



INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT



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PACIFIC PATHWAYS 15-02

*Lessons and
Best Practices*



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Pacific Pathways 15-02

Initial Impressions Report

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Executive Summary

(U) This initial impressions report (IIR), the second in a series of three, focuses on the second operational phase of Pacific Pathways 15-02, consisting of the following exercises: Hamel with Australia, Garuda Shield with Indonesia, and Keris Strike with Malaysia. Hamel was a decisive action exercise with American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand partners. Garuda Shield and Keris Strike consisted of engagements with the respective host nation focusing on Phase 0 tasks, staff activities replicating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and small-unit tactics. The first two chapters of this IIR discuss planning and interoperability observations. Chapters 3 through 7 cover the mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and sustainment warfighting functions, with sections specific to the Hamel exercise and the Garuda Shield and Keris Strike exercises. Finally, Chapter 8 touches on protection and engineering.

(U) Following the three IIRs for Pacific Pathways, the Center for Army Lessons Learned will publish a Pacific Pathways Newsletter. This newsletter (in cooperation with U.S. Army, Pacific Command [USARPAC], I Corps, and 25th Infantry Division [25ID]) will contain key leader interviews; first-person, Pacific Pathways-specific articles; positive outcomes; and trends. This collaboration will create a shared understanding of Pacific Pathways, facilitate planning development of future Pacific Pathways, and inform the Army warfighting challenges and the Army leadership at large.

(U) Pacific Pathways 15-02 continues to move toward operationalizing the USARPAC exercise program within the command's area of operations (AO). It sets regionally aligned forces in motion and demonstrates U.S. commitment and capability to partners and allies. While Pacific Pathways is a new way of engaging the Pacific theater, it is by no means outside of what the U.S. Army has done for decades. For example, this is the Army's 19th iteration of exercise Keris Strike and the ninth iteration of Garuda Shield.

(U) Historically, the U.S. Army has been in the Pacific since 1898. Post-World War II, the Army had a significant presence in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea. As the Army's presence matured, U.S. Army forces deployed regionally in single, discrete bilateral exercises to ensure stability and cooperation. However, Pacific Pathways changes this single and sequential engagement process by linking several of these exercises together in an operational deployment lasting up to three months. This renewed U.S. commitment and shift in operational design have gained positive outcomes, but not without challenges.

(U) Since 2013, USARPAC has evolved from a three-star headquarters to a four-star headquarters to better support the national objectives associated with this idea of strategic rebalancing. This command restructuring has provided a greater ability for the Army component of the Pacific

command to influence these strategic objectives and support the command. USARPAC also gained a U.S. two-star deputy commander and an Australian deputy two-star general. As a result, USARPAC has become a more capable and effective headquarters.

(U) One significant outcome for the Army in the Pacific was assigning I Corps to the Pacific Command with operational control (OPCON) to USARPAC and administrative control remaining with United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). While I Corps receives funding from FORSCOM, it is assigned to the Pacific theater. Furthermore, the 25ID is assigned to the Pacific Command and attached to USARPAC, under I Corps OPCON. This 25ID and I Corps mission-command relationship enables USARPAC and its staff to focus strategically in the Pacific and concentrate on the core mission of setting the theater.

(U) The USARPAC Commanding General's intent is clear: I Corps provides operational-level mission command. For example, the Stryker brigade combat team (BCT) and airborne BCT in Alaska remain under U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) for training oversight, but when the BCTs are operationally employed, I Corps conducts OPCON.

(U) In the future, as the 7th Infantry Division evolves its operational abilities, its regional alignment is expected to be in the Pacific. This will have a significant impact on Pacific Pathways exercises and the ability of USARPAC to meet the rebalancing objectives. While the alignment of I Corps has generated some growing pains, the overall realignment has been a positive evolution, enabling USARPAC to set the theater in Phase 0.

(U) I Corps has been instrumental in the effort to operationalize Pacific Pathways. While a division headquarters has planning capabilities, it is still a tactical unit. The corps, on the other hand, is designed for the kind of operational-level planning and execution required to synchronize elements that conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and provide a mission command node to synchronize the current operation and/or react to crisis. Significant to I Corps' abilities is the addition of the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), which is aligned to the corps.

(U) While there have been planning challenges, it remains an evolving process. For example, the relationship building that I Corps has done to establish the operational linkages with other agencies (such as the Surface Deployment Distribution Command [SDDC]; 404th Army Field Support Brigade; Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], and DLA-Energy) has been significant and continues to develop.


(U) In the planning cycles (i.e., timelines from unit deployment lists for shipping), all the needed sustainment support and synchronization of classes of supply have been somewhat to the left of the Joint Exercise Life Cycle (JELC). The continued challenge is to align the two (sustainment of supply and JELC), and that requires some synchronization between USARPAC and I Corps as operational-level planning requirements are aligned with the current JELC. Improvements are being made in that direction. I Corps has been incorporated into the overall USARPAC Pacific Pathways Conference and it hosts a weekly Pacific Pathways working group, which pulls together all the representatives from the sustainment enterprise, USARPAC, and the corps staff to identify, work, and solve current issues and synchronize future Pathways events.

(U) In addition, prior to execution of a Pathways exercise, I Corps conducts a digital rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill, which is an interactive discussion among the commanders presenting their task and purpose by phase, emphasizing operational-level activities of movement (sea and air lifts), mission command (transitions and locations), and sustainment (to include strategic enterprise partners such as the SDDC, Air Mobility Command, and the defended asset list synchronization). A significant result of the ROC drill and eventual Pacific Pathways event is that it spans from Joint Base Lewis-McChord to Japan, across the international dateline, to bring together eight commands actively involved in a major event.

Pacific Pathways 15-02

(U) Figure 1 (next page) shows the Pacific Pathways 15-02 scheme of maneuver. It is followed by the USARPAC, I Corps, and 25ID commanders' purpose, methods, and end state for the operations; a description of mission command; and a brief summary for each exercise.

Pathways 15-2 Concept



(FOUO) Figure 1. Pathways concept: building readiness with partners.

USARPAC: Purpose, Methods, End State

(U) Purpose. To strengthen relationships with allies and partners while building a broader set of readiness outcomes for all participating forces and providing crisis response options to the combatant commanders.

(U) Methods.

- Continue the enduring development of relationships with allies and partner nations.
- Conduct a tailored force meeting exercise that provides requirements to achieve specific theater effects.
- Foster a climate of regional interoperability and cultural understanding.
- Sustain U.S. forces' high readiness levels through exercises.
- Advance expeditionary ethos and experience within theater and joint land component forces.
- Include U.S. Pacific Command and globally managed Army Total Force and joint forces.
- Support the USARPAC theater campaign plan creating a joint and/or Service-specific presence.

(U) Campaign End State. USARPAC advances Pacific Command theater security cooperation objectives that validate elements of the Army operating concept. In the end, the Pacific Pathways campaign demonstrates U.S. commitment to the region and improves partner nation interoperability while enhancing U.S. readiness. Moreover, Pacific Pathways operations provide an option for U.S. Pacific Command to respond to unforeseen contingencies.

I CORPS: Purpose, Methods, End State

(U) Purpose. The purpose of Pacific Pathways operations is to build readiness, from tactical through theater levels, with allies and partnered Army forces in support of theater security cooperation objectives, while maintaining operational flexibility in the Pacific.

(U) Methods.

- Deploy expeditionary adaptive, responsive, and scalable task forces.
- Each Pacific Pathways operation serves as a platform for the following:
 - Rehearsing tactical to theater operations (United States, bilateral, and multinational).
 - Reconnoitering operational support locations within the Pacific.

- Building technical and human interoperability (Army-Army, joint, and U.S. Government).
- Strengthening Army-Army and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) relationships in the Pacific.
- Instill a deployment mindset, build agile training plans, and remain flexible to ensure successful accomplishment of training objectives.
- Leverage expeditionary mission command, Army forces transitions, collective training events, and live-fire exercises to build readiness at echelon.
- Leverage bilateral and multilateral training events to build Army-Army interoperability.
- Capture lessons learned, capability gaps, and interoperability challenges.

(U) End State. Trained and regionally tested forces ensure U.S. Army operational agility within the Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR) and global response, as needed. U.S. Army forces increase response options within the Pacific by increasing fight-and-win capabilities with allies and partners. Pacific Pathways operations support set-the-theater objectives in an expeditionary fashion without increasing permanently assigned forces to the Pacific Command AOR.

25ID: Mission, Intent, End State, Overall Mission Command

(U) Mission. 25ID(-) deploys no later than 05 JUN 2015 to conduct expeditionary security cooperation operations, oriented on exercises Hamel-15 (Australia), Garuda Shield-15 (Indonesia) and Keris Strike-15 (Malaysia), from 01 JUL to 25 SEP 2015 to strengthen relationships with JIIM partners and increase readiness.

(U) Commander's Intent.


- **Purpose.**
 - Strengthen relationships with the Australian, Indonesian (TNI), and Malaysian armed forces and JIIM partners by building trust and understanding through presence and commitment.
 - Improve readiness through all actions necessary to deploy and function in an expeditionary environment within each exercise while developing regional understanding.
 - Increase tactical interoperability by practicing multinational operations at all echelons.

• **Key Tasks.**

- Ensure all actions taken preserve, enhance, and support strategic relationships with regional partners.
- Improve readiness throughout Pathways by conducting deployment operations, regional and cultural learning, multinational command post exercises (CPXs), field training exercises (FTXs), live-fire exercises, other mission-essential tasks, and field craft-related training events at each echelon.
- Provide forces and capabilities required to meet all exercise objectives and execute all operations based on agreed actions.
- Deploy and redeploy safely, conducting seamless RSOI and transition management.
- Serve as a “battle lab” for the Army operating concept.

(U) End State. 25ID successfully completes exercises with JIIM partners, while improving readiness, relationships, tactical interoperability, and redeployment and maximization of lessons learned within the division and overall Army community. The Commonwealth of Australia, Republic of Indonesia, Federation of Malaysia, and other regional partners stand convinced of the division’s commitment to the Indo-Asian Pacific region. The division is seen as a reliable, credible, and disciplined regional partner ready to conduct multinational operations when called upon.


(U) Overall Mission Command and Task Organization. USARPAC, the Army Service component command to the Pacific Command, provided overall mission command (see Figure 2, next page). I Corps was the supported command and provided mission command for Pacific Pathways 15-02. During the first exercise (Hamel), embedded in the joint and multinational exercise Talisman Saber, I Corps assumed responsibilities for U.S. Army elements in Australia. There was only one mission command transition — the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25ID (4/25), transitioned from USARAK to 25ID during Hamel and back to USARAK after the exercise was completed. (USARAK was a supporting command during Hamel, tasked to provide an airborne assault force, if/when needed.)



(FOUO) Figure 2. Exercise organizational charts.

(U) Upon completion of Hamel and Talisman Saber in Australia, 25ID assumed Army forces responsibilities for the Pathways forces remaining in Australia and onward through Pacific Pathways exercises Garuda Shield and Keris Strike (see Figure 2). The 25ID was I Corps’ main effort throughout Pacific Pathways 15-02 (07 JUL to 30 OCT 2015) and provided the 3rd Brigade Combat Team(-), 25ID (3/25), and those enablers required to support all phases of the exercise. Finally, the 593rd ESC, as a supporting effort, assisted with RSOI coordination, liaison, and sustainment throughout the overall Pacific sustainment enterprise.

Exercise Hamel



(FOUO) Figure 3. Task Organization for Hamel.


(U) The Hamel-15 exercise (see Figures 3 and 4) is an annual Army FTX conducted at Shoal Water Bay Training Area, Australia, in support of the Australian Army certification for its “Readying Brigade.” The exercise included a surface air drop (SAD) from the 3/25 and 4/25 during the first leg of Pacific Pathways 15-02. (Hamel also was conducted under the larger umbrella of the joint and combined exercise Talisman Saber.)

(U) Hamel serves as Australia’s version of a combat training center (CTC) rotation, which is why the focus during the early days of Pacific Pathways 15-02 differed from than many of the other host nation engagements — it was a decisive action exercise with an American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Program partner. After 3/25 returned from its Joint Readiness Training Center rotation, it deployed to the Pacific Pathways exercise, receiving an excellent opportunity to conduct another CTC-like maneuver event. In addition, the 4/25 (from Fort Richardson, AK) provided 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment (Airborne)(-) (3/509), which deployed from Alaska and performed an SAD into the exercise AO and conducted an airfield seizure.

(U) I Corps assumed mission command responsibilities during Talisman Saber as the Army forces command for all U.S. Army elements in Australia included in the Hamel-15 exercise. The 25ID(-) and 3/25 deployed 28 JUN to 19 JUL 2015 to the Hamel-15 AO. The 25ID provided mission command by establishing an early-entry command post (vicinity Camp Growl) as a multinational division command node to facilitate the 3BCT’s joint CTC rotation with the Australian 7th Brigade. From 05 to 20 JUL 2015, in the


vicinity of Sam Hill (the primary training area), 3/25, in coordination with the Australian 7th Brigade, executed a movement-to-contact, passage of line, relief in place, and defense movement. The 4/25(-) and 3/509(-) conducted an airborne drop on 08 JUL 2015 and secured Williamson Airfield.

(U) Upon completion of Hamel-15, I Corps and the multinational divisional mission command node redeployed, and overall mission command transitioned to 25ID on 22 JUN 2015 for the remainder of Pacific Pathways 15-02. Subsequently, 3/25 assumed the Army forces command. Australia's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry(-) (2/27) moved to Townsville, Australia (Lavarack Barracks), and continued with host nation combined training events such as land navigation, small-arms ranges, military operations in urban terrain, U.S./Australian squad competitions, and cultural engagements. Simultaneously, elements of 3/25 began equipment loading and transition to the next leg of Pacific Pathways 15-02 — Garuda Shield.



(FOUO) Figure 4. The training area in Australia where the Hamel exercise was conducted.

Exercise Garuda Shield



(FOUO) Figure 5. Task organization for the Garuda Shield exercise.


(U) Garuda Shield (see Figures 5 and 6) is a bilateral exercise in the Republic of Indonesia. On 6 AUG 2015, the 3/25 transitioned from Australia to Indonesia, a torch party of eight to nine individuals (the advanced echelon [ADVON]) arrived 10 AUG 2015, and the main body arrived 15 to 16 AUG 2015.

From 18 AUG to 02 SEP 2015, 3/25(-) and 2/27(-) conducted host-nation training, a CPX, FTX, and other lower-level specialty engagements with the 1st Kostrad Division of the TNI. The CPX was a BCT-level engagement with a U.N. peacekeeping operations focus integrating the military decisionmaking process and staff processes training to coordinate and integrate multinational, interagency, and humanitarian organizational support. The 2/27(-) focused on strengthening the tactical proficiency between the TNI and U.S. forces through a series of FTXs such as platoon live fires; cordon and search; urban operations; troop leading procedures; company (-) defense; and mission command tactics, techniques, and procedures exchanges. Subject matter expert (SME)-level exchanges were tomahawk/knife throwing (instructed by the TNI), U.S. medical training, and Javelin and Raven weapons training. On 31 AUG 2015, 3/25 began equipment loading and transition for the Keris Strike exercise.




(FOUO) Figure 6. The Garuda Shield exercise is held in Indonesia.

Exercise Keris Strike



(FOUO) Figure 7. Task organization for Keris Strike.

