at a slower rate or could benefit from additional assistance.

i.   **Own and protect the influence campaign.** The coalition force will generate a comprehensive influence campaign to highlight the successful transition of security and services to the HN. As a highly visible and emotive topic health has the ability to provide significant impetus in winning over public support to new HN governance and management frameworks.

Timing

10.   The timing of transition is critical to ensuring the success of the overall operation. A medical risk assessment needs to be conducted to identify the potential risk areas during transition to ensure the timing of health transition does not adversely affect the overall operational plan. Some areas that should be considered within the risk assessment include:

a.   As health and evacuation asset ratios dissipate in-line with reduced densities of coalition forces, evacuation times might increase. Therefore, the maintenance of evacuation assets may be required to increase in order to cover the reduction of medical treatment facilities (MTFs) in the area of operation (AO) (hub and spoke coverage) to ensure that clinical timelines are adhered to.

b.   Potential spikes in casualty numbers as a result of increased logistic road movement supporting retrograde operations.

c.   Expected spikes in enemy combatant attacks during the transition phase resulting in increased casualty numbers.

d.   Contract, OGA and NGO health capabilities that can be utilized to assist in HN health transition.

11.   It is essential transition planners retain situational awareness of the development of HN capabilities across all echelons of care to ensure transition occurs as soon as HN capability is postured to take primacy for service delivery.

12.   Particular care needs to be taken so health transition is not conducted prematurely. Health care is a highly visible component of deliverable public services and any failure of HN to deliver a standard of health care that its citizens would define as suitable or appropriate will result in a loss of public confidence which could destabilize transition efforts across all LoE.

13.   It is critical HN, OGA and NGO are included in the transition planning process. Close liaison will ensure coalition forces correctly apportion resources across each of the LoE to achieve the most efficient transition possible. The ability to leverage the large number of OGA and NGO who operate in the health development space can significantly reduce the burden on coalition health elements who can then focus effort on health support to deployed coalition elements and redeployment of surplus capabilities.

14.   As detailed in the first principle of transition, care should be taken to ensure transition is only progressed on meeting defined pre-conditions as opposed to politically driven timelines. The ability to clearly articulate transition pre-conditions and then implement measures of effectiveness that can be assessed by all engaged parties (coalition forces, HN, OGA and NGO) will ensure all parties concur on the tiered handover of responsibilities at a time that provides the best possible chance for success.

Phases

15.   The two phases of transition outlined in the transition handbook are equally as applicable to the transition of health. Consideration should be given to the following factors:

   a.   ***Phase 1 (Assessment).*** This is often a difficult task for coalition force health professionals. The assessment needs to establish the conditions that would be assessed as reasonable and suitable for health service standards within the context of the HN. This will mean the assessment will often draw a baseline at well below the standard delivered in the coalition forces home country. Whilst 'best practice' solutions are desirable consideration needs to be given to the ability of the HN to establish and then support the costs of health capabilities developed to that standard.

   b.   ***Phase 2 (Implementation).*** This phase will see a gradual transition through 4 stages:

      (1)   Supported – HN should commence taking a lead role in health service delivery. Coalition forces, OGA and NGO elements will provide key capabilities that have not yet been developed. HN

should be taking the lead in policy development and clinical governance.

(2)   Mentor – HN should take responsibility for health service delivery. Coalition forces, OGA and NGO should be providing mentors to assist in developing the skills and education of HN service providers.

(3)   Enable – HN should have full control of health service delivery. Mentoring and education from coalition forces, OGA and NGO should be scaled back as HN mechanisms take control of ongoing professional development and education of health care providers.

(4)   Sustain – At this stage coalition forces, OGA and NGO should have withdrawn from all areas of health service delivery. The only exception may be some clinical specialties which HN will require years to develop. Additional assistance on request from HN may be required in these specialist fields whilst training and education programs are developed to resolve the deficiencies in the long-term.

Conclusion

16.   The Transition Handbook provides commanders and their planning staff with a conceptual framework around which coalition planning can occur. The ability to articulate a coalition transition plan will ensure that individual troop contributing nations do not work to differing ends during the conduct of transition. This shared purpose will ensure HN responsibility across all LoE is synchronized to minimize the risk of failure which can have long-term consequences on local population confidence in coalition forces and their developing HN government. The ability to consider specific health risks is critical to the commander as health service delivery is a highly visible public service that can have a disproportionate effect on public confidence.