(U) Keris Strike (see Figures 7 and 8) is a bilateral exercise hosted by the Federation of Malaysia. On 31 AUG 2015, the 3/25(-) torch party made the transition from Indonesia to Malaysia. The ADVON deployed 02 SEP 2015, and the main body arrived 04 to 05 SEP 2015. From 09 to 22 SEP 2015, 3/25(-) and 2/27(-) conducted host nation training, CPX academics/staff exercises, an FTX, and other lower-level specialty engagements with the Malaysian Army. The CPX, conducted in Ipoh, was a combined exercise focused on humanitarian and disaster relief operations to improve planning processes and develop standard operating procedures. The 2/27(-) primarily focused on joint training objectives by SME exchanges in the vicinity of Kluang and FTXs in the vicinity of Taiping. Joint exercises consisted of platoon/company attacks, evaluate/treat casualties, negotiate water obstacles, company defense, react to/conduct ambush maneuvers, movement techniques, react to direct fire, and establish a patrol base. Some SME exchanges consisted of medical training and engineer training such as counter-improvised explosive device academics and unmanned aircraft system training.



(FOUO) Figure 8. The Keris Strike exercise is conducted in Malaysia.

Chapter 1

Planning

(U) Overview

(U) Pacific Pathways involves a significant amount of planning from the Army component to the company level. Funding, along with the synchronization of the Joint Exercise Life Cycle (JELC), and the operationalizing efforts of I Corps planners continues to evolve in a positive manner with each iteration of a Pacific Pathways event. This chapter discusses some of the best practices and observations during Pacific Pathways 15-02 focused mainly at the brigade combat team (BCT) and below.

(U) Pacific Pathways involves long-term planning horizons, about six months for a single phase before actual execution. For 15-02, from January to June 2015, the planning included multiple conferences for the Army and three of its partnered host nations, across all warfighting functions, in multiple locations, in each country. A best practice discussed in this chapter is to put together a solid operational and logistical planning team early, manned by the same team throughout the planning phase.

(U) During the Hamel exercise, one issue (not necessarily experienced in 15-01) was the need for joint or multinational reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the Australian units partnered with the 3rd BCT(-), 25th Infantry Division (25ID).

(U) Observation: Units Should Sustain Operational and Logistical Planning Team to Maintain Continuity

(U) Discussion. The decision was made by the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (2/27) commander early in the planning process that the assistant S-3 and the S-4 (Logistics) were to be the battalion forward-planning team for Pacific Pathways. This caused significant friction as the battalion prepared to execute the 3BCT rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) two months before the Pathways execution. The assistant S-3 and the S-4 were conducting an initial planning conference at the time for all countries involved in Pacific Pathways 15-02, so they did not attend the JRTC training. This commitment enabled 2/27 to have the best overall grasp of operations and sustainment throughout the Pathways exercise. In contrast, 3BCT's primary planner was unable to attend the final planning conference (FPC), but he assigned a designated logistics planner (a logistics captain borrowed from the brigade support battalion) to manage the operations and logistics planning. While a division organizes itself differently (the G-5 Regional Engagements and Exercises is organized by region/country, not Pathways event), there was mixed planning continuity. The G-5 planner for the Hamel exercise remained constant, but the Garuda Shield and Keris

Strike exercise planners changed between the initial planning conference (IPC) and FPC, and again before execution. As a result, the G-5 REE representative lacked the benefits of attending a planning conference. On the logistical side, the G-4 was unable to send a planner to the IPCs, but was able to provide planners for the Hamel and Keris Strike FPCs (the Garuda Shield G-4 planner missed the conference at the last minute). There was a large correlation between the effectiveness/understanding at echelons and how consistent the planning teams performed.

(U) Recommendation. Planning team continuity is a best practice that should be applied at all planning levels. Develop the planning team, manned by the same personnel, for the duration of an entire Pathways iteration. Planning team personnel must be identified early in the process (no later than the IPCs). At a minimum, the team should include operations and logistics planners, and these personnel must be fully aware of their responsibilities and hold the appropriate rank. Planners must attend all necessary planning conferences, and other personnel must be attached to perform the planners' regular duties while they are away at the conferences and conducting the Pathways mission.

(U) Also, the addition of an S-6/G-6 representative is critical to planning and facilitating mission command. This individual's responsibility is to make major decisions that affect the overall mission with the full support of his chain of command. The partner nations will be sending officers in the rank of major and/or colonel to the planning conferences. While not all Army planners need to be of that rank, an Army brigade or division lead planner should hold at least the rank of major to avoid negative perceptions from partner nations.

(U) Observation: Planning and Coordination Responsibilities by Warfighting Function and Echelon Were Unclear

(U) Discussion. During Pathways planning, there were times when responsibility for planning, organizing, and sending requirements was not clearly understood. An example was in Garuda Shield contracting. The parties involved were personnel from the 2/27 and 3BCT; a representative from the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), who also served as the Army forces logistics representative; and a contracting officer. The contracting responsibilities were not clearly defined. It was understood that the executing units (2/27 and 3BCT) were responsible for generating the requirements, but consolidation and validation of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) kept bouncing between the 251D G-4 and the 593rd ESC logistics representative. As a result, the PWS and statements of work were submitted through multiple avenues — some direct from executing unit to contracting officer, some through division, and some through 593rd ESC.

(U) Who is producing what? Who is consolidating and tracking? Who is hitting that final “send” button? This all needs to be discussed during planning conferences.

(U) Recommendation. Clear responsibilities need to be established with particular focus on the following:

- Generating requirements
- Consolidating requirements
- Tracking requirements (exercise logistics synchronization)
- Sending requirements to the supplier (contracting, Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], etc.)

As a best practice, the battalion and BCT generated a consolidated requirements list, which better synchronized logistics with the division G-4. Division validated the requirements and passed the requirements list to the Army logistics representative responsible for final validation and execution with the Defense Logistics Agency.

(U) Observation: Delayed Detection of Force Cap Requirements Impeded Planning and Execution

(U) Discussion. The force cap for Pacific Pathways 15-02 changed repeatedly throughout the planning process. Second- and third-order effects of this uncertainty included the following:

- Class I (rations) and Class V (ammunition) supplies were over-ordered (in the Hamel exercise, the total passenger numbers went from 1,200 down to 600-700), resulting in significant time and money spent to deal with excess supplies that had to go back on the logistics support vessel.
- Manifests and materiel allowance lists were not clarified/finalized until after materiel and personnel processed through customs check points, resulting in last-minute adjustments to get equipment and personnel numbers corrected. This was mostly because confirmation discussions with host nations were not finalized and/or the results of those discussions were not passed to lower echelons. For the Hamel exercise, specifically, planners did not talk with budget specialists about funding for an additional charter flight until after the fact.

(U) Recommendation. When a unit is tasked for a Pathways mission, the force cap should be thoroughly discussed at the IPC; otherwise, initial planning is invalidated by unexpected changes.

(U) Observation: Certain Requirements Should Have Been Identified Sooner

(U) Discussion. Certain long lead-time requirements were not identified early enough to accomplish through normal means, which resulted in a significant expenditure of time, energy, and funding to ensure mission success.

(U) The requirements levied against a combined training event of this magnitude were largely focused on the logistic aspects of deploying and sustaining a combat-ready force. These issues were compounded by the addition of requirements specifying the conditions for entry into each country and the transportation of certain materials and equipment, both between nations and within foreign nations.

(U) Compliance with the established standards within the host nation is an extremely valuable means to cultivate common operating processes, which are the foundation of interoperability. In order to streamline this process, diligent and exhaustive planning must take place. Priority must be given to logistic and sustainment planners. The coordination of an extensive array of moving pieces is required to execute an operation of this complexity and size.

(U) The largest concern among the ranks was the customs clearance process. Soldiers were digging through checked bags one hour before loading the buses to try to remove contraband items.

(U) Recommendation. Identify and mitigate during IPCs any host-country requirements necessary to enter partner countries (i.e., passports, customs restrictions, etc.) through detailed advanced echelon preparation. If possible, conduct a combined RSOI exercise with host nation forces to allow mitigation of any friction points not identified during mission analysis, planning, and/or reconnaissance.

(U) Observation: Achieving Common Understanding Was Hampered

(U) Discussion. Uncertainty about the force package and enabler support required during face-to-face coordination during the operation to provide common understanding of U.S. capabilities. Additionally, understanding of the depth and gravity of the Hamel exercise was hampered.

(U) The composition of the deploying force was not established until a few weeks before deployment. As a result, the host nation was not aware of U.S. capabilities or enabler support until U.S. forces arrived. The result was a generic mission set and wasted available combat power that could have enabled the commander to initiate offensive movements more audaciously. Due to interaction at the senior-leader level, the coordination was made in time to complete the mission, but the training value of the entire exercise

could have increased with additional time to understand each other's formations, techniques, and operative processes.

(U) The depth and complexity of the Hamel operation was not clearly understood at the battalion/brigade level, which impacted what capabilities were funded for the operation/exercise. A great multi-echelon training opportunity was lost and should be captured for the next Hamel exercise.

(U) Recommendation. Identify and provide capabilities/assets by echelon to the host nation to meet training objectives early in the planning process. This could be facilitated using combined planning sessions between the two training units up to and including a rehearsal prior to arrival in country. This exercise has tremendous potential to promote multi-echelon readiness for both Australia and the United States. Accordingly, ensure corps/division planners understand the opportunities available to train division, BCTs, and battalion-level operations with Australian forces and leverage these opportunities with additional funding/capabilities/mission command nodes.

(U) Observation: There Were Planning Phase Gaps and a Missed RSOI Opportunity

(U) Discussion. During the Hamel exercise's initial, intermediate, and final planning conferences held between U.S. and Australian planners, BCT representatives were not present. The absence of the brigade planners (especially the S-6) also resulted in interoperability gaps. These gaps caused issues during the maneuver portion of the exercise, decreasing effectiveness on the battlefield.

(U) A joint RSOI was not conducted between the U.S. and Australian units. This was a missed opportunity to develop relationships and ensure synchronization between units. These relationships help mitigate interoperability friction early enough to develop and implement solutions. In most instances, the first time U.S. and Australian counterparts met was in the maneuver "box" as the units began a time-constrained planning process.

(U) Recommendation. Foster interoperability during RSOI by performing the following actions:

- Establish a joint communications plan (include software version compatibility and ensure connectivity of all mission command systems).
- Conduct a coalition communication plan rehearsal.
- Conduct/facilitate doctrine exchange and clarification of acronyms and terms.
- Rehearse a sustainment plan (rehearsal of concept drill) to include a casualty evacuation plan (i.e., locations of Role I, II, III facilities).
- Develop coalition knowledge-management procedures.

- Conduct coalition maneuver planning.
- Understand how coalition headquarters uses and allocates battlefield enablers (i.e., unmanned aircraft systems, artillery, and aviation).

(U) Observation: Each Country Has Unique Restrictions on Information Operations

(U) Discussion. The rules and authorities governing U.S. activities in each nation reside with the U.S. ambassador to that country. Without prior approval from the chief of mission, nonlethal effects (i.e., military information support, civil affairs, public affairs, and combat camera teams) are usually restricted. However, with enough emphasis on these areas before a Pathways rotation begins, these teams can provide tangible, real-world effects if they receive the right approval and resources.

(U) Recommendation. Coordinate with the Pacific Command augmentation team and military information support team during planning conferences to authorize nonlethal effects. Ensure nonlethal enablers are built into the initial planning stages. Coordinate with nonlethal planners from each enabler unit to plan operations beginning at the initial stages.

(U) Observation: Short-term Deployment of Enabler Teams Disrupted Continuity

(U) Discussion. Three separate military information support teams supported the BCTs throughout the Pacific Pathways rotation. This required the deployment and redeployment of personnel in each country. This also disrupted continuity with the supported unit because these teams were from the U.S. Army Reserve and could deploy only for 29 days at a time.

(U) Recommendation. Provide military information support teams that can stay on orders for the duration of the Pathways exercise or use active duty personnel.

(U) Observation: Language Interpreters Were Not Requested Before Brigade Deployment

(U) Discussion. The 3BCT had one military interpreter for Indonesia and three interpreters for Malaysia. The interpreter for Indonesia was requested following the Hamel exercise. The interpreters for Malaysia were requested by a higher-level unit and not tracked by the brigade. The brigade planners did not have a clear method for requesting interpreters.

(U) Recommendation. Pathways planners need to ensure that all required interpreters are requested in advance of the deployment.

(U) Observation: Enabler Teams Were Not Integrated into Exercise Planning for Each Country

(U) Discussion. Enabler teams (i.e., military support, civil affairs, combat camera, public affairs, explosive ordnance disposal, advisory working group, brigade logistics support, and Web in a box) did not have the opportunity to input training objectives into the planning conferences for the exercises. This resulted in inadequate resourcing and support to the enabler teams. As a result, teams were assigned last-minute missions and objectives during operations.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure an enabler team planning representative attends the JELC for each exercise.

(U) Observation: Enablers Were Not Fully Utilized

(U) Discussion. Both the military support and civil affairs teams were able to integrate on the team level with the Australian Army during the exercise, which greatly enhanced interoperability. However, due to the pace of the exercise and the lack of familiarity with each sister military's standard operating procedures, these teams were not used to the fullest potential.

(U) Recommendation. Conduct a capabilities brief by section for counterparts prior to the exercise. This enables expectations to be managed and plans for an accurate account of the other nation's forces. Embedding nonlethal liaison officers from each military would enhance information-related capabilities throughout the exercise.

(U) Observation: Information Operations (IO) Cell Was Distracted From Strategic Communications Message

(U) Discussion. The IO cell has numerous objectives to accomplish in country to monitor and promote the U.S. Army's strategic communications message. This is an opportunity for the unit to capitalize on the Pacific Pathways mission, develop relationships, and promote cooperation. However, because the IO cell was occupied with training, including a command post exercise, the overall strategic communications message was hindered.

(U) Recommendation. Establish a separate IO cell with a full-time mission to conduct strategic communications messaging.

Chapter 2

Interoperability

(U) Overview

(U) Pacific Pathways 15-02 differed from the previous iteration with its significant focus on decisive action during the Hamel exercise. That exercise featured an Australian Army brigade (an international intelligence sharing network partner) set in a larger joint and multinational exercise — Talisman Saber. As a result, there were more interoperability issues than normal in the areas of networking, communications, doctrine, and the use of liaison officers (LNOs).

(U) Observation: Procedural Communications Interoperability Exhibited Problems

(U) Discussion. Even after the technical issues involving communications interoperability were identified and resolved, cultural and/or procedural issues remained. These issues included the use of distinctive call signs (i.e., Seagull, Sunray, Acorn), restrictive net entry and exit processes, and differing communications security (COMSEC) procedures. This makes the initial stage of any operation difficult if there has not been a successful transfer of both radio security procedures and established communications standard operating procedures (SOPs). Well-equipped LNOs mitigate this problem, but this is an expensive solution in terms of manpower and resources. Solving these issues with an LNO also restricts the implementation of a solution to the level where the LNO is embedded and can prevent organization-wide solutions.

Recommendation. Similar to the technical issue, a Joint communication exercise would be an opportunity to share radio procedures and rehearse COMSEC procedures before the operation begins. Use of LNOs is a must at platoon, company, and battalion levels; LNOs must be identified and exchanged early to achieve positive results.

(U) Observation: Technical Difficulties Affected Communications Interoperability

(U) Discussion. Although the Australian Defense Force uses several of the same make and model radios as the U.S. Army, there are technical differences that impact communications. The current communications and cryptological input devices are too complex to assume interoperability based on radio model or manufacturer. For example, different COMSEC input devices (Windows-based laptop computer vs. simple key loader) resulted in different software that affected whether certain radios accepted certain keys. Additionally, similar (or the same make and model) radios did not necessarily have the same hardware capabilities and frequency ranges, which led to incorrect assumptions about technical interoperability.

(U) Recommendation. Although communications planning and preparation before the exercise can be effective in eliminating major compatibility problems, the only true way to test technical interoperability in communications is to conduct combined communications exercises as part of an integration phase of the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process. Quick fixes, equipment, and LNO exchanges can bridge the problem for the short term, but a comprehensive search for solutions requires close coordination and a communications rehearsal exercise.

(U) Observation: Information Technology (IT) Interoperability Presented a Challenge

(U) Discussion. The forces participating in the exercise used various systems. The ability to communicate at all levels between coalition partners via a compatible communications infrastructure on an integrated network with the proper access is imperative to ensure a common operational picture that is shared between partners (i.e., FM communications, TACSAT, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], Command Post of the Future). This enables units to exercise mission command. In the absence of connectivity and IT interoperability between coalition partners, exercising mission command becomes a significant challenge.

(U) A message packet network (MPN) was established for this exercise, but U.S. forces had MPN access only at the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 25th Infantry Division, TOC. The MPN worked well at the brigade main command post in consolidating communications and offering SharePoint abilities, but it did not work at the brigade's forward command post and battalion level. The forward brigade tactical aviation center and the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (2/27), TOC lacked an embedded capability for coalition voice, video, or data. Those two elements had to utilize the U.S. Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) and SECRET Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) networks to report to division or 3BCT. This limited the ability of U.S. battalions to coordinate with the supported Australian brigade. The only coalition communications platform at all infantry battalion command posts were FM and TACSAT radio (the division command network) for cross-force synchronization.

(U) Additionally, limited success was obtained in using AFATDS. The United States used software version 6.8.0 versus the Australian version 6.7.0 over the Australian mission support network. This provided the Australians with the means to conduct fire support for U.S. units, but it was at a diminished capacity.

(U) Recommendation. Allow U.S. forces to use native wide-area network platforms (i.e., command post node, joint network node, Tampa/mission enclave node) to tie into the backbone of the MPN infrastructure. This enables U.S. equipment sets to integrate the existing coalition networks

into U.S. formations. Additionally, U.S. units can train on familiar signal equipment with coalition implementation prior to a multinational operation.

(U) Observation: Usage of Acronyms Was Conflicting

(U) Discussion. Joint forces from numerous nations participated in Talisman Saber and the overall Hamel exercise. The use of multinational acronyms caused confusion and reduced understanding across these forces.

(U) Recommendation. Pre-exercise documentation should avoid acronyms or, at a minimum, should include an attached acronym appendix. The use of acronyms across the forces during the exercise should be discouraged whenever possible.

(U) Observation: There Was a Lack of Synchronization With Joint SOPs and Systems

(U) Discussion. It was difficult to process supply requests and coordinate movements due to the lack of common systems and processes.

(U) Recommendation. During the planning phase, logisticians from all units should agree on common products and processes to improve synchronization during the exercise. These products should be pushed out in the exercise order prior to the start of any operation.

(U) Observation: Communications Interoperability (Communications Voice Security) Was Not Fully Developed

(U) Discussion. Due to other operational requirements, full communications synchronization during the planning phase and RSOI was never conducted. This timing shortfall created an environment where a complete communications plan was never fully developed or rehearsed. This resulted in significant issues during follow-on maneuver phases of the exercise. As units started the execution phase of the Hamel exercise, there was an initial communications plan that all units were expected to utilize during operations. However, due to the lack of development/rehearsals, the communications plan quickly broke down as contingencies arose (i.e., COMSEC compromise, COMSEC supersession, frequency hopping/timing, etc.). This applied to the frequency modulation [FM] and TACSAT (voice communications). Multiple reasons led to this communications breakdown, such as differing or unknown communications policies and procedures between Australian and U.S. forces. The following issues also were identified as adding to battlefield confusion for both Australian and U.S. forces:

- FM/TACSAT (voice communications diminished).
- Frequency hopping/timing standards differed (Australian forces used Kilo time; U.S. forces used Zulu time).

- Differing standards for generating and distributing COMSEC information.
- Lack of understanding of crypto-supersession plan (when COMSEC was compromised, not all units were aware of the supersession plan, rendering the units unable to communicate).

(U) Recommendation. The following must be completed prior to or during RSOI:

- Establishment of a coalition communications plan (include software version compatibility; ensure connectivity of all mission command systems).
- Joint communication plan rehearsal.

Chapter 3

Mission Command

(U) Overview

(U) Mission command during Pacific Pathways 15-02 involved testing and using commercial communications capabilities in support of setting the theater. In addition, the exercise provided an excellent tool to enhance unit readiness. The 25th Infantry Division (25ID) G-6 identified the need to use expeditionary communications in setting the theater and during Phase 0 operations. Expeditionary communication packages are easy to transport and provide the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) and SECRET Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network capabilities to allow units to establish a baseline of communication support in early-entry situations.

(U) Planning is critical to ensure the unit identifies its communications/information requirements in support of the mission. Pacific Pathways provides a vehicle to train and educate leaders and Soldiers on expeditionary communication packages. The use of commercial communication packages (i.e., ground antenna transmit and receive/mobile network emulator [GATR/MNE]) was key in establishing a network that allowed information sharing with U.S. partners.

(U) Observation: Pacific Pathways Provides Echeloned Readiness Characterized as Rehearsal, Reconnaissance, Relationships, and Repetition

(U) **Discussion.** In addition to the U.S. Army's traditional method of reporting a unit's readiness status, one of the positive outcomes of Pacific Pathways has been to achieve readiness at echelon. Although this is still evolving, it has been characterized as the ability of all units involved at multiple echelons and across all warfighting functions (WfFs) to rehearse. This includes all the required deployment activities within reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) repetitively over a 90-day (or more) period dealing with the "fog and frictions" in real time and space of the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR). For example, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 25ID, conducted strategic sea and air lift activities from Hawaii to Australia and into Malaysia and Indonesia at least five times. Elements of the 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and mission command elements of I Corps and 25ID also provided support.


(U) In addition, participation in Pacific Pathways activities provides an understanding of the operational environment by operating in and out of ports; over host nation roads and rails; and across different types of terrain, extended distances, and time zones. This experience offers a level of readiness that cannot be replicated in a single combat training center (CTC) deployment.

(U) Additionally, the fostering of relationships and continued interaction with host nation militaries are important because they facilitate access into and out of the sub-regions of the AOR through possible agreements or status of forces arrangements that U.S. forces may not have had before.

(U) Looking holistically at the Pacific Pathways operation as a means to rehearse, conduct reconnaissance, and build relationships by repetitively stressing all the warfighting systems across several echelons, the Army gains the experience to operate successfully in the Pacific AOR, which it has not been able to do for quite some time.

(U) Recommendation. The development of a deployed readiness assessment should be included in the Army's overall readiness model. Extended exercises like Pacific Pathways or others similar in nature (i.e., Atlantic Resolve) develop operational readiness and lengthen the readiness built during a unit's CTC rotation. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 (developed by I Corps) depict the 3BCT commander's assessment of the overall readiness of units deployed to Pacific Pathways and those that remained at home station. The figures show the unit's mission essential task list (METL) at the far left with the events or activities that support the task. The middle column shows Pacific Pathways activities that train the METL tasks, and the last column is the assessed effect on readiness.

3IBCT Pathways Deployed Readiness Assessment



(FOUO) Figure 3-1. 3BCT, 251D, readiness assessment chart.

3IBCT Pathways Home Station Readiness Assessment

[AS OF 22 SEP 2015 - COMPLETION OF PATHWAYS]

	Leader Dev / MSN CMD Training	Operational Skills / Training	Deployment Skills / Training	Sustainment Skills / Training	During Pathways Events	Post Pathways Effects
<p>MEZL: MSN CMD</p> <p>CDR/1SG Course</p> <p>WLC / ALC / SIC</p> <p>PCC</p> <p>JRTC LTP (29BEB)</p>	<p>TIGER BALM CPX</p> <p>T/5 CPX</p> <p>UFG</p> <p>TAC/TOC Shake</p> <p>BDE CPXs</p> <p>RRT/ERR</p>	<p>Defensive LPD/TEWT</p> <p>Support LPD</p> <p>NEO LPD</p> <p>Sustainment LPD</p> <p>Sec Area Ops LPD</p> <p>LFX Cert</p>	<p>Lethal TNG CONF</p> <p>Co/BN MET</p> <p>Sect-PLT Arty Cert</p> <p>IND MM</p> <p>SOD STX/LFX</p> <p>PLT STX/LFX</p> <p>OIC/RSO</p>	<p>VALEX</p> <p>EDRE</p> <p>PAI</p> <p>SRP</p> <p>NTC Outload</p> <p>CRE</p> <p>Dental</p>	<p>CDR/1SG Course</p> <p>LALC</p> <p>WLC</p> <p>ALC</p> <p>SIC</p> <p>JRTC LTP (29BEB)</p>	<p>Most battalions will have experienced slight degradation in MSN CMD due to personnel transitions through summer move cycle. Some exceptions are 2-27 (Pacfic, Pathways), 2-35 (CRP) and 29 (Tailsman S). Improvements will be made in leader competencies which will mitigate losses.</p> <p>Individual readiness levels will have improved through schools attendance and individual-level training. Many of the battalions will have sustained subordinate unit collective readiness through the execution of squad LFXs as well as several company level missions (i.e., PTA, Philippines, Guam).</p> <p>Deployment skills will have improved for many of the battalions through CRP preparation and assumption, as well as multiple deployments (i.e., PTA, Philippines, Guam). Additionally, improvement will be seen in many of the low-density, individual skills.</p> <p>Readiness will improve for sustainment skills IRT home station processes and systems due to high level of focus by battalions on this area, specifically through educating the formation and then checking systems/processes to ensure proper procedures are being utilized.</p>
<p>MEZL: 31 OFE OPNS</p> <p>MEZL: DEF OPNS</p> <p>MEZL: STAB OPNS</p> <p>MEZL: FIRE SPPT</p> <p>MEZL: NEO</p>	<p>CL5/BLS</p> <p>Medic</p> <p>WPNS Qual</p> <p>PTA (LW, HVY WPNS)</p> <p>JFO Cert</p> <p>Arms Handler</p>	<p>JOTC</p> <p>Co/BN MET</p> <p>OPN LPD</p> <p>NTC LTP</p> <p>Co CALFEX</p> <p>Guam SECFOR</p> <p>Arms Staff</p>	<p>VALEX</p> <p>ISOPREP</p> <p>OPSEC</p> <p>SERE 100</p> <p>CRC</p> <p>SAV</p> <p>LRI</p>	<p>PHYSEC (Vaults, Arms, Locks)</p> <p>Red Cycle Taskings</p> <p>100% SI / Coc Inventories</p> <p>GCSS-A Conversion</p> <p>XO Course</p>	<p>OIC/RSO</p> <p>WPNS Qual</p> <p>PTA (LW, HVY WPNS)</p> <p>EIB (25BCT)</p> <p>IND MM</p> <p>Guam SECFOR</p> <p>Philippine Mission</p>	<p>Individual readiness levels will have improved through schools attendance and individual-level training. Many of the battalions will have sustained subordinate unit collective readiness through the execution of squad LFXs as well as several company level missions (i.e., PTA, Philippines, Guam).</p> <p>Deployment skills will have improved for many of the battalions through CRP preparation and assumption, as well as multiple deployments (i.e., PTA, Philippines, Guam). Additionally, improvement will be seen in many of the low-density, individual skills.</p> <p>Readiness will improve for sustainment skills IRT home station processes and systems due to high level of focus by battalions on this area, specifically through educating the formation and then checking systems/processes to ensure proper procedures are being utilized.</p>
<p>MEZL: DEPLOY</p> <p>HAZWAT</p> <p>CPOF</p> <p>Driver's TNG</p> <p>Master Driver</p> <p>AT Level 1</p> <p>BISE/TNG</p>	<p>EDRE</p> <p>PAI</p> <p>SRP</p> <p>NTC Outload</p> <p>CRE</p> <p>Dental</p>	<p>JOTC</p> <p>Co/BN MET</p> <p>OPN LPD</p> <p>NTC LTP</p> <p>Co CALFEX</p> <p>Guam SECFOR</p> <p>Arms Staff</p>	<p>VALEX</p> <p>ISOPREP</p> <p>OPSEC</p> <p>SERE 100</p> <p>CRC</p> <p>SAV</p> <p>LRI</p>	<p>PHYSEC (Vaults, Arms, Locks)</p> <p>Red Cycle Taskings</p> <p>100% SI / Coc Inventories</p> <p>GCSS-A Conversion</p> <p>XO Course</p>	<p>HAZWAT</p> <p>ISOPREP</p> <p>OPSEC</p> <p>SERE 100</p> <p>PAI</p> <p>SRP</p> <p>AT Level 1</p> <p>SAV</p> <p>LRI</p> <p>Dental</p>	<p>HAZWAT</p> <p>ISOPREP</p> <p>OPSEC</p> <p>SERE 100</p> <p>PAI</p> <p>SRP</p> <p>AT Level 1</p> <p>SAV</p> <p>LRI</p> <p>Dental</p>
<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p>	<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p> <p>Red Cycle</p> <p>CSDP</p>	<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p> <p>Red Cycle</p> <p>CSDP</p>	<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p> <p>Red Cycle</p> <p>CSDP</p>	<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p> <p>Red Cycle</p> <p>CSDP</p>	<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p> <p>Red Cycle</p> <p>CSDP</p>	<p>UMMO</p> <p>ICODES</p> <p>CCO</p> <p>TC-AIMS II</p> <p>DST TNG</p> <p>Red Cycle</p> <p>CSDP</p>
LOE	JUL	AUG	SEP	HOME STATION QUARTER 15-04 (During Pathways)		
<p>Leader DEV</p>	<p>TIGER BALM CPX (11-25 JUL)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (CDR/1SG, PTA, WLC, ALC, SIC, RRT, FRR)</p> <p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>
<p>OPN Skills</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>
<p>Readiness</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>
<p>Sustainment</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>	<p>Various Schools / TNG / Courses (Ranger, PFT, Battle Staff, CHINE, CSY/CLS, Medic, WPNS, CQAT, Ammo Handler, CIG/RSO)</p> <p>1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)</p>
	CDR/1SG (11-25 JUL)					
	1/3 WPX (11-17 JUL)					
	RED CYCLE LOG RDT REV FUPL RDTG CSDP I CNDP Various Schools / TNG / Courses (UMMO, ICODES, CCO, TC-AIMS II, DST, CIG, XO Course, 100% SI/Cyclic Inventories)					
	C/716 COG INV					

(FOUO) Figure 3-2. 3IBCT, 25ID, home station readiness assessment.

Hamel

(U) Observation: Hamel Provided Another CTC-like Experience for BCT

(U) Discussion. The Hamel exercise is the Australian Army's equivalent of a U.S. combat training center rotation. The 3BCT had just returned from a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and immediately deployed on Pacific Pathways to the Hamel exercise, which provided an excellent setting for the 3BCT(-) to hone skills it had practiced at JRTC. A decisive action exercise, Hamel gave the BCT multiple opportunities to conduct mission command and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). The exercise also allowed the BCT to conduct actual maneuver in coordination with a multinational BCT under a division headquarters.

(U) Recommendation. Continue decisive action engagements with Pacific Pathways rotations to significantly enhance echeloned readiness for BCTs.