TRANSITION CASE STUDY

IRAQ – OP BROCKDALE

Overview

1.   The UK's political strategy for a 'Transition to a bilateral partnership' with Iraq was announced by the Prime Minister on 22 Jul 08. UK forces had been in Iraq since early 2003 in a variety of different incarnations and strengths. On 16 Mar 09 when the Joint Force Logistic Command, deployed to Iraq, there was a Divisional sized force of nearly 5,000 troops in Iraq, with the associated equipment and infrastructure to support a high-intensity, counter insurgency operation. By 31 Jul 09, there was nothing but a handful of British troops under a NATO banner. This was due to the excellent foundation laid by Headquarters Command UK Amphibious Forces and 20 Armoured Brigade (20 Armd Bde), with the final stages of the execution of the redeployment completed by the Joint Force Logistic Command (JFLogC).

Relevance

2.   This case study will demonstrate the following aspects of the handbook:

  a.   The security Lines of Effort (LoE) includes a **comprehensive package of support to the Host Nation (HN) in which logistic support is integral**.

  b.   **Effects of sequencing the timing of the operation**. Logistic planners must be involved from the outset during Transition in order to ensure integration into the overall plan.

  c.   The **challenge of fractures in the process** such as the role played by 3rd party states, contractors and other coalition partners.

The story

3.   In Aug 08 The JFLogC was tasked with "Operation BROCKDALE" and was given the simple mission of "Extracting UK forces from Iraq and to do so in good order." Commander JFLogC's mission was to:

  a.   Take over and complete UK Transition.

b.   Ensure the return of all equipment, materiel holdings and removable infrastructure.

c.   Conduct the transfer of functional responsibility for command, governance and accounting to designated stakeholders.

d.   Close accounts, contracts and recover to UK.

e.   Sustain the enduring UK lay down in Iraq.

4.   The JFLogC arrived in theater in Mar 09 having had the previous 9 months to conduct essential planning and preparation required. Their plan included **4 stages**:

a.   **Shape** – through "Aggressive housekeeping", the backloading of surpluses and a transfer from a campaign mentality towards a more expeditionary approach.

b.   **Extract** – kit and equipment was extracted into the COB in Basra and then across the border into Kuwait.

c.   **Recover/ recuperate/ redeploy** – kit and equipment was then either flown or shipped back to the UK where it went through a rehabilitation process before being place back on the shelves.

d.   **Operational closure** – this activity ensured that accounts were closed, audit trails finalized, records archived and residual tasks transferred to their enduring custodians.

Relevance

5.   This case study will demonstrate the following aspects of the handbook:

a.   Role of Logistics across the security **LoE.**

b.   Following the **principles** and conducting an analysis of the multi-stakeholder environment.

c.   Conducting shaping activities during the Transition phase such as "Aggressive Housekeeping" in order to maintain **Transition management and timing**.

d.   **Obstacles to transition** and how these can be mitigated by reliance on other coalition partners to shoulder some of the logistic risk.

e.   **Measurements of success** illustrated by the amount of equipment that was either returned to the UK, sold or gifted or sent on to Afghanistan.

Lessons and risk

6.   This case study highlights the following lessons contained in the handbook:

a.   **LoE -** The security LoE is likely to have included a comprehensive package of CS and CSS support to the HN. These functions will need to Transition to normalized practices that are enduring and sustainable. Logistic planners will need to examine what support is currently being provided and how this could be provided by other coalition partners or the HN. The process of implementing enduring logistic solutions is likely to take longer than the handover of combat functions.

b.   **LoE - tempo**. Government strategies are likely to dictate disengagement. If this happens within a coalition context then Transition/ redeployment will occur at a different time. For Op BROCKDALE the UK began the Transition/redeployment process before the US. Therefore logistic planning will need to consider your role in the overall coalition plan and what impact your redeployment may have on other forces.

c.   **Transition preconditions -** Stakeholder analysis. Logistics will be operating within a multi-stakeholder and it is critical that planners understand who these are and how they affect the Transition process. In particular, understanding the role played by other coalition nations and the logistic risk you may be holding for them or what they may be able to absorb as you Transition. Planners must also take into consideration external factors such as the part played by 3rd party states and contractors. In Iraq the US provided the medical cover allowing the UK to withdraw its medical facilities across the border into Kuwait.

d.   **Transition timing and management -** It is likely that Transition will be operating to a tight timeline with milestones that

are irreversible. Therefore logistic planners should conduct any activity which reduces the potential for significant effort towards the end of a campaign. Prior to the launch of Op BROCKDALE, units were encouraged to conduct "Aggressive housekeeping" with the aim of reducing surpluses and not over burdening the reverse supply chain.

e.   **Phases of Transition -** Op TELIC and the logistic effort mirrored the phases of Transition. As the HN forces grow in capability it will see a reduction in coalition force logistic effort. By stage 3 the UK was planning Op BROCKDALE.