(U) Observation: Cell Manning Contributed to Combined Staff Integration

(U) Discussion. Most cells within the headquarters consisted of personnel from the United States and Australia. Over the duration of the exercise, this allowed for the various reporting formats to be consolidated by personnel who understood the respective formats.

(U) Recommendation. During future Hamel exercises, cells within the coalition headquarters should consist of a representative from each contributing nation to enhance integration capabilities.

(U) Observation: Tactical Control of Aviation Assets Was Inconsistent

(U) Discussion. When aviation is under tactical control (TACON) of a brigade formation, the only person supporting the brigade commander's staff is a liaison officer (LNO). This manning and decision support construct is untenable, and information dissemination is sporadic and inconsistent.

(U) Recommendation. When division assigns TACON of the aviation element to a subordinate formation, the order requires the aviation element to also provide a forward/tactical headquarters element for the duration of the task. As a result, commanders and staff of both units receive the needed support.

(U) Observation: Embedding the Right LNOs Proved To Be Challenging

(U) Discussion. The U.S. and Australian units exchanged LNOs during the exercise. When properly assigned and resourced (the right personnel and equipment), the LNOs proved to be essential in ensuring that each

unit exchanged vital information about current operations, future planning, and situational awareness. However, LNOs who did not possess the proper rank, experience, and/or resourcing were found to have reduced liaison capabilities. LNOs exhibiting enhanced interoperabilities possessed the appropriate rank, experience, maturity, and access to the necessary equipment (i.e., radios, maps, field gear, and communications security [COMSEC]). Additionally, LNOs required the proper authority to “speak for the commander,” and an ability to maintain situational awareness of coalition units during maneuvers.

(U) Recommendation. An LNO must be able to enhance interoperability by performing the following actions:

- Exhibit competence and credibility.
- Possess the authority to speak for the commander.
- Have a current understanding of the overall situation.
- Be involved in the planning process.
- Understand doctrine/SOP/acronyms of parent and host units.
- Understand how host units utilize enablers and parent requirements of battlefield enablers (i.e., unmanned aircraft systems, artillery and aviation assets).
- Maintain knowledge of current unit locations and status.
- Possess or have access to proper communications systems (i.e., compatible radios, IT systems, security credentials, etc.) to communicate/contact parent and/or host units as needed.
- Be part of an LNO team that can conduct 24-hour operations.

(U) Observation: Combat Network Radio Reliability and Interoperability Presented a Challenge

(U) Discussion. Lack of adequate planning for a reliable tactical satellite (TACSAT), common VHF frequencies, and joint COMSEC key material (KEYMAT) caused unreliable analog communications on planned division TACSAT networks (especially for division fires and command nodes).

(U) Recommendation. Ensure signal planners for future exercises acquire TACSAT networks that are dedicated and do not demand assigned multiple access or integrated waveform. Also, ensure a common load set with shared Australian and U.S. COMSEC KEYMATs is issued to all forces.

(U) Observation: Australian and U.S. Signal Planning Synchronization Presented a Challenge

(U) Discussion. U.S. brigade-level signal leadership had little to no direct contact with Australian Defense Force Signal Regiment planners prior to the exercise. There were some 25ID teleconferences with engineers from Australia's local area network integration center and signal officials in the Australian Army.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure that future planning efforts for this exercise include a recurring technical working group (either via telecommunications or video teleconferencing) requirement at scheduled intervals during the planning phase prior to the exercise.

(U) Observation: Adjacent Unit Coordination Was a Challenge

(U) Discussion. There was limited information sharing and coordination between U.S. and Australian units. Lack of access to the message packet network (MPN) for the first few days of the exercise posed a challenge. The activation of voice-over secure Internet protocol allowed for limited coordination.

(U) Recommendation. Training value would be enhanced if a combined information operations section were created to synchronize information-related capabilities in both brigades. Another benefit would be for multinational partners to meet before the exercise and exchange capabilities documents to facilitate information sharing.

(U) Observation: Combined RSOI Was Challenging

(U) Discussion. Lead U.S. planners sent representatives from each WfF ahead of the main body to establish the architecture for planning and reception. These representatives (the torch and advanced echelon parties) were welcomed by the Australian contingent at Rockhampton, but unable to make progress in each WfF because the Australian-equivalent staff members were involved in field training. Not until the lead U.S. planners linked up with elements of the 593rd ESC was progress made on RSOI.

(U) Recommendation. Execute deliberate combined RSOI. Pair partner nations with counterpart WfF leads during the RSOI process immediately upon arrival to lay the foundation for larger-size follow-on forces. Nest all WfFs early (in relationship to RSOI) to set the conditions for the overall operation.

(U) Observation: Capturing Lessons Learned Must Be Developed

(U) Discussion. Too often, the U.S. and Australian armies commence planning or execution of an exercise without reading or reviewing the hard lessons learned from the prior exercises. Such information offers the logical place to begin planning so as not to repeat the same mistakes.

(U) Recommendation. Develop a central repository for collecting country- and exercise-specific information to share at future planning conferences, Pathways events, and real-world deployments. For U.S. forces, the 25ID G-5 should lead this effort.

(U) Observation: Systems Interoperability (Army Battle Command System) Was Hindered

(U) Discussion. Since U.S. systems are not compatible with Australian systems without proper configuration, U.S. forces were forced to send and receive information over the phone or in person (when possible). This was overcome through implementation of hourly calls being scheduled into the S-2 battle rhythm. However, it still left a great deal of room for potential misreporting and/or misinterpretation. During Operation Aqua Terra in 2014, the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) served as a testing hub that allowed both nations to communicate. As a result, a team of contractors were on site to bridge the gap between the U.S. SIPR and the Australian system.

(U) Throughout Hamel, however, communication between higher and lower echelons was hindered by the capability of each unit. The MPN was intended to be the common system disseminating and receiving intelligence between partner units, but U.S. and Australian battalions lacked MPN capability (MPN services were provided only to the brigade level and above). This lack of access significantly delayed reporting time and ultimately degraded the collective understanding of the common operational picture. (Miscommunication prior to the deployment also contributed to the problem.) As a result, all intelligence reporting had to be passed via radio communications, which was often limited, causing nonreceipt of intelligence products from the brigade S-2 to the forward deployed forces.

(U) Recommendation. Provide equipment read-ahead/training material in order to prepare coalition forces to understand functionality of platforms and interfaces and prepare forces before exercise execution. Ensure that ABCS support is dedicated to (but not reliant upon) this exercise to ensure connectivity between systems. Ensure each unit at each echelon is aware of and deploys with the capability to communicate via classified means (SIPR). Also, ensure each unit at every echelon is aware of the need to

bring a computer system that can be imaged to MPN. The MPN services should be provided to the battalion level. Understand that when a battalion is attached to a partner brigade, it does not have any digital means to communicate.

(U) Observation: Combat Network Radio Interoperability Posed a Challenge

(U) Discussion. Upon arrival at Pacific Pathways 15-02, U.S. forces were notified to load a different key into TACSAT radios to facilitate communication with the Australian Army. After arriving at the Sam Hill location, frequency modulation (FM) communications were tested with the Australian forces and it was discovered that the Australians and 7th Brigade had different load sets.

(U) Recommendation. The proper keys and load sets need to be issued to all participants prior to the exercise. This enables units to focus elsewhere without having to find the appropriate keys and load sets during a critical phase of setting up and troubleshooting on other systems. Prior to the exercise, execute a division technical working integration group with each unit to do one final synchronization.

(U) Observation: Frequency-hop Capabilities Between Multinational Units Required Troubleshooting

(U) Discussion. During Hamel, 3BCT, 25ID, attempted to conduct an FM frequency-hop radio check with the Australian unit and discovered that the radios had not been programmed. Australian units use an ARC-210 radio, which loads differently from U.S. unit radios. Although the Australian brigade received the U.S. load set information, extensive troubleshooting was necessary to get positive FM communications with a frequency hop.

(U) Recommendation. The load set should be built to meet the requirement for all elements that have ground and air-to-ground communications. This is critical for interoperability with the Australian Army.

(U) Observation: Partnership Stage-setter and Initial Social Interaction Were Hindered

(U) Discussion. Pacific Pathways 15-02 lacked an introductory event involving tactical-level leaders from partner forces. This hampered opportunities to introduce key players, exchange contact information, understand capabilities, and build initial partnerships.

(U) Recommendation. Prior to the beginning of any multinational exercise, an event should be organized to introduce leaders from participating forces to lay a foundation for partnership building between the allied forces.

Garuda Shield and Keris Strike

(U) Observation: Planning, Coordinating, and Building Relationships Are Critical in Establishing and Maintaining a Communications Network

(U) Discussion. 25ID identified multiple challenges in standing up the network to support mission command for the Pacific Pathways exercise. The division must deal with a vast area of operations, over 1 million square miles, as well as interoperability with joint and coalition units. During the planning process, the division identified the capabilities requirements and coordinated with different agencies for support. The division does not have network authority or permissions throughout the AOR, so coordination and relationship building are key. The division sent an LNO to the regional hub node (RHN) in Okinawa to build a relationship with the partner nation and assist the RHN in establishing the connection.

(U) The LNO provided assistance and ensured there was an understanding of what the unit required for connectivity. This also provided professional development for the LNO and enhanced the relationship between these organizations.

(U) Additionally, the division established a relationship throughout the command with signal support, U.S. Army-Pacific Command, 311th Signal Command, and 516th Theater Signal Brigade to understand requirements and assist in troubleshooting. This collaboration provided LNOs with a better understanding of new capabilities, the expeditionary communication package, and configuring the network to support.

(U) Recommendation. Sustain the ability to identify requirements/capabilities to support the exercise. Continue to coordinate and build relationships with outside supporting agencies through collaborative efforts of assigned LNOs.

(U) Observation: Utilization of an Expeditionary Communication Package Proved Beneficial

(U) Discussion. To address the challenges of supporting Pacific Pathways 15-02, the G-6 used an expeditionary communications construct to establish a communication network. The expeditionary communication package provided capabilities/features that supported the division's mission during the exercise.

(U) The expeditionary communications package requires the unit to own and operate the equipment without the requirement of a field service representative.

(U) Use existing capabilities from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), which supports reachback to home station (Hawaii) by the following:

- Leveraging RHN assets.
- Providing a package that can be tailored to meet the unit's missions.
- Offering easy to use, requiring fewer people forward.
- Providing greater flexibility for command post operations.
- Including a GATR inflatable, satellite communication terminal.

(U) The division leverages DISA and RHN assets to provide the backbone and reachback capabilities for the exercises. The expeditionary communications package:

- Is small enough to be deployed commercially (easily fits on a C-17 aircraft), providing flexibility and reducing resources to set up and maintain.
- Supports division tactical and BCTs.
- Offers connectivity for units located in remote areas (Indonesia and Malaysia) to the RHN with reachback to Schofield Barracks, HI, for services.
- Furnishes multiple capabilities in support of the command.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to integrate expeditionary communication systems/package into units for early entry/expeditionary missions and operations.

(U) Observation: Network Operations (NETOPS) Was Challenged with Help Desk and Reachback

(U) Discussion. The division encountered challenges in managing the network over a vast area, to include troubleshooting and help desk operations. No one with expertise in network functions was available in the unit's chain of command. The division did not have the authority or permissions necessary to manage the network. Coordination with those agencies that control the network was key to building and maintaining the network for the AOR. The G-6 conducted key-leader engagements with senior signal personnel of supporting agencies to enhance unit awareness of the division's priorities. The division used LNOs and a relationship with the Radar Control Computer Program, RHN, and DISA to mitigate the risk and ensure that associated elements understood the division's communication requirements.

(U) To help with troubleshooting, the division created a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week chat room for troubleshooting links and systems. The chat room provided access to subject matter experts within the NETOPS area

and those in Hawaii for assistance with links, switch/router configuration, and/or systems issues. The unit had reachback to home station and those capabilities needed to assist with communication challenges. The unit also assigned LNOs to the help desk in Hawaii to assist with troubleshooting and provide assistance to other help desk personnel on the Pacific Pathways unit operations and communication needs.

(U) Recommendation. Units should assign LNOs to assist with relationship building and coordinate communication requirements with/between supporting agencies, plus establish a reachback help desk operation to support network troubleshooting.

(U) Observation: Expeditionary Cyber Defense Posed a Challenge

(U) Discussion. Expeditionary systems lack protection in Phase 0 operations. Tools available today are designed to protect against mission command system (i.e., ABCS) servers on a closed network (SIPR). Unit G-6s need the ability to scan/patch/monitor/detect and remediate vulnerabilities on expeditionary communication systems. The division requires access to tools to scan and assess cyber threats and the ability to remotely manage those tools.

(U) Recommend. The division should have access to scan and assess tools for the expeditionary communication package either within its NETOPS AOR or within theater (the Network Enterprise Center or Regional Cyber Center).

(U) Observation: Integration of Tactical and Strategic Communications (Phase 0) Presented a Challenge

(U) Discussion. During Phase 0 operations, mission command systems take time to set up, but do not provide a medium for sharing information with coalition partners/host nation. The unit used expeditionary communication packages (MNE, GATR, and Tampa) to establish early-entry communications and connectivity with the host nation. During the early part of the operations, the naval ship loaded with the unit's organic communication systems (Warfighter Information Network–Tactical [WIN-T]/Joint Network Node) ran aground and delayed the arrival of communications equipment. The division sent the expeditionary communications package via commercial air, however, and was able establish a network to support operations in a timely manner.

The challenge was transitioning to the WIN-T system. The expeditionary communication package provided an early-entry capability that enabled units to establish organic systems. In addition, mission command systems do not share information with coalition partners due to a lack of capabilities, but the expeditionary communications package establishes connectivity with the NIPR that can provide interface capabilities.

(U) Recommendation. Incorporate an expeditionary communications package during early-entry operations to support the transition needed to establish tactical communication.

(U) Observation: CTC Rotation Lacked the Utilization of Communication Systems for Phase 0 Operations

(U) Discussion. The CTC rotation prior to Pacific Pathways did not provide the unit with the opportunity to train and/or utilize the expeditionary communications package. The CTC rotation focused on decisive action and exercised the unit's go-to-war communications (WIN-T). The unit went from the CTC rotation directly to the Pacific Pathways exercise. Although the unit's staff procedures and processes were well developed, personnel had to quickly learn, set up, and maintain the expeditionary communications package. Fortunately, due to the minimum training required for the systems, unit personnel were able to train and operate the system successfully during the exercise.

(U) Recommendation. The CTC should integrate expeditionary communications package training for Phase 0 operations.

(U) Observation: Pacific Pathways Provides a Good Operational Environment for Testing Capabilities

(U) Discussion. 25ID, in conjunction with the Joint Staff J-6, evaluated emerging communications equipment. Expeditionary communication systems were tested to validate capabilities and training formats in an operational environment.

(U) The G-6 (working with the J-6), 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Infantry Division, 25ID, and the U.S. Marine Corps provided Joint Special Operations Command technologies to conventional force units. Capabilities are "gap-fillers" to bring increased technology and information such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration; air/ground linkage; and high-capacity data to Soldiers. The 25ID is collaborating in the spiral development of technologies to determine suitability for Pacific Pathways' unique mission sets. The division goals are to determine the capability/suitability for expeditionary operations, reachback requirements, operability by division Soldiers, and capabilities associated with coalition partners.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to use the Pacific Pathways exercise as another venue to test and validate capabilities the Army can use in the future.