f.   **Obstacles -** Op BROCKDALE presented many challenges during the redeployment phase. At the tactical level this included: ensuring the accuracy of the PERSREP to determine force protection levels and medical cover; the accuracy of the compendium that itemized all equipment and materiel held in theater. At the operational level the challenges included: maintaining situational awareness and the sharing of information across the coalition; the capability of the HN to provide its own integral logistic support. At the strategic level the challenges remained political considerations such as balancing up the wish of the Iraqi government for there to be a UK force to remain in situ and the drive to withdraw from Iraq.

g.   **Measurements of success -** What did Op BROCKDALE achieve?

i   4,200 personnel and 650 vehicles successfully recovered.

ii   Stores equivalent to around 4,000 ISO containers were packed, processed and either returned to the UK or disposed of in theater

iii   Efficiencies meant that only five rather than seven roll-on-roll-off Freight Ships were used.

iv   Over 90% of items returned to the UK were back on the shelves ready for use by Sep 09.

v   All UK-occupied or managed facilities have been handed over to US forces or handed back to Iraqi or Kuwaiti authorities.

vi   All key data has been captured and its location catalogued.

h.   Moved directly to Afghanistan:

i   105 pallets of electronic counter-measures force protection equipment.

ii   500 sets of body armor.

iii   15,000 kg of ammunition.

iv   35 vehicles.

TRANSITION CASE STUDY

EAST TIMOR

Overview

1.   International forces in East Timor have undergone a number of Transitions since the deployment of INTERFET in Aug 99. The conflict then was based on the violent response to the 1999 UN referendum which voted against autonomy with Indonesia, in favor of independence as a sovereign state. Militia forces within East Timor supported by the Indonesian military, turned on the population in a rampage of terror during which thousands were killed and more fled over the border to Indonesia. The militia was eventually disarmed and neutralized by an Australian led coalition force of 22 countries. The coalition, then consisting mainly of Australian and New Zealand forces operating under the mandate of the UN, remained in place performing stabilization and repatriation operations until they withdrew in 2004. In 2006, violence spurred by the crisis in the East Timor Defence Force provoked a second deployment of a stabilization force, which is currently undergoing a second Transition to a drawdown of forces in 2012.

Relevance

2.   This case study will demonstrate the following aspects of the handbook:

        a.   A split security **Lines of Effort**(LoE).

        b.   Failure to apply whole of government **LoE**.

        c.   Failure to apply the **principles.**

        d.   Effects of sequencing the **timing.**

        e.   Correctly applying **phases.**

        f.   The **challenge** of fractures in the process.

The story

3.   The sequencing of LoE and Transitions within the East Timor case are presented below in Figure B1.1. The Transitions are represented by

vertical red lines corresponding with the year in which they occurred. The red stars over the dates represent crisis points.

4.   The first Transition in the story occurred in 1999 when a multi agency international community gathered in Dili to address the post referendum violence and assist East Timor in Transitioning to a new state. Because East Timor had been under Indonesian occupation for 25 years, there was no Timorese government, and so a temporary administration was provided by the UN. Consequently, there coexisted temporary governance and policing provided by a multination UN force, and military functions provided by a coalition of foreign defense forces.

5.   The second Transition occurred in 2001 when the rebel force (FALINTIL) was legitimized into the first state defense force, Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL), and the beginnings of a state police force (The East Timor Police Service) emerged. At this point there was a state security force, but no state. The framework needed for a security sector (laws of national security in particular), did not exist, and the capabilities in the force were immature. At the same time F-FDTL was created, an Australian Defence cooperation team was deployed into Dili to mentor and develop the F-FDTL.


Figure B1.1: East Timor Transition Lines of Effort

6.   The third Transition came the following year in 2002 when sovereignty was declared and the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste became the 191st member of the UN. The East Timor Police Service became the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). By referring to the diagram above, it can be seen that East Timor at this stage had its own government and defense force, but lead security authority was still held by UNPOL.

7.   The fourth Transition came with the withdrawal of coalition military forces in 2004, and the deployment of the Australian Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) to mentor the PNTL.

8.   Two years later, an ethnic crisis in the still immature F-FDTL brought about the 2006 violent incidents between F-FDTL and PNTL and the Australian/ New Zealand coalition (this time known as the International Stabilization Force - ISF) returned. As half of the F-FDTL had been dismissed for desertion by the CDF, security capacity was lost. The F-FDTL started a rebuilding phase, and former F-FDTL officer Alfredo Reinado, lobbying for the sacked deserters known as 'the petitioners', went on the run.