(U) Observation: There Was a Lack of COMSEC Support After Hamel

(U) Discussion. COMSEC support for Pacific Pathways ended after Hamel, with the departure of the brigade COMSEC custodian. The 2/27 had to rely on existing fills in the simple key loaders (SKLs) for the duration of the exercise. When these fills experienced database corruptions, units had no alternative means to acquire COMSEC remotely. The only means of reacquiring COMSEC was from the division G-6, who arrived with two SKLs that had to be shared across the battalion due to compatibility issues with the organic SKLs.

(U) Recommendation. Acquire system test equipment for phone/computer-fill cable (and appropriate authorization to use this equipment) from brigade before deployment. Ensure SKLs have similar firmware versions.

(U) Observation: Analog (FM/TACSAT) Troubleshooting Proved Challenging

(U) Discussion. Troubleshooting for various analog systems was not done in a timely manner, resulting in flawed communications during various stages of the exercise. Lack of troubleshooting experience contributed to delays in fixing simple user errors or identifying faulty equipment.

(U) Recommendation. The S-6 should perform the following:

- Continue to provide radio/telephone operator (RTO) academy training once per quarter to ensure personnel are proficient with operating equipment.
- Establish a weekly communications class (open to the battalion) to ensure continuous proficiency between RTO academy dates.
- Send communications representatives to Company B and headquarters, headquarters company in the near future.

Chapter 4

Movement and Maneuver

(U) Overview

(U) Pacific Pathways 15-02 offered participating units an opportunity to conduct multiple repetitions of maneuver forces while incorporating partner nations. Pacific Pathways provided realism and increased overall readiness in a way that cannot be accomplished during a combat training center rotation. However, there were areas that could be improved, including the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), the exchange and understanding of standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the integration of enablers.

Hamel

(U) Observation: Aviation Support Coordination Presented a Challenge

(U) Discussion. Several differences in U.S. and Australian aviation procedures and terminology created points of friction during the air assault and air movement. The differences involved pickup zone control procedures, in-flight communication plans, and pre-mission planning and checklists. Aviation support coordination became more deliberate as these gaps became evident. The challenges were mitigated by the direct involvement of the Australian 7th Brigade Commander with his U.S. counterpart, ensuring a successful exercise.

(U) Recommendation. Air mission briefings and coordination of air mission tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should take place during the initial planning and final planning conferences. This provides time for the partner units to come to a common understanding of TTPs and doctrine, which will facilitate multinational aviation operations during the exercise.

(U) Observation: Incorporating Liaison Officers (LNOs) Is Key to Multinational Operations

(U) Discussion. U.S. and Australian planners put substantial energy toward a robust LNO network to include using noncommissioned officers (NCOs). As predicted, this network proved invaluable during all aspects of the Hamel exercise and is a “sustain” for future iterations, with a few enhancements.

(U) Recommendation. A robust LNO network must be sustained, but recommended enhancements include the following:

- Conduct a combined LNO “academy” during the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) period.
- Trade unit-level LNO standard operating procedures (SOPs) if they exist.

- Equip LNOs with partner nation radios.
- Standardize LNO report formats and required report windows.
- Provide only top-notch officers and NCOs to serve as LNOs.
- Consider sending LNOs to attend the planning conferences.

(U) Observation: Multinational Cross-attachments Facilitate Interoperability

(U) Discussion. U.S. and Australian forces took only meager steps toward cross-attaching maneuver formations. Not until the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was wholly task-organized under the Australian 7th Brigade did such cross-attaching occur.

(U) Recommendation. Consider cross-attaching a minimum of one company-size maneuver unit to each formation (for example, one Australian company to the U.S. formation, and one U.S. company to the Australian formation). The purpose of this task organization is to truly combine and test interoperability. Both elements should maintain a running after action report during the cross-attached period to be distributed and shared following operations. **Note:** Cross-attaching a battalion-size maneuver element (vs. company-size) should be a point of discussion between nations.

(U) Planners from both nations should strongly consider habitually incorporating company-size elements (at a minimum) during U.S./Australian home station training events like the 25th Infantry Division's (25ID) Lightning Forge exercise.

(U) Observation: Hamel-specific Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP) With Counterparts Is Needed

(U) Discussion. With the exception of the Australian defense coordinating officer, combined (U.S. and Australian) movement and maneuver planning did not occur for the first time until the Hamel exercise was well underway — and only in the form of air mission planning with the direct involvement of the 7th Brigade Commander.

(U) Recommendation. The first step of MDMP (receipt of mission) should be conducted with Australian counterparts. A facility/location that supports combined planning efforts (i.e., Camp Rocky or similar) would greatly enhance interoperability and set the tone for the rest of the operation. Subsequent steps of MDMP (i.e., mission analysis; course of action development, analysis, comparison, approval; and orders production) should further emphasize combined efforts. Ideally, U.S. and Australian forces should depart the combined planning site for the first time only after completion of the combined arms rehearsal (CAR). Once “in the fight,” make in-person touch points a first priority, followed by video-teleconference mechanisms for virtual planning as a second priority.

(U) Observation: Tactical SOPs Should Be Exchanged

(U) Discussion. At the tactical level, U.S. and Australian maneuver forces never formerly traded SOPs prior to, or during, the Hamel exercise. Before certain actions occurred, forces discussed nuanced aspects of maneuver (such as helicopter landing site markings or load/offload procedures), but lacked a comprehensive guide to 3rd Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 251D, or 7th Brigade fighting at the tactical level.

(U) Recommendation. Trade tactical SOPs during the initial planning conference, or sooner, down to the battalion level months before the Hamel exercise. Once on the ground during RSOI, conduct 3BCT and 7th Brigaded SOP briefs. At a minimum, ensure combined forces understand how the other performs the following:

- Reacts to contact.
- Sequences an attack.
- Marks friendly vehicles.
- Camouflages personnel and equipment.
- Conducts basic patrolling (hand/arm signals, patrol base establishment, danger area crossing).
- Executes basic radio procedures.

(U) Observation: Attachment of Teams to 7th Brigade Provided Training Benefit

(U) Discussion. The 7th Brigade requested that the brigade tactical psychological operations and civil affairs teams be attached to the unit. This was a good strategic decision based on the area of operations of each brigade. The U.S. teams received rewarding experiences and the 7th Brigade benefited from the diverse capabilities.

(U) Recommendation. Continue to mix forces between the U.S. and Australian units in future exercises to create challenging and rewarding experiences.

(U) Observation: Use of Enablers on the Battlefield in Support of Friendly Maneuvers Was Difficult

(U) Discussion. The coordination and synchronization of enablers is more complex when operating in a coalition environment. U.S. forces encountered issues when requesting enablers (aviation assets, artillery, unmanned aircraft systems [UAS], etc.) from the coalition's higher headquarters. This friction was compounded by differing partner nation doctrines, planning guidance, and schools of thought (best practices) on how to employ enablers on the battlefield. Numerous interoperability issues surfaced when U.S. and Australian units used enablers for such events as air

assault planning and execution; casualty evacuation plan; fire support plan; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning. Much of the friction experienced by units during this exercise could have been reduced or eliminated by addressing it during prior planning conferences and RSOI.

(U) Recommendation. A full and complete understanding of how coalition partners plan to utilize battlefield enablers must be captured during the planning phases and RSOI. It cannot be assumed that enablers will be allocated in accordance with normal SOPs. The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies' Program (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook and ABCA Two-Star Headquarters Handbook provide pertinent information that can assist commanders and planners in mitigating interoperability issues.

(U) Observation: Establishing a CAR is Critical

(U) Discussion. Conducting a CAR is a critical element of predeployment preparation to fortify the interoperability of multinational divisions in the execution of air and fires operations.

(U) Recommendation. Establish and maintain prior to deployment a CAR that focuses on the concept of combined arms actions expected in coming operations. This rehearsal is critical in supporting interoperability of formations within a multinational division.

Garuda Shield and Keris Strike

(U) Observation: Team Call Signs and Differing Grid Coordinate Systems Created Challenges

(U) Discussion. When one company split into teams, the tactical operations center continued to use its internal call signs, which, along with the Malaysian call signs, caused unnecessary conflict. The situation was eventually resolved after assigning call signs: Team Ranger and Team Comanche. The Malaysians also used a grid coordinate system that differed from the Military Grid Reference System (specifically, West Malaysia RSO, Kertow 1948). True interoperability supports the ability to exchange grids for locations, call for fires and medical evacuations, and report other significant actions (SIGACTS).

(U) Recommendation. Prior to execution, there needs to be an agreement on call signs and which systems to utilize during the operation.

(U) Observation: Tracking System Was Beneficial

(U) Discussion. The Malaysian dismount tracking system (known as Ringtail Mojo) is a beneficial and powerful system. It is capable of providing a digital front-line trace in conjunction with a traditional analog front-line trace. The system is similar to the ad hoc digital tracker used

during the Hamel exercise, yet provides better maps, SIGACTS, three-dimensional terrain analysis, elevation and distance calculations, and a real-time UAS feed.

(U) Recommendation. While overdependence and reliance on digital systems at the cost of the analog system is a constant struggle for the S-3, employment of these systems is helpful when assessing real-time response and movement times. Continue to use within the S-3 operation whenever possible.

(U) Observation: Malaysian Army Forces (MAF) Transportation Requirements Were Delayed

(U) Discussion. Throughout the entire jungle field training exercise (FTX), there was a hefty need for MAF transportation, including 3-ton vehicles and escorts. These needs often had to be relayed to the MAF intelligence and operations representatives to facilitate, and this often delayed fulfilling the requests in a timely manner.

(U) Recommendation. An LNO must be appointed to directly facilitate and oversee the execution of transportation needs and physically travel with the executing MAF proponents to ensure timely execution.

(U) Observation: Conversion of Fragmentary Orders (FRAGORDs) Was a Challenge

(U) Discussion. The MAF FRAGORDs sent to company elements lacked detailed information and provided no more than 4-digit grid references. As a result, more detailed FRAGORDs had to be disseminated to Team Comanche via frequency modulation communications to facilitate ongoing operations and the final attack.

(U) Recommendation. When working with partner nations, ensure there is a Wolfhound-driven contingency plan for major operational updates to be disseminated to company elements during operations.

(U) Observation: Interaction with MAF Counterparts Presented a Challenge

(U) Discussion. Several times, the MAF battle trackers were unaware of certain SIGACTS and forward line of their own troops within Team Comanche and Team Ranger. Constant cross-talk, use of one another's systems, and familiarization with TTPs, however, enabled the MAF to eventually understand the common operational picture.

(U) Recommendation. Immediately lay out expectations for counterpart cross-talk prior to the operation (i.e., during the FTX) to alleviate confusion and relieve tensions that could arise later in the operation.

Chapter 5

Intelligence

(U) Overview

(U) When setting the theater, it is important to understand the area of operations: friendly, enemy, or threat capabilities; topographical and manmade terrain; and a range of other pertinent information. Developing baseline information is vital for conducting theater cooperation and engagement or, in worse scenarios, humanitarian or combat operations. The intelligence warfighting function (WfF) plays an important role in providing information needed to understand the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR).

Hamel

(U) Observation: Intelligence Interoperability Presented a Challenge

(U) **Discussion.** Ineffective information sharing occurred on multiple occasions when attempting either to give information to partners or receive information from them. Even though Australia and the United States are within the international intelligence sharing network classification group, transferring classified data between the two partners was not streamlined or even permitted at certain times. Foreign disclosure procedures were not conducive to the battlefield environment. A U.S. courier with secret courier orders was not permitted to take a compact disc with Australian secret material because he did not have Australian secret courier orders. What resulted was the use of subpar imagery and intelligence sharing.

(U) **Recommendation.** Identify communication assets and security constraints/requirements for mission command and resource appropriately.

(U) Observation: Digital Communication and Product Sharing Were Challenging

(U) **Discussion.** As it currently stands, 3BCT has the ability to use the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) and SECRET Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) networks as well as the message packet network (MPN). This allows the 3BCT to read reports uploaded onto a portal from the brigade level; however, it does not allow it to send or receive any products from the Australian partner unit that operates on its own secure network.

(U) Although 3BCT operates SIPR, the division is currently utilizing MPN only. Although MPN and SIPR are similar in terms of classification levels, SIPR cannot communicate directly with anyone using MPN (i.e., division and 7th Brigade) or DVSN. Instead, it requires 3BCT to load the documents onto a disc and upload to a portal on MPN.

(U) Further, and equally as important, 3BCT has no ability to communicate via e-mail with these elements except through NIPR. This presents significant challenges when much of the information to share is classified.

(U) Recommendation. Ultimately, 3BCT overcame these challenges through aggressive communication in the form of hourly phone calls to each of the elements described above. This was a temporary fix. Both nations should explore a common intelligence operating system to communicate; otherwise, make sure all LNOs have access to all systems in partner tactical operations centers (TOCs).

(U) Observation: Data Sharing and Analysis During Intelligence Planning Phase Were Limited

(U) Discussion. Only the base order was provided to 3BCT upon its arrival in Rockhampton.

(U) Because there was no Annex B (Intelligence) or Annex L (Collection Plan) and the order was very limited in scope, the brigade S-2 section, with only 24 hours to prepare a mission analysis (MA) brief, was forced to spend significant time tracking down the information needed to conduct MA effectively. This limited the depth of the analysis during this initial phase.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure base orders include the requisite annexes and are shared prior to deployment, if possible. If not possible, ensure that communication between unit S-2 sections is prioritized immediately upon arrival. Due to the lack of digital interoperability, this would require a scheduled visit to each partner unit's location. Ultimately, this would eliminate the time required to track down required information (i.e., enemy order of battle) and enhance the depth of the analysis.

(U) In addition, collocation of brigade TOCs during a multinational planning phase would facilitate analysis, data sharing, and collaboration ahead of an exercise.

(FOUO) Observation: Setting the Theater (Regional Situational and Intelligence Preparation) Was a Challenge

(FOUO) Discussion. In reference to echeloned readiness and setting the theater in Phase 0, gaining an understanding of the operational environment is vital. As Pacific Pathways matures, units must develop and have access to a comprehensive database/intelligence picture of the following information that spans the region and is specific to each country:

- Composition, disposition, strength, and capabilities of each nation within the region
- Terrain/topography and seasonal meteorological data
- Infrastructure, to include the following:

- Airports (major, minor, and remote usable airstrips)
- Seaports (major, minor, and identified amphibious-landing sites); during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, ports may be damaged to the point that amphibious landing sites have to be developed to project immediate support
- Roads, bridges, and applicable rail networks
- Major usable river networks
- Medical threats like disease, poisonous animals, and insects

(FOUO) Recommendation. Develop digital or hard-copy databases in the form of battle books of each country to include ready-made tactical intelligence preparation of the battlefield products.

(U) Observation: Theater and National-level Intelligence Sharing Presented A Challenge

(U) Discussion. Intelligence from U.S. theater and national-level assets is shared with the Australian Army with the restriction that Australia is not allowed to share the raw data, only intelligence products. When the Australian Army is the link between U.S. ground forces and the national or theater-level asset, it creates a situation where Australia is not allowed to share information that originated from a U.S. asset with U.S. ground forces. The assumption was that U.S. ground forces would always have a direct link to the asset or the appropriate U.S. agency from where the intelligence originated. However, this proved to be incorrect during the exercise.

(U) Recommendation. Educate both nations on what U.S. intelligence-sharing policies truly are. Agree upon a shared policy that allows Australian forces to share raw intelligence data with U.S. forces in the following cases:

- The intelligence originated from a U.S. asset (or vice versa).
- U.S. ground forces do not have a direct link to the originating source (or vice versa).

(U) Observation: Organic Plotting Capability Is Needed

(U) Discussion. Geospatial production was hampered by the lack of organic plotting capabilities because the brigade's only organic plotters were still in transit from the Joint Readiness Training Center.

(U) Recommendation. Purchase enough plotters organic to the brigade S-2 and geospatial teams to facilitate forward capability in no less than two locations simultaneously while also maintaining capability in the brigade rear (Schofield Barracks, HI). Also, purchase one additional plotter (total of four) to ensure the loss of one plotter does not prevent the S-2 and geospatial team's ability to support the mission.

(U) Observation: Geospatial Data Is Needed Prior to Exercise

(U) Discussion. U.S. forces had no exercise-specific data (i.e., routes, helicopter landing zones, operational graphics) before arriving at Camp Rocky. The initial data used to populate the COP was generated and digitized during MDMP, which limited the depth of the terrain analysis and resulted in some inconsistencies between the 7th Brigade and 3BCT COPs.

(U) Recommendation. Coordination before deployment for the sharing of geospatial data will assist geospatial engineers in the planning phase.

(U) Observation: Intra-Staff Communication Was Successful

(U) Discussion. There was outstanding communication between staff sections across Team Bronco. Despite little to no experience working with one another, members of the team came together quickly to overcome challenges caused by limited planning prior to arrival. This team effort occurred as the result of aggressive communication between staff sections and an overall willingness to support one another.

(U) Recommendation. Continuously reinforce the concept of successful teamwork. Further, reinforce the concept that the mission is a collective effort to ensure all members feel invested and remain committed to the overall success of the team.

(U) Observation: System Interoperability (Army Battle Command System [ABCS] Support Team) Was a Challenge

(U) Discussion. Since U.S. systems (i.e., Distributed Common Ground System-Army) were not compatible with Australian systems without proper configuration, the brigade intelligence section was often forced to send and receive information over the phone or in person. This challenge was overcome by requiring at least hourly phone calls to each partner unit as part of the intelligence battle rhythm. Although this effort undoubtedly paid dividends and helped bridge the divide, it still left a great deal of room for potential misreporting or misinterpretation.

(U) This is not a new issue. During the Aqua Terra 2014 exercise, ABCS served as a testing hub that allowed U.S. and Australian systems to communicate effectively. As a result, contractors were on site and able to bridge the gap between U.S. and Australian classified systems.

(U) Recommendation. ABCS support should be contracted to ensure that systems can talk to each other and, more importantly, that information is passed efficiently and accurately to facilitate the brigade's use of its ABCS.

(U) Observation: Digital System Interoperability (MPN, SIPR, NIPR) Was Hindered

(U) Discussion. Throughout the exercise, communication between higher and lower echelons was hindered by the capability of each unit. The MPN was intended to be the common system to disseminate and receive intelligence between partner units. However, since neither the 7th Brigade Commander nor 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (2/27) had MPN capability, reporting time was delayed and collective understanding of the COP was degraded. This was due in part to a lack of communication prior to deployment; 2/27 had the impression that it would not need to communicate via SIPR or MPN. As a result, all intelligence reporting had to be passed via radio communications, which often were limited. Additionally, 2/27 was unable to receive intelligence products from the brigade S-2 while forward deployed.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure each unit at each echelon is aware of and deploys with the capability to communicate via classified means (SIPR). Also, ensure each unit at every echelon is aware of the need to bring a computer system that can be imaged to MPN.

Garuda Shield and Keris Strike

(U) Observation: Intelligence Reachback Was Beneficial

(U) Discussion. Prior to deploying for Pacific Pathways, the 3BCT's S-2 cell established an intelligence reachback cell to provide continuous, real-world intelligence research, analysis, and production. Production included daily classified intelligence reports and open-source reports. Both of these were daily products generated by 3BCT's all-source analysts (military occupational specialty 350F/35F) utilizing the 25ID analysis and control element and providing situational awareness of both real-world threats and political/military dynamics for each of the Pacific Pathways countries and across Southeast Asia. Because the brigade staff was reduced significantly during Pacific Pathways and the S-2 worked across multiple lines of effort to support the daily battle rhythm, the support of this cell was paramount to the brigade's ability to maintain awareness.

(U) Recommendation. Build this into the brigade S-2's current home station battle rhythm. This ensures that the process and products generated become part of the fabric of how the 3BCT's S-2 cell does business. In addition to the training benefits, this initiative also provides the ability to conduct intelligence analysis and production well in advance of any anticipated deployment. This effort also will enhance the unit's overall readiness in both regards.

(U) Observation: Scenario Lacked Use of Intelligence

(U) Discussion. There was almost no reporting and very little sensitive site exploitation built into the scenario to allow analysis that could be provided to the company.

(U) Recommendation. Integrate higher-level reporting for the analysts to work the downward flow of information. Add sensitive site exploitation at the company level to work the upward flow of information.

(U) Observation: Analyst Follow-up to Company Reporting Is Needed

(U) Discussion. Initial reports from the company often were very brief, with little intelligence value. Analysts tended to write down SIGACTS, but failed to follow up to gain additional information needed for in-depth analysis on enemy actions or tactics, techniques, and procedures. The company did not want to interrupt operations to ask further questions, but it needed to collect pertinent details to assist adjacent units and conduct battalion-level analysis.

(U) Recommendation. Analysts need to conduct thorough debriefings after tactical actions. Resume the daily intelligence synchronization with companies to allow detailed exchange of information.

(U) Observation: S-2 Support to Current Operations (CUOPS) Was Successful

(U) Discussion. Regardless of reduced manpower, coordination across WfFs in the 3BCT's TOC improved during Garuda Shield. Although CUOPS was stretched thin, there was always someone (S-2, S-3, S-9, etc.) willing to cover down to ensure the information was being received and tracked appropriately (i.e., digital and analog SIGACTS tracker).

(U) Recommendation. Continue to reinforce the concept that personnel in the brigade TOC must remain aware of and involved in the fight — battle update briefings and common understanding of the battlefield maintain awareness.

(U) Observation: SOP for Communications During United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations Is Needed

(U) Discussion. The question “Who else needs to know?” takes an entirely different meaning in the context of peacekeeping operations. U.S. forces need to ensure that information flows up, down, and within the UN formation.

(U) Recommendation. Incorporating as many contingencies as possible, develop a communication SOP that specifically designates points of contact for information dissemination in the U.S. forces TOC and within the UN formation and humanitarian assistance organizations.

(U) Observation: Benefits of Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian Assistance Training Should Be Sustained

(U) Discussion. The academic portion of Garuda Shield provided tremendous insight into UN peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Even from a peacekeeping (security) perspective, there are multiple entities with which to coordinate. The timeline was adequate to allow the information to be fully digested and incorporated into mission analysis during MDMP.

(U) Recommendation. Sustain and develop this aspect of the academic schedule while maintaining the pace of training. Ensure the training audience does not become overwhelmed, resulting in a loss of important information.

(U) Observation: Geospatial Data for Garuda Shield-Indonesia Is Needed

(U) Discussion. There was no geospatial data available for this exercise. There was a lot of information included in the exercise, but none of it was geospatially enabled.

(U) Recommendation. Enlist the support of a geographic information systems (GIS) professional to help build a COP that is available for use on an open-source GIS platform (i.e., Google Earth).

(U) Observation: Closed Network Imposed Limitations

(U) Discussion. During Keris Strike, working on a closed network significantly restricted the intelligence WfF's ability to leverage open sources of intelligence and information. This affected the ability to conduct analysis of civil considerations, critical during a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) mission, which was a key aspect of this mission.

(U) Further, the closed network affected the ability to conduct terrain analysis. Already unable to employ the Defense Common Ground System-Army due to foreign disclosure restrictions, U.S. forces had to conduct terrain analysis strictly from the map or images provided by higher command or during academics. Although conducting terrain analysis on a map alone is certainly a critical skill, it limited the brigade staff's ability to achieve the depth of analysis typically expected at the brigade level.

(U) Recommendation. Incorporate use of an open network. Although access would need to be managed by the brigade, it would enhance the staff's ability to conduct open-source research and reduce the current reliance on slides and/or information provided during academics.

(U) Observation: Command Post Exercise (CPX) Constraints Dictated the Scenario During Keris Strike

(U) Discussion. A certain degree of flexibility must be accepted during a CPX to acknowledge and respond to work being done by its participants. In one case, a great deal of effort went into terrain analysis and threat course of action development for a meeting scheduled with an informant only to have the informant insist upon meeting at a new location. The new location was entirely notional; it did not actually exist. Therefore, real terrain analysis could not be conducted. In essence, this devalued the work put into analysis and evaluation of sites. This lack of flexibility further limited the ability to work through those requirements that are typically associated with conducting this type of meeting to include transportation, security, and exploitation.

(U) Recommendation. Allow for a degree of flexibility within the scenario. Allow the unit to take the scenario as far as it can to ensure the unit receives as rich an experience as possible.

(U) Observation: UN and Humanitarian Assistance Orientation Is Required

(U) Discussion. Despite the real possibility of deployment in support of an HADR mission, it is rare that UN or humanitarian assistance training is conducted beyond basic civil considerations. However, U.S. forces are just as likely to deploy in the Pacific Command AOR in response to a natural disaster as for any other reason. This possibility requires U.S. forces to be prepared to operate comfortably alongside humanitarian assistance organizations in such a situation.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure this scenario becomes a part of the Keris Strike exercise. The CPX portion of the exercise should require U.S. forces to operate under a UN mandate and partner with humanitarian aid organizations.

(U) Observation: Troop Cap Numbers During Pacific Pathways Hinder Echeloned Readiness

(U) Discussion. Although there are benefits as a staff section to execute MDMP on a reduced timeline without the entire S-2 section in a partnered environment, there are concerns in terms of U.S. forces infusing lessons learned back into the formation at home. One of the benefits of Pacific Pathways is the ability to gain echeloned readiness and for the S-2 sections to gain understanding of the environment and interaction with host nation counterparts.

(U) This concern is driven specifically by the fact that lessons are best learned through experience. Unfortunately, U.S. forces were not able to bring the entire S-2 section. Because it is imperative that the S-2 section

capture the key take-aways learned throughout the Pacific Pathways deployment and incorporate those lessons into the training and culture at home station, it is optimal to deploy the entire S-2 section. There is simply no way to replace the experience and readiness gained in a Pacific Pathways deployment.

(U) Recommendation. If possible, planners for future Pacific Pathways exercises should negotiate increased troop cap levels so BCTs can deploy as close to a full brigade staff as possible to gain the full advantage of echeloned readiness levels in the area of mission command.

Chapter 6

Fires (Lethal and Non-lethal Effects)

Overview

(U) Areas that are emphasized in this portion of the initial impressions report encompass the Hamel exercise and the difficulties that were encountered by the fires sections from U.S. and Australian units. Most difficulties dealt with the different equipment and procedures used by both armies. These areas could have been articulated in the planning conferences. This type of coordination between the two partner nations on procedures, equipment, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) would have enhanced the overall success of Pacific Pathways.

(U) Observation: Coordination Between Unit Information Operations (IO) Teams Was Limited

(U) Discussion. There were limited information sharing and coordinating efforts between IO teams. Aggravating the situation was the absence of message packet network (MPN) access the first few days of the exercise. As a result, units coordinated via secure voice-over-Internet protocol, but information sharing was limited.

(U) Recommendation. The training value would have been greatly enhanced if U.S. forces were able to create a combined IO section that synchronized information-related capabilities in both brigades. It would also be beneficial if coalition partners could meet before or during the exercise, as well as exchange capabilities documents to fully understand each element.

(U) Observation: Australian Public Affairs Unit Was Well Equipped and Trained

(U) Discussion. Australia's 1st Joint Public Affairs (PA) Unit is a well-equipped and well-trained group of PA specialists with capabilities equal to a U.S. brigade PA section. It receives priority for transportation, signal, and information technology (IT) assets.


(U) Recommendation. U.S. Army brigade PA sections should embed into the 1st Joint PA Unit during future deployments to Australia.

(U) Observation: Digital Fires Connectivity Posed Challenge

(U) Discussion. Australia uses version 6.7 of the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), while the U.S. version is 6.8/6.9. This prevented Australian and U.S. fires planners from communicating through designated fire support systems, and forced the planners to use an AFATDS hard-line connection at the division fires level. The 3rd Brigade Combat Team could communicate digitally only with the 2nd Battalion, 27th

Infantry AFATDS and the 25th Infantry Division (25ID) AFATDS. The 25ID, however, had to manually transfer to the Australian AFATDS for fire mission processing and geometries (and vice versa). Additionally, the digital thread was interrupted because U.S. forces were on MPN and the Australians were on a different network, thus raising safety concerns.

(U) Recommendation. Upgrade both forces to the most current version of AFATDS. If this is not possible, institute and agree on a viable alternate solution before mission commencement. Ideally, all forces will operate on the same network or have a counterpart (i.e., 7th Brigade AFATDS operator) sending and receiving mission tasking orders and shot/splash commands within the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). (See Figure 6-1.)



(FOUO) Figure 6-1. Problems with operating on diverse networks.

(U) Observation: Clearance of Fires Was Constrained

(U) Discussion. Utilizing solely the Australian fire support systems, U.S. forces were constrained by lengthy clearance procedures. A fire mission that required clearance was sent to the firing unit with “do not load” (DNL) instructions so the forward direction center could generate a firing solution and guns could lay on the target while ground and air clearance was achieved in accordance with the U.S. SOP. Once clearance was obtained, DNL instructions canceled the mission.

(U) Australian firing batteries (via division fires instructions) then required an air mobility corridor or weather restriction instruction to initiate the clearance procedures. If clear, this does accelerate delivery; however, if the ground or air is unclear, the gun line is now required to punch the round out of the gun, rendering it not-mission-capable for 5 to 10 minutes.

(U) Recommendation. Talk through and then walk through refined clearance of fires procedures. Incorporate combined nation TOCs in the talk/walk-through and repeat the process using radios for clarity before mission execution. Establish and widely disseminate the refined SOP, and manage expectations with ground units on realistic call-for-fires times. Execute a robust and detailed combined fires rehearsal during planning.


(U) Observation: Personnel and Assets Are Needed in the Fires Package (Expeditionary)

(U) Discussion. U.S. forces' inability to control fixed-wing air assets at the brigade and battalion levels during the initial phases of the Hamel exercise prevented units from massing fires on objectives. Once U.S. forces pushed the brigade tactical command post element out into the field, personnel operating AFATDS over a 24-hour period had to fill multiple roles, thus inhibiting U.S. forces' timely fires. Additionally, without any organic fire support or target-acquisition assets, U.S. forces had to rely on division-level support to process fires missions and asset requests. Without a liaison officer in the division fires cell, U.S. forces had a difficult time translating fires plans to division.

(U) Recommendation. Enhance the fires communications package with the following assets:

- AFATDS
- Four ASIP radios (one of them frequency modulation [FM] digital): two for brigade fires, one for division fires, and one spare
- Two tactical satellites (one for brigade fires and one for division fires)
- One high-frequency radio for FM voice
- Two OE-254 (FM digital)

As illustrated in Figure 6-2 (next page), positions identified in red were vacant for the Hamel exercise. Positions highlighted in yellow were vacant due to extenuating circumstances.



(FOUO) Figure 6-2. Hamel duty position shortcomings.

Chapter 7

Sustainment

(U) Overview

(U) Pacific Pathways remains challenging for sustainers in all functional areas. Some issues have remained constant throughout the series of exercises, but lessons are not being learned. Constant communication via sustainment synchronization meetings and requirements oversight council drills has been key to improving overall support to these exercises. The Pacific Pathways 15-02 rotation did a particularly good job of capturing medical-related issues. This information needs to be disseminated throughout the command because it involves the overall health and readiness of the force.