9.   Another two years later, in 2008, while the ISF was still deployed in country, President of the Republic, Jose Ramos Horta was shot by Reinado's men. Reinado was killed by Horta's guards which essentially brought an end to the chapter in the F-FDTL crisis. Horta recovered and returned to his position, and the petitioners' case was heard by the Timorese government.

10.   The following year, seven years after the creation of the new state, Transfer of lead security authority from UNPOL to the PNTL commenced. That Transition was completed in 2011, but a small UN contingent remains in country primarily to monitor the parliamentary elections in 2012.

11.   The 10 year anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste in 2012, will see major Transitions after the parliamentary and presidential elections with the withdrawal of the majority of UN and ISF personnel.

Lessons and risk

12.   This case study highlights the following lessons contained in the handbook:

    a.   LoE.

The security lines have not been synchronized in a whole of government approach. There has been no formal relationship between coalition forces (CF) and the DCP and a minimal relationship between DCP and TLPDP. Consequently, the police and military capabilities are being developed independently from each other which will not alleviate the cultural tensions between them.

b.   Principles.

The CF probably transitioned prematurely in 2004. By not basing the transition on the principle of 'conditions based', they failed to identify the cultural and ethnic east-west tensions within the F-FDTL, which led to fractures causing the 2006 crisis.

c.   Timing.

The Host Nation (HN) security forces transitioned to state force before sovereignty and legislative instruments were in place. This has resulted in a poor understanding of the legal restrictions on both forces. The transfer of lead security authority was split between the HN defense force and HN police by 10 years. This has resulted in frustration by PNTL who perceive double standards in government confidence and resourcing.

d.   Phases.

CF Transitions did accord with the five stages of Transition proposed in chapter 5.

e.   Obstacles.

The case study demonstrates examples of both a Contingency Fracture (seen in the rupture of the F-FDTL) and a resolution fracture (seen in the shooting of Horta). These fractures became crises which represented challenges to the Transition process. Fractures act as useful contingencies for Transition planning.

TRANSITION CASE STUDY

HAITI

Overview

1.   The 7.0 earthquake on 12 Jan 10 was centered on Port-au-Prince and affected nearly 3 million people. Communication systems, air, land, and sea transport facilities, hospitals, and electrical networks were damaged by the earthquake, which hampered rescue and aid efforts. A conspicuous lack of coordination, air traffic congestion, and problems with prioritization of flights further complicated early relief work. The US military response, while effective in operational terms, had little immediate connection to the already ongoing civilian effort. The effectiveness of the military's efforts immediately began to erode due to the vastly different methodologies and choice of objectives of foreign donors and host country authorities. The military's priorities and those of the US mission in the immediate aftermath of the disaster were fairly similar. However, this changed as differences in mandates, authorities, resources, and outreach capabilities became more evident

Relevance

2.   This case study will demonstrate the following aspects of the handbook:

      a.   Failure to apply whole of government **Lines of Effort (LoE).**

      b.   Failure to apply the **principles.**

      c.   The **challenge** of fractures in the process.

The story

3.   At the close of 2009, Haiti was wrestling with a still-fragile political structure, a feeble economy, barely functioning social services, and a long prevailing assumption on the part of the populace, that the international community would continue the flow of foreign aid. The earthquake had an epicenter only 16 miles from the country's capital and dozens of massive aftershocks followed which resulted in most buildings in the metropolitan

area, including over 90 percent of Port au Prince's government ministry buildings being destroyed. Approximately 300,000 persons were killed nationwide and 1.5 million people eventually moved to displaced person locations. The essential public services – water, power, light, markets, airports, hospitals – were compromised or non-functioning. Almost all of the inmates of the metropolitan prison (including hundreds of the most notorious prisoners) escaped. The international development agencies were equally affected with a combination of missing staff, both local and international, and little ability to communicate.

4. Virtually all primary government buildings were either destroyed or rendered inoperable. This loss erased access to records and equipment. Communication breakdowns prevented remaining government personnel from rallying to a central operational location and resuming activity in an orderly manner. Those who managed to reestablish contact were handicapped by the need to adjust to the vast numbers of missing personnel. The major destruction to roads, markets and other public spaces, prevented people returning to what otherwise would have been the normal gathering points greatly handicapping the ability to provide emergency assistance. In short, massive numbers of survivors became displaced, seeking shelter, food and medical assistance wherever they could find it. The initial assessment of arriving international relief workers was that almost everything required for an effective response would need to be imported.

5. The immediate international humanitarian aid response was massive. Hundreds of organizations and institutions flooded into Haiti and thousands of relief activities were initiated. Acting under the imperative of saving lives, the international community (IC) operated with considerable independence, doing whatever it felt was necessary. As a predictable consequence, the majority of early aid efforts suffered from a conspicuous lack of coordination.

6. Little effort was given to ensuring that pre-quake Haitian standards or customs were respected or that already-established counterparts and systems would be supported as opposed to being ignored. As a result, a range of varied health-care regimes were promoted (new medicaments and treatments, different care and follow-up, etc) and many Haitian clinics did not reopen because their potential clientele was relying on the free service provided by nearby non-government organizations (NGOs). Given the availability of resources and services supplied by the responders, many businesses delayed reopening as well.

7.   A long-term concern quickly emerged as imported relief food and water containers (most frequently made of styrene or plastic) littered the landscape. When asked, some relief workers suggested the clean-up of discarded emergency service materials would form part of the later stabilization and development phases of foreign assistance. They tended to see their role in terms of immediate outcomes, with assistance as the measuring stick. The question of how immediate action during a response will affect subsequent Transition and reconstruction efforts is one with which the humanitarian community has long wrestled.

8.   Upon arrival, the US military (SOUTHCOM), while working closely with the already present United Nations (UN) forces (MINUSTAH), set up their own internal support mechanisms. While effective in operational terms, there was little immediate connection to the already ongoing civilian effort. Rapidly swelling to 22,000 military personnel, the US forces established or supported an unusually wide range of activities, primarily, in the initial stages, aimed at quelling outbreaks of violence and supporting actions directed towards a quick return to normalcy. Military management of the international airport, while arousing some protests regarding the establishing of priorities, was among the highlights of the response effort.

9.   The military's logistics capability plus its access to an extensive variety of resources and equipment coupled with a disciplined command structure, enabled it to quickly step in and reestablish some essential services. As a result, the airport quickly became functional, general street security improved, and satellite mapping and plotting greatly contributed to a more effective response. In addition, the extensive communication capabilities it provided enabled it to establish and maintain liaison with the principle actors, with the engagement with the UN cluster system as a critical example.

10.   The ability to perform in such an efficient manner did not always mesh with the operational styles and resource capabilities of other organizations. As an example, the military concluded the population residing in particular displaced personnel camps were most vulnerable and lobbied other groups to assist in mitigating the dangers, with mixed response based upon dissenting assessments, priorities and resources.

Lessons and risk

11.   This case study highlights the following lessons contained in the handbook:

>   a.   An inadequate effort was made in parallel to the emergency relief effort to reestablish Haitian essential service mechanisms.

>   b.   Insufficient attention was paid in managing the relief effort to avoid establishing new patterns of dependency.

>   c.   There was a tendency to overlook the impact that program operations during the response and Transition phases can have on reconstruction.

>   d.   Climactic condition required urgent attention be paid to the provision of adequate shelter. The storms in late Sep 10 destroyed several thousand tents sheltering the displaced.

>   e.   The people of Haiti needed to believe that it was in their interest to be part of the process. The IC bears a significant burden in supporting the framework required.

TRANSITION CASE STUDY

KOREA

Overview

1.   South Korea (ROK) illustrates the role of the US military and security played in the creation of a modern state. The ROK's success is a testament of how a Transition from a devastated, impoverished post-conflict environment with a highly autocratic government to a mature, liberal democracy can occur. The insights derived from the ROK inform what might be required of other states and their sponsors. Transition was and remains a nonlinear process. It cannot be episodic nor react to artificial timelines of a supporting nation. However, supporting nations by recognizing the components above can better make decisions in regard to intervention and better manage the extent of their contributions and the nature of their departure.

Relevance

2.   This case study will demonstrate the following aspects of the handbook:

    a.   Importance of the security **Lines of Effort (LoE).**

    b.   **Whole of government** integration.

    c.   Importance of **engagement** with and involving leadership.

    d.   Confirms principle of **start at the bottom.**

The story

3.   On 25 Jun 50 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) invaded South Korea. North Korea was supported by the Soviet Union with military aid and by the forces of the new People's Republic of China (PRC). South Korea was supported by military forces and aid from the United States and its United Nations (UN) partners. Severe combat action swept up and down the peninsula, but neither side could defeat the other and unite Korea into one nation. An armistice was signed on 27 Jul 53 and a precarious "peace" dominated by North Korean threats and

provocations still endures today. For the next 40 years security dominated the concerns of South Korea's governments and allies. Korea's development cannot be understood without grasping this.