Hamel

(U) Observation: Class III (Bulk Fuel) Refueling Was Challenging

(U) Discussion. The Australian Defense Force (ADF) and the U.S. Army do not always use the same type of fuel for vehicle/equipment fleets, which makes refueling missions challenging in the heat of battle. The 3rd Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 25th Infantry Division (25ID), was able to draw JP-8 (a type of jet fuel) from either the ADF aviation assets or the 17th Forward Support Group's logistics resupply area (if located elsewhere in the area of responsibility).

(U) Recommendation. Sustain the ability to provide more than one type of fuel in the joint operational environment.

(U) Observation: Real and Notional Casualty Play Was Largely Successful

(U) Discussion. In notional casualty play, it often took more than 24 hours to get Soldiers returned to duty. The brigade task force concluded that the terms commonly used by U.S. forces were not necessarily used across the world. This highlighted the importance of having liaison officers positioned in several different units. Although notional casualties were at a minimum, a few real-world incidents also occurred. Fortunately, communication about the incidents and location parameters of the incident on the battlefield were always successful. ADF medical teams in support of the exercise were very proficient in providing Role I and II emergency care for ADF and U.S. forces. Patient tracking was simple via telephone communications.

(U) Recommendation. Led by the Army forces' early-entry command post, conduct a medical synchronization/rehearsal and practice drill before the commencement of the exercise. Ensure section personnel conduct the

military decisionmaking process with their counterparts. “Meet and greet” is important, but getting into the details of the operation is an added benefit. Use live platforms (i.e., aircraft) during the drill.

(U) Increase notional casualty play to involve more medical treatment and response scenarios. The medical treatment aspect was not stressed enough, and was utilized only for real-world injuries or illnesses. Prior to the beginning of the exercise, discuss rules on casualty play (how the umpire, operations center, and executive control would adjudicate casualty play). Provide the medical role and responsibilities to U.S. forces. Include topics such as wounded-in-action identification, what role of care (I, II, III, or IV) casualties should be evacuated to, and when and how notional casualties are returned to duty.

(U) Ensure all U.S. and Australian medical military personnel are given an opportunity to visit each other’s facilities (U.S. Role I, Australian Role II-emergency, and Australian medical surface/ground evacuation elements) before operations commence. Ensure contact numbers also are available prior to the start of the exercise.

(U) Observation: Medical Common Operating Picture (COP) Was Unavailable

(U) Discussion. There were no products available displaying all the medical treatment facilities/assets in play. This would be helpful for medical planning and potential coordination.

(U) Recommendation. The lead medical planner or operations officer should have an overall medical COP that lists all the medical treatment facilities within the area of operations to include contact information. That medical COP should be distributed to all units.

Garuda Shield and Keris Strike

(U) Observation: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration and Customs Support Were Successful

(U) Discussion. In contrast to Australia and Indonesia, the 25th Sustainment Transportation Company that was supporting Keris Strike in Malaysia brought several transportation management coordinators (military occupational specialist 88N) to support aerial port of debarkation and seaport of debarkation operations. Additionally, during the process of generating DD Form 1750s (packing lists) for redeployment, the 25th Sustainment Transportation Company coordinated directly with 3BCT to both receive and work through any issues identified. This alleviated the requirement for unit movement officers (UMOs) to run port operations and assisted in the accurate production of customs paperwork.

(U) Recommendation. Each exercise needs an adequate number of mobility personnel, whether it be mobility warrant officers or 88Ns, to assist the executing unit. This fills the potential mobility gap when UMOs are either busy with primary duties or inexperienced.

(U) Observation: Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) Operations Need Sufficient Personnel

(U) Discussion. During the field training exercise (FTX), the battalion executed CTCP operations. The original intent was that the CTCP would consist of a headquarters company, a forward surgical team (FST)/ medical team, an S-4, and an S-1. During execution, the S-4 would serve at the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) for connectivity and the S-1 would remain at the CTCP. Due to a lack of personnel and limited communications equipment, however, the CTCP was left with frequency modulation voice communications and a civilian wireless interconnection forum for data only.

(U) Recommendation. In a full execution of CTCP operations, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) should be at the CTCP to facilitate sustainment operations, with an officer-in-charge (OIC) located with the plans section at the TOC. This enables the NCO to focus on execution, while the OIC focuses on future planning.

(U) Observation: Late Timeline Changes to the Main Body Movement Impeded Operations

(U) Discussion. After U.S. forces arrived at the Pacific Pathways 15-02 location, departing flight schedules changed from one departure to two. This change forced Soldiers to depart Taiping with as little as 12 hours notice after returning from the FTX. This created significant stress on recovery and load-out operations and left no margin for error on movement or pack-out requirements. This also changed the ration cycle, for both contracting and rations, leading to wasted funds and excess food.

(U) Recommendation. Movement timelines need to be locked and disseminated earlier. Last-minute changes to the timelines have second- and third-order effects that waste funds and significantly impact training and mission execution.

(U) Observation: Class I (Rations) Were Over-Ordered

(U) Discussion. As in other exercises, there was a surplus of Class I rations at the end of the Keris Strike exercise. While the amount was reduced due to splitting the orders with contracting, there was still enough left over that coordination had to be made to move the excess rations to the U.S. Embassy for its use.

(U) Recommendation. As much as possible, especially when contracting Class I rations, break the orders into smaller, more frequent batches under a blanket purchase agreement. With accurate consumption tracking, this enables the sustainment side to cancel later orders so the unit is not left with excess rations.

(U) Observation: Multiple Contracts Were Adequately Supervised

(U) Discussion. During the Keris Strike exercise, the number of contracts to be executed was identified early and an adequate number of contracting officer representatives (CORs) were trained to provide supervision.

(U) Recommendation. As was the case in Keris Strike, a good dialogue with the contracting officer to identify COR requirements, followed by full staff support to execute COR training, is critical to successful contracting. It is important to distribute COR responsibilities so contracts are monitored successfully.

(U) Observation: Camp Mayors Need a Clear Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

(U) Discussion. During Keris Strike, the S-4 identified camp mayors for the 2nd Royal Engineer Camp and the 3rd Royal Artillery Camp. Both camp mayors took responsibility for their areas, but there was not a definitive briefing on procedures and responsibilities, nor was there a clear linkage between the mayor cells and the host nation personnel in charge of each camp.

(U) Recommendation. As part of the execution, there needs to be a camp mayors' SOP that includes the following:

- Coordination with the host nation
- Signing for and returning host nation equipment
- Daily and exercise tasks to be conducted
- Reporting requirements to higher headquarters
- A camp occupation and camp clearance checklist

(U) Observation: Class V (Ammunition) Management Is Needed at a Higher Level

(U) Discussion. During the planning process for Keris Strike, the conversation about Class V (how it was moving, where it was to be stored, coordination with the host nation) was done by either contracted ammunition personnel or higher-level safety personnel. When an absence of ball ammunition for the exercise was identified, however, those personnel did not attend execution, leaving the unit to make its own Class V arrangements on site.

(U) Recommendation. The responsibility of managing and moving ammunition should remain at a higher level. If subject matter experts are the planners, they should either come to execution or complete planning and send the executing unit a detailed Class V plan.

(U) Observation: Blood Procurement Met Mission Requirements

(U) Discussion. Blood products obtained from the Area Joint Blood Program in Okinawa, Japan, were procured, shipped, and delivered according to mission timelines, making blood products available throughout the exercise.

(U) Recommendation. Incorporate the Area Joint Blood Program early into Pacific Pathways planning, and use the following planning factors:

- Blood/plasma expiration dates may not cover the entire duration of the exercise based on customs/transportation timelines; plan for multiple shipments per location, if needed.
- Frozen plasma is an option if there is an approved toxic substances management policy storage unit and thawer.
- Identify a good shipping address, ground point of contact to receive, and local cellphone number.
- Include the address of the U.S. Embassy in the host nation on Armed Forces Blood Bank Center shipping documents to avoid complications or delays through customs.
- Make sure the defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy is tracking all inbound Class VIII (medical) shipments to assist with customs if needed.

(U) Observation: Host Nation Class VIII Purchase for Cobra Anti-venom Was Approved

(U) Discussion. Poly-variant snake anti-venom purchased for Pacific Pathways through U.S. medical supply sources did not cover treatment for a cobra bite. To mitigate this risk, cobra anti-venom was purchased at an international source of supply (SOS)-approved medical supply activity in Jakarta, Indonesia, using a government purchase card (GPC). This ensured that life-saving anti-venom would be available if a Soldier were bitten while handling cobras during bilateral survival training in Indonesia and Malaysia. (Fortunately, no one was bitten.)

(U) Recommendation. Coordinate with an international SOS for approved host nation Class VIII supplies in advance, and identify an approved international GPC holder authorized to make local Class VIII purchases.

(U) Observation: Utilization of Veterinary Service Support Was Necessary

(U) Discussion. The 218th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services) (MDVS) provided mission-essential food and water inspection services for Indonesia and Malaysia including food-source selection, storage, preparation, and serving at the command post and field exercises (to include cobras eaten during the field exercise survival training); logistical-support vessel's bulk-water quality resupply; and host nation food services quality-control training.

(U) Recommendation. Veterinary support services are an essential force health-protection combat multiplier, and should be integrated into future Pacific Pathways exercises. Include a representative at the final planning conference to assist in contracting food vendors and coordinating host nation military working dog and first responder training, if applicable.

(U) Observation: Timely Requests for Augmentation of FST and Veterinary Services Are Needed

(U) Discussion. The official request for the 250th FST and 218th MDVS for Pacific Pathways was made six months prior to the beginning of Garuda Shield in Indonesia. Refining the FST and veterinary package took two more months. This left a short period of time to coordinate personnel readiness, medical supply ordering, and multi-modal transportation required to support the mission.

(U) Recommendation. Identify the FST and veterinary package at the initial planning conference (IPC), and send the FST and veterinary chiefs to the final planning conference to coordinate force health protection medical coverage and medical training objectives.

(U) Observation: Class VIII Readiness and Re-supply Presented Challenges

(U) Discussion. The FST, veterinary support, Hawaii Army National Guard, and 3BCT medical teams did not have all required medical supplies and pharmaceuticals on hand prior to loading containers for Pacific Pathways 15-02. The 3BCT, specifically, had a very narrow window of opportunity to reset after completing the Joint Readiness Training Center exercise (15-07). Although the 3BCT placed a large consolidated Theater Lead-Agent for Medical Materiel-Pacific (TLAMM-P) order (on behalf of all medical enablers), only 91 percent of the 396 line items ordered was received due to the short lead time given to fill the order and meet the required delivery date to Indonesia.

(U) Recommendation. Class VIII planning considerations should include the following:

- Identify all active Army and U.S. Army Reserve units with Class VIII requirements at the final planning conference (FPC), and submit a consolidated Class VIII order to the home station installation medical supply activity and TLAMM-P no less than four months prior to mission container load-out date.
- Coordinate pre-customs clearances for hand-carried Class VIII items to support sick call and force health-protection requirements prior to receiving containers with medical supplies.
- Position an approved international GPC holder at each training location for command post and field exercise operations. These GPC holders must be authorized to make emergency Class VIII purchases from international SOS-approved sources.

(U) Observation: Host Nation Hospital Memorandum of Agreement for Emergency Medical Services Is Required

(U) Discussion. TRICARE-approved international SOS host nation hospitals are the preferred location for emergency medical treatment while supporting overseas operations. Unfortunately, not all training locations are located close to these facilities.

(U) Recommendation. If a host nation memorandum of agreement for emergency medical services does not exist at the local U.S. Embassy, a formal written agreement must be created and approved at the FPC by all host nation hospitals identified to support emergency care for U.S. Service members during bilateral training exercises.

(U) Observation: Infrastructure Presents a Challenge for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Plan

(U) Discussion. Indonesia's under-developed and congested road system made ground movement extremely difficult, with a 12-hour drive from Cibenda (an FTX site) to Jakarta (Role III). Indonesia lacks a rotary-wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) platform, and the CASEVAC rotary-wing platform provided at the FTX site was deemed unsafe because maintenance records were unavailable and U.S. safety maintenance inspections were not authorized. Additionally, the logistics support vessel used to transport equipment was not configured to support 25 combined arms battalion MEDEVAC rotary-wing air frames.

(U) Recommendation. Request a sea vessel that supports U.S. rotary-wing MEDEVAC assets for use during Pacific Pathways events.

(U) Observation: Second Medical Officer (Paygrade O-1 or O-2) Was Beneficial in Assisting Brigade Medical Officer

(U) Discussion. Having at least two medical officers (paygrade O-1 or O-2) at the brigade level ensured a medical presence at all necessary locations to provide such services as landing point designator and coordination for hospitalization and/or medical appointments for real-world patients.

(U) The experience also provided the medical officers with an opportunity to learn how a brigade operates and hone their skills as a brigade support battalion platoon leader/executive officer.

(U) Recommendation. Sustain this action.

(U) Observation: Preventive Medicine (PM) Team Successfully Conducted Operations and Training

(U) Discussion. The PM team not only conducted field sanitation and health and welfare checks on the Soldier living conditions, but the team also provided training to Indonesian soldiers on preventive medicine and field sanitation. Much of this information was new to the Indonesian Soldiers, and they were very receptive.

(U) Recommendation. Sustain this enabler in future Pacific Pathways events.

(U) Observation: Brigade Medical Operations (MEDOPS) Used Personal Phones to Call International SOSs and TRICARE

(U) Discussion. The brigade MEDOPS team used over two cumulative hours of personal international minutes to contact TRICARE for work-related purposes. Occasionally, the team was able to borrow the S-1's Blackberry when access was available.

(U) Recommendation. Brigade MEDOPS should be provided an international phone for Pacific Pathways events for work-related issues.

(U) Observation: Class VIII Readiness Levels Depleted from JRTC Affected Medical Readiness

(U) Discussion. The short time frame between 3BCT's return from JRTC and deployment on Pacific Pathways 15-02 did not allow for Class VIII supplies to be reordered. This had a direct impact on the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (2/27) Class VIII readiness.

(U) In addition, Class VIII supply orders submitted to the TLAMM-P did not meet the specified timelines required to meet Indonesian delivery dates for stocked/non-stocked items as designated in the TLAMM-P customer handbook.

(U) Recommendation. Units conducting combat training center (CTC) rotations prior to Pacific Pathways must perform the following:

- Ensure that required medical equipment sets and Class VIII items are forecast and budgeted at least 90 days in advance of cargo load-out dates.
- Comply with the order-processing times found within the TLAMM-P customer handbook.
- Plan for additional time to receive non-stocked items.
- Conduct the necessary mission analysis to estimate Class VIII needs for both a CTC rotation and a follow-on Pacific Pathways deployment.

(U) Observation: Coordination With Counterparts for Medical Exchange Is Needed

(U) Discussion. Proper coordination with the Indonesian medical counterpart was not done prior to deployment. The written agreement vaguely outlined a combat lifesaver (CLS) class, but the Indonesians were actually looking for a medical exchange, not a CLS class. Soldiers spent many hours preparing a class that ended up being completely different from the classes executed.

(U) Recommendation. Coordinate a global health exchange and medical subject matter expert exchange with the Medical Theater Security Cooperation Plan's country objectives developed by 18th Medical Command and refined by medical planners at Joint Exercise Life Cycle events. Getting contact information for medical counterparts in the early stages of planning would help the medical unit better prepare for this exchange. The medical counterparts could also provide better insight into creating the medical concept-of-support in country.