4.   The most central concerns for both North and South Korea during the first decade after the Korean War were to rebuild their respective nations and unify Korea under their own terms. The war had left South Korea with over three million refugees from North Korea. Most South Koreans lived a very harsh life below the level of subsistence. Health care and other services were not much better for those above the poverty line. Economic recovery was slow; the average growth of the gross national product (GNP) was merely 1% per year. As we are re-learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, "democracy on steroids" did not prove conducive to nation building in the ROK. Democratic politics were initially more problematic than helpful. Factionalism dominated politics in South Korea and the military essentially kept control, while the North Korean government was able to consolidate power swiftly after a series of purges and quickly recovered from the war with economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

5.   Major General Park Chung-Hee effectively reorganized the South Korean economic model around export oriented industrialization, focusing on industries where South Korea had a competitive advantage in the international market place. His policies set new records in economic growth. His administration stimulated economic growth by promoting indigenous industry through imparting special privileges to industries that were able to acquire foreign currencies in exchange for their product. The influx of foreign currency helped build capital, stimulated job growth, and improved the quality of life of Koreans. The export-based industrialization and somewhat collusive economic policies initially incurred skepticism among US economic advisors as such models were unsuccessful in many underdeveloped countries. However, Park's assessment of the energy and drive of the Korean people proved right and he moved the economy beyond reliance on US aid.

6.   By far, the most significant contribution of the US military in the ROK was to provide the security framework which enabled the ROK leadership to focus on ameliorating their economic development. Through partnership and individual and organized unit initiatives US troops participated in numerous beneficial activities that helped alleviate poverty and provide economic opportunity. Among the many humanitarian activities were the building and adoption of schools, outreach and financial support of orphanages, adoption of unwanted children, and support to higher learning institutions. US military commanders at all levels

encouraged their ROK counterparts to participate in civic action projects, including lending assistance and providing equipment for Park's New Community Movement (*Saemaeul Undong*).   The New Community Movement did much to improve the infrastructure in rural South Korea. It brought modernized facilities such as water systems, bridges and roads to rural communities.

7.   The South Korean experience confirms the importance of the role of leadership and strong, effective governance during Transition. It suggests that the path to an effective democracy and successful state may require an interim courtship with less than ideal regimes. How those authoritarian regimes are to use and relinquish power is a different problem from a failing state. The US military engaged the society at all levels and in ways far beyond security interests. The US military has a special relationship with the South Korean state and people. It is relationship that has strategic benefits for both US and ROK interests: deterrence of North Korean aggression, regional stability, preservation of robust a ROK-US and ROK-Japan Alliance, economic prosperity, non-proliferation, and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Lessons and risk

8.   This case study highlights the following lessons contained in the handbook:

> a.   Transition was in the sovereign and shared national interests of the ROK (as a supported nation) and the US (as a supporting nation).
>
> b.   The ROK people and their leaders wanted to make this Transition. In particular, the emergence of a national leader in President Park, who had a vision for a successful South Korea, and the actions he undertook to create the conditions and momentum for success and Transition were critical. Success did not flow from democracy, but rather democracy flowed from vision, ownership, success, and partnership in a spiraling interaction initiated by competent, nationalistic leadership.
>
> c.   The role of the US military in providing a security shield and the manner in which it played out its roles in defense, presence, civil actions, and development of the ROK military proved pivotal.

d.   The Transition was given time to succeed. Security, economic development, and a rise in human security over time built a strategic partner for the US. There was no rush to failure or clamor for an exit strategy.

ILLUSTRATIVE TRANSITION ASSESSMENTS/METRICS

The following assessment/ metrics were drawn from the RC (SW)
Transfer, Transform, Transition, TAQAT - RC(SW) Approach to 'Inteqal'
dated 01 Aug 10 and show key areas along all three Lines of Effort (LoE):

Security

Assessment	Measure
1.1 Increased Host Nation (HN) army capability to provide security in selected areas.	1.1.1 Ability to plan, execute and sustain independent operations. 1.1.2 Operations conducted effectively. 1.1.3 Local population turn to the HN army for security.
1.2 Increased HN police capacity to provide security capability for the local population.	1.2.1 Ability to plan, execute and sustain policing security operations independently. 1.2.2 Policing conducted effectively. 1.2.3 Local population turn to the HN police for security.
1.3 Insurgents pose reduced threat to local population and combined forces (HN security forces (HNSF) and coalition forces (CF)).	1.3.1 INS activity against coalition forces. 1.3.2 INS activity against HNSF. 1.3.3 INS activity again local population.
1.4 Local population perceive HN government and HNSF as legitimate sources of authority.	1.4.1 Local population turn to HN government and HNSF for security. 1.4.2 Local government is coordinated with district, provincial and national government. 1.4.3 Degree of influence by maligned actors.
1.5 Increased freedom of movement for the local population.	1.5.1 Ability of population to get where they want to go. 1.5.2 Ability of commerce, HN government officials and others to reach the local population (this includes the population's ability to connect to the public road network.
1.6 Increased border security.	1.6.1 Functioning, legitimate border crossings 1.6.2 HN border police conducting border operations independently.

| | 1.6.3 HN government collecting revenue. |

Governance

Assessment	Measure
2.1 Increased local government capacity	2.1.1 Functioning line ministries (including staff, ability to plan and budget, and ability to provide basic services) 2.1.2 Application of development plan (strategic plan for area) 2.1.3 Effective relationships with regional and national governance
2.2 Increased district government capacity	2.2.1 Functioning government staff, district community councils and other low level entities. 2.2.2 Development of district development plans 2.2.3 Relationship with provincial and village governments
2.3 HN rule of law structures are seen as legitimate and preferred by the majority of the population	2.3.1 Functioning judicial system 2.3.2 Use if legitimate dispute resolution mechanisms 2.3.3 Improve auxiliary police capacity to support judicial system
2.4 Popular perception of the HN government	2.4.1 Presence and activities of shadow government 2.4.2 Influence on maligned actors
2.5 Reconciliation	2.5.1 Development of an integrated reconciliation plan between local, district and national levels 2.5.2 Implementation of reconciliation plan
2.6 Physical infrastructure for governance	2.6.1 Examples: appropriate government offices, detention facilities and housing for government officials

Development

Assessment	Measure
3.1 Economic growth and livelihoods	3.1.1 Market availability of basic necessities and amenities 3.1.2 Availability of banking and credit 3.1.3 Economic activity (including HN businesses, agricultural output, natural resources and processing)
3.2 Health	3.2.1 Provision of health services 3.2.2 Use of health services 3.2.3 Quality of health services
3.3 Education	3.3.1 Provision of education (including primary and secondary schools, adult literacy programs and vocational training) 3.3.2 Quality of education
3.4 Infrastructure	3.4.1 Link between infrastructure projects and development plans 3.4.2 Lead on infrastructure development (i.e. HN government, coalition forces or the international community designing and implementing the infrastructure improvements) 3.4.3 Sustainability of infrastructure (do the local population have a stake in the infrastructure projects? Are they willing to assume responsibility for maintaining the infrastructure?)
3.5 Delivery of basic services (including food, potable water, irrigation, sewage, electricity, etc)	3.5.1 Provision of services by the HN government 3.5.2 Provision of services by the international community 3.5.3 Sustainability of services.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this handbook, the following definitions will be applied.

A

Accreditation. The method by which coalition governments determine whether Host Nation security forces or civilian agencies are capable of operating independently.

Advisers. Personnel from coalition governments who are placed within Host Nation institutions to provide advice on day-to-day procedure.

Area of interest. The geographical area in which activities that occur could influence the operation. The area of interest extends beyond the area of responsibility to include places of decision making, state borders, ports of entry and main supply routes.

Area of responsibility. The geographical area assigned to an appropriate commander within which that commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.

Armed Forces. The state controlled military forces of a nation. Does not include private militia or citizen gangs.

Assessment. A continuous process which measures the overall effectiveness of force capabilities during military operations.

Assistance. The cooperation and coordination between coalition forces and Host Nation forces, to establish Host Nation capabilities.

B

Base ISTAR. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance surveillance equipment which provides protection to forward operating bases (FOBs) and patrol bases (PBs).

C

Capability. The full spectrum of requirements including personnel, equipment, training and sustainment; to produce an effect.

Civil military cooperation. Coordination and cooperation in peace or war between the military and civil actors which include the population and local authorities.

Civil military operations. The activities directed by a commander which establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and non-government civilian organizations and authorities; and the civilian population. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs staff, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil institutions and other forces.

Coalition. The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

Conflict prevention. A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and military actions, to identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are often conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring.

Consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents.

Constraint. A requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action which must be carried out, thus restricting freedom of action.

Contingency fracture. Something which goes wrong with one of the planned steps of the operation, and can therefore be anticipated and mitigated. This kind of contingency is most damaging when it evolves from the failure of a program designed to have an immediate and positive impact on the Host Nation population.

Control. Authority which is less than full command exercised by a commander over part of a subordinate organization, or exercised temporarily.

Conventional forces. Those forces capable of conducting operations which do not involve nuclear weapons, special operations forces, or asymmetric or terrorist operations. Conventional forces usually involve standardized formations, combined arms operations and heavy equipment supported by general forces.

Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat or prevent an attempt to overthrow political authority.

Counterintelligence. Those activities which are concerned with identifying and assessing the threat to operational security posed by hostile intelligence services or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

Country team. A group which encompasses all the entities of the national (or UN) system which carry out operational activities for military operations, nation building, disaster recovery and Transition. The country team ensures inter-agency coordination and decision-making at the country level. Their main purpose is to coordinate individual agencies to plan and work together, to ensure the delivery of tangible results in support of the development agenda of the government.

E

Economic action.   The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state.

Enabling force.   Those forces used to assist Host Nation forces until such time as they can be considered capable of independent action.

Engagement.   The interaction between two or more actors for the purposes of cultivating and maintaining trust and collecting information.

F

Footprint. The total sum of personnel, equipment, sustainability, and supporting capabilities physically occupying space at a deployed location.

Foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies in an action taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

H

Handover. The transfer of functional responsibility and authority from a departing military member to a replacement, or to a Host Nation service.

Host Nation. A nation which invites a foreign government force to operate in, or to transit through its territory for a specific political or humanitarian purpose.

Host Nation support. Civil and military assistance rendered by a Host Nation to foreign forces that are located on or in transit through the Host Nation's territory. The basis of such assistance is based on bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Host Nation support agreement. Agreement of assistance normally concluded at government level. These agreements may include general agreements, umbrella agreements, memoranda of understanding and status of forces agreements.

I

Indigenous populations and institutions. A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area including its populations, government, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities.

Integration. The transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution.

Interdependent. The arraying of forces and resources in such a manner that the success of the mission relies on the success of all parties.

Intervention. Assertion of influence (and sometimes force) in a country by an external government or international organization to prevent state failure.

Irreversible. Level of Host Nation capabilities have progressed to a point where the likelihood of failure is deemed low.

Influence activities. Those actions taken by the commander to direct both kinetic and non-kinetic effects onto a target audience, in order to change their attitudes towards coalition forces and, potentially, Host Nation forces.

L

Lines of Effort. The linking of activities with similar goals throughout the campaign resulting in simultaneous advancement towards the operational endstate. Examples are security, engineering and humanitarian lines.

Line of operation. The linking of operational objectives in a military campaign to create a linear progression along which a commander may execute and monitor his mission.

M

Mentoring. The practice of guiding and advising Host Nation military or political personnel in an occupation in which they have been recently trained.

Militia. Armed groups sourced from the local population for the purpose of providing security and order in their area. These groups may or may not be associated with the central government.

Mobile training team. A team consisting of one or more military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill.

Multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed a temporary alliance for a specific operational purpose.

Multinational force commander. A commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations.

Multinational operations. A term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

Multinational staff. A staff composed of personnel of two or more nations within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

N

Non-government organizations. National or multi-national organizations of private citizens active in the Area of Interest. Non-government organizations may be professional associations, religious groups, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in supporting humanitarian assistance activities.

O

Other government agencies. A non-military agency or department of one of the governments contributing to the coalition. Examples are foreign affairs, federal investigations and aid coordinators.

Overwatch. Strategic observers focusing on ministerial and national level institutions. Operational advisors for regional leadership in the day-to-day conduct of security for their area. Tactical forces set up as a quick reaction force or partnered force that can assist local security forces in the event of overwhelming enemy activity.

P

Partnering. The accompanying of a small military or police unit by a coalition unit with the purpose of building capacity in the Host Nation unit. Partnering units can also monitor and measure the effectiveness of the Host Nation unit, ultimately contributing to the Transition Process.

R

Reconciliation. The process of bringing two or more opposing groups to agreeable terms for future cooperation.

Redeployment. The transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home for reintegration or exit-processing.

Reinvestment. The movement of forces or resources to a location where they can reinforce successful policy and security measures.

Repatriate. A person who returns to his or her country of citizenship, having left either unwillingly or for reason of political or religious persecution.

Resolution fracture. Something which goes wrong outside the planned steps of the operation, and cannot therefore be anticipated or mitigated.

Often referred to as Strategic Shock, this kind of fracture may happen in the area of operations (like an assassination), back at the coalition force's home country (government failure), or in a neighboring area (like a natural disaster).

S

Security cooperation activity. Military activity which involves allied states and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners.

Security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state.

Service provider. Any organization or group (security forces, NGO, civilian agencies) that provides a crucial service to the population in an area being considered for Transition.

Stakeholder. Any group or organization within the coalition force, including local power brokers, which has an interest in the outcome of the Transition process.

T

Transfer of lead security responsibility (TLSR). The formal act of recognizing the local security agency and government as having responsibility and authority in its area of operations.

Transition. The formal and methodical process by which a supporting Host Nation assumes control for whole of government responsibilities from a supported coalition force.

Transformation.   Long term capacity building, nation building, establishing whole of government capabilities for the purpose of completing Transition.

U

Unified land operations. A US term describing equal parts of offense, defense and stability operations, and military support to civil authorities.

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