(U) Observation: Task Force Medical Enablers (Preventive Medicine Team, Veterinary Team, and Behavioral Health Officer) Are Needed on Deployments

(U) Discussion. In an austere environment, these medical assets were a force multiplier to reduce non-battle injuries and keep Soldiers safe. This includes, but is not limited to, testing water, inspecting food preparation, and assessing living conditions. Some key operations for Keris Strike included water-in-the-box operations, food vendor inspections, and product audits. The task force's behavioral health officer also provided valuable specialized support and experience to a host nation that did not have similar medical enablers.

(U) Recommendation. Include these medical assets with any task force heading into austere living environments and/or where external food contract support is being provided. In addition, continue to include low-

density specialized medical experts, such as a behavioral health officer, in Pacific Pathways. These enablers provide valuable subject matter expertise to the task force that is not typically available by the host nation.

(U) Observation: Translators/Interpreters Are Important on Medical Teams

(U) Discussion. Translators/interpreters are important, especially to teach medical training and translate medical class slides.

(U) Recommendation. Assign translators/interpreters to medical teams when engaging with host nations. Obtain at least one dedicated translator/interpreter for each medical team.

(U) Observation: Medical Preparations Are Needed Prior to the Keris Strike Exercise

(U) Discussion. Prior to the start of the exercise, several key medical preparations must happen, to include the following:

- Customs and clearance of goods (such as Class VIII medications) into country.
- Identification/establishment of host nation medical treatment facilities.
- Memorandums of agreement/understanding developed between U.S. and host nation forces.
- Country medical points of contact and TRICARE international/overseas contacts identified.

(U) Recommendation. The preparations outlined above must occur by the end of the FPC. The 18th Medical Command should be the theater enabling medical command that creates a baseline checklist of key medical preparation tasks with an annex detailing country-specific actions.

(U) Observation: Unit Medical Representative Did Not Attend Planning Conferences

(U) Discussion. Due to conflicting training events and other factors, the battalion task force did not send a medical planner to the FPC. For the command post exercise, some key medical-support preparations (i.e., host nation/local medical representatives contacted, host nation medical support memorandum of agreement/understanding completed, medical concept-of-support finalized) were not accomplished until after the exercise began.

(U) Recommendation. Send a battalion task force medical representative for each training location (preferably the participating unit provider or medical planner) to the IPC or FPC, or via a torch/advanced echelon party. These representatives should be on the ground to coordinate with key points of contact, conduct reconnaissance of training sites, and adjust the medical concept-of-support as needed to enhance unit medical preparations.

Judge Advocate General Issues

(U) Observation: Collaboration Among Contracting Officer, S-4, S-8, and Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) Ensures Brigade Staff Is Aware of and Plans for the Sustainment Task Force

(U) Discussion. Brigade planners can improve insight into the sustainment support that the brigade expects to receive and anticipates to provide. This is accomplished by acquiring and understanding two documents:

- The Exercise Administrative Support Agreement (EASA), sometimes referred to as the Exercise Procedural Agreement or the Exercise Support Agreement, which is acquired from the S-4 or exercise planners.
- The contracting brief, which is provided by the contracting officer (KO) assigned to the exercise.

(U) All anticipated logistics, supplies, services, and support (LSSS) received from the host-nation military is included in the EASA. Everything U.S. forces need to procure from the local economy (that exceeds the micro-purchase threshold of \$3,000) should be accounted for in the contracting brief. **Note:** According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101, in accordance with FAR 13.301(c), a GPC is authorized for acquisitions under the micro-purchase threshold.

(U) Between the EASA and contracting brief, brigade planners should be able to piece together a holistic picture of the sustainment package. The documents also enable the legal department to anticipate and preempt potential legal pitfalls. (At the brigade level, there were no intragovernmental acquisitions, so U.S. forces did not advise on Economy Act transactions pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §1535. For intragovernmental transfers, consult with the servicing SJA representative/office.)

(U) Recommendation. Meet with exercise planners, the KO, and the legal representative to ensure these documents are shared with key staff members.

(U) Observation: Brigade Staff and Logistical Representative Must Ensure Reimbursement of LSSS Procured Under an Acquisition Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA)

(U) Discussion. During Pacific Pathways, the legal office was approached by S-4 and G-4 representatives to conduct final execution of military logistics supply orders (MLSOs) for receipt of services. Over the course of the meeting with Australian logistics representatives, it was apparent that numerous MLSOs valued the services rendered at \$0.00. After further inquiry, the Australians informed the U.S. representatives that where

services were rendered with organic Australian Defense Force (ADF) assets, no charge was made. It was explained that while this was appreciated, it would be an improper augmentation to accept these services. At the same time, however, U.S. forces were operating under fiscal constraints and any increases to the projected budget, even modest gains, would have significant impact on future operations. As a result, rather than process the MLSO as a payment-in-kind, it was processed as a replacement-in-kind, with a commitment to provide similar services to the ADF within the next year.

(U) Recommendation. The SJA and Army forces logistics representatives and the Army Service component command's interagency branch should discuss fiscal law requirements for ACSA transactions to ensure U.S. brigades avoid improper augmentation of unit funding. These transactions, if feasible, should be processed as replacement-in-kind to avoid this issue.

(U) Observation: Exercise Operation Orders (OPORDs) Are Critical, and Mission Command Principles Need To Be Clarified When Ambiguous

(U) Discussion. Obtaining an OPORD for each exercise was invaluable, but gaining possession of the OPORD proved to be difficult. The OPORD is critical to understanding the composition and relationship between the task force and the myriad enabling units and advising the commander on jurisdictional issues. Moreover, knowledge of these units and the units present in country was useful on numerous occasions.

(U) The 25ID did not produce an OPORD for these exercises, however, and it was not until the I Corps Internet portal was studied that the OPORDs for Garuda Shield and Keris Strike were found. These OPORDs identified the 3BCT commander as the Army forces commander.

(U) Of particular relevance to SJAs was the mission command subsection 5(a) of the OPORD, which for Garuda Shield and Keris Strike designated all participating units under the administrative control of the 3BCT commander.

(U) Recommendation. There should be early and continued communication with the division operational law office, the G-5, and I Corps operational law office to ensure OPORDs are complete and updated, and the mission command sections are reviewed for administrative and operational control attachments.

(U) Observation: Disposing of Excess Property and Rations Presents a Challenge

(U) Discussion. The necessity of shedding excess property that proved economically unfeasible to ship on the logistics support vessel arose during each leg of Pacific Pathways (this also was an issue during past iterations of Pacific Pathways events). Units planning to deploy in support of future

operations should anticipate this dilemma. Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 4160.21, *Defense Materiel Disposition*, governs the process for donating, abandoning, or disposing of Operation and Maintenance, Army-funded materials. During Pacific Pathways, this issue arose exclusively with Class I (rations) supplies. After the Hamel exercise, U.S. forces possessed an excess of food (i.e., meals ready to eat [MREs]) and bottled water. Additionally, after the Garuda Shield and Keris Strike exercises, there was an excess of MREs and unit ground rations (UGRs). While the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual provides information about donating these items, intra-Army transfers (typically to special operations forces) proved to be the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars and the most expeditious means of shedding excess property. Collaboration with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was instrumental in this process. **Note:** When attempting to donate MREs and UGRs in Indonesia and Malaysia, donations are significantly limited by halal (Islamic) dietary requirements.

(U) Recommendation. Ensure SJAs are familiar with DODM 4160.21 and Economy Act transactions pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §1535.

S-1 (Personnel) Issues

(U) Observation: Accountability by Platoon/Section Is Necessary

(U) Discussion. For the FTX, there was accountability to the company level. Tracking numbers by platoon/section location is preferred.

(U) Recommendation. Before each exercise begins, submit a by-name troop to task for that exercise. This enables the battalion to have visibility of “who is where” in case of an emergency.

(U) Observation: Postal Support Operations Were Challenging

(U) Discussion. Postal operations were not emplaced for troops to receive mail during any of the Pacific Pathways events. While cellphones and e-mail (or other digital systems) may provide connectivity back home, deployments to austere locations or the need for operational security may preclude the use of such technology. Mail in the form of a letter or a small package from home is a morale booster. Even in a 60- or 90-day deployment, mail deliveries can be coordinated for a specific leg of a Pacific Pathways exercise at least once or twice.

(U) Recommendation. United States Army, Pacific Command should engage the J-1, and I Corps can assist deployed units in establishing an Army Post Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) during Pacific Pathways. For example, if there is a U.S. Naval ship that remains with a unit throughout the deployment, it may be possible to establish an FPO on board. It also may be feasible to establish an APO at a U.S. Embassy for a

temporary period of time augmented with unit mail handlers. Additionally, with the future establishment of a forward command post (i.e., the hub or Pacific Pathways coordination center to provide mission command and facilitate logistics), an APO could be established with that element.

(U) Observation: Awards Processing Should Be Streamlined

(U) Discussion. Awards had a short suspense for 2/27 Soldiers, enablers, and those departing early. Clear instructions were necessary for timely submission and appropriate signatures to streamline the awards process and execution.

(U) Recommendation. Create a concise SOP for awards submissions in the garrison environment. The fewer the steps, the easier and quicker the process.

(U) Observation: Communication with Rear Detachment S-1 Was Challenging

(U) Discussion. There was a lack of communication between the OICs and the noncommissioned officers in charge that delayed critical information submissions/coordinations between the forward and rear S-1 command posts.

(U) Recommendation. Set up daily standardized logistical reports (by logistical representatives), and add an S-1 synchronization meeting twice a week to the battalion battle rhythm. This can be rehearsed in a garrison environment to refine S-1 split operations.

(U) Observation: Access to Unit Identification Codes (UICs) Outside of Battalion Was Unavailable

(U) Discussion. U.S. forces could not assist enablers with personnel actions. Something as simple as pulling an enlisted record brief for update/viewing could not be accomplished.

(U) Recommendation. Forward S-1s should be given access to UICs for Soldiers attached to the battalion, or they should create a task force UIC that personnel can be assigned to while in support of the operation.

Chapter 8

Protection and Engineering

(U) Overview

(U) Most of the following observations apply to the Keris Strike exercise in Malaysia, but some also address recurring trends that appeared throughout Pacific Pathways 15-02.

(U) The protection portion of this chapter does not cover all functions in the Army Universal Task List (AUTL), nor every echelon, but it does relate to echelons (I Corps and 25th Infantry Division [25ID]) in the previous Pacific Pathways 15-01 Initial Impressions Report (IIR) with a primary focus at brigade and below.

(U) Not all units strictly follow the AUTL to divide task responsibilities. For example, force health protection is a function in the AUTL, but it is addressed under sustainment in this IIR.

(U) Although engineering is not a warfighting function (WfF), it does support almost all WfFs in one form or another. This chapter addresses those engineering elements that specifically support protection.

(U) **Note:** All Pacific Pathways IIRs and the coming newsletter will ultimately address all echelons (brigade and below through the theater army) and applicable AUTL functions and overall trends.

(U) Observation: Force Protection (FP) Liaison Responsibilities Need To Be Fixed at the Lowest Level at the Onset of the Planning Process

(U) **Discussion.** Due to the split nature of the exercise (the battalion field training exercise [FTX] at Taiping, with the brigade and division element command post exercise [CPX] at Ipoh), 3BCT had to conduct its own force protection coordination with the Malaysian forces, causing changes to FP requirements that had been previously arranged during planning conferences. The result was confusion, duplication of work, and missed deadlines.

(U) This appears to be a recurring challenge from Pacific Pathways 15-01, in which FP coordination on the ground with the host nation (HN) counterpart is not being conducted early enough by the executing unit. Additionally, that responsibility does not appear to be fixed at the lowest level from receipt of mission.

(U) According to the Pacific Pathways 15-01 IIR, both I Corps and 25ID reported being under-represented at the various planning conferences and had to conduct on-the-ground FP coordination with the HN later in the process, which is far from ideal for such a vital function. This lack

of representation and late delegation of authority appear to trickle down, especially in split-based operations.

(U) Recommendation. Force protection coordination needs to be the fixed responsibility of one person or organized cell, with liaisons with a specific HN individual counterpart or organized cell. This prevents unnecessary work and ensures that FP plans pass through the executing FP personnel and that the appropriate courses of action are properly assessed.

(U) In addition, the following are recommended:

- United States Army, Pacific Command (USARPAC) should allocate the appropriate number of planning conference slots for FP planners at I Corps, especially at the 25ID level, during the initial planning conference so that planning and HN coordination can be delegated early.
- USARPAC at all levels should create and use an HN force protection matrix that lists every HN entity with whom a U.S. or coalition FP planner must coordinate during the course of Pacific Pathways.
- Assign an appropriate U.S. (or coalition) unit/staff section and by-name point of contact to conduct such coordination, with desired milestone dates, down to the lowest appropriate echelon.
- The HN force protection matrix also should serve as a continuity tool (or chain of custody) if FP planning starts at a higher level and is later delegated to a lower level.

(U) Observation: Use of Government Purchase Cards (GPCs) in Host Countries Needs To Be Planned

(U) Discussion. On several occasions, a GPC purchase was attempted, but the transaction was denied due to an incorrect or unavailable merchant code. To remedy the problem, a call was made to the Regional Contracting Office (RCO). Given the contingent nature and time zone differences of Pacific Pathways events, the RCO should open all merchant codes for use by GPC holders before exercises begin to enhance efficiency of the GPC purchase process.

(U) Recommendation. All GPC users (or through a consolidated unit or staff section effort) should coordinate with the RCO to provide merchant codes prior to departure. GPC cardholders are required to account for all purchases and maintain records. Therefore, there should be no concerns about making unwarranted GPC purchases. Codes should be made available in a consolidated manner, so the RCO does not receive tens or hundreds of messages or phone calls to accomplish the same action. Enabling codes for GPC use prior to a Pacific Pathways event also should be a predeployment checklist item designated with a set timeline to ensure efficiency.

(U) Observation: Better Planning Could Improve Counter-Improved Explosive Device (CIED) Training for Infantry Soldiers Prior to FTX

(U) Discussion. Many U.S. engineers attended a two-day CIED course conducted by the Malaysian CIED mobile training team (MTT). The training was excellent, but there was room for more Soldiers to participate (i.e., infantry Soldiers). The lessons from the training were applicable to the jungle FTX. For Soldiers with prior IED experience, the training also served as a refresher on the basics.

(U) Recommendation. Infantry soldiers scheduled to participate in the Keris Strike exercise, especially those involved in the jungle FTX, should coordinate (through the brigade engineers) with the Malaysian CIED MTT for inclusion in its training. Brigade engineers should make early inquiries on available slots. If slots are limited, however, engineers should provide a CIED class for the remaining exercise participants prior to the jungle FTX.

(U) Prior planning for CIED training should start with USARPAC's Asian/Pacific CIED Fusion Center. The center routinely reviews multinational CIED training opportunities for every leg of Pacific Pathways and assesses the CIED threat.

(U) Pre-deployment Pacific Pathways awareness training also should be conducted for all deploying Soldiers, based on the HN's CIED threats.

(U) Observation: Combined Arms Obstacle Clearance in Jungle FTX Should Be Enhanced

(U) Discussion. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps are inherent in jungle warfare. On several occasions during the FTX, engineer Soldiers and units could have been used to facilitate realistic training for both infantry and engineer Soldiers and units, individually and collectively (combined arms mode).

(U) Recommendation. Prepare IED and booby-trap simulations for the jungle FTX that keep exercise participants engaged in these tasks. For the same FTX, provide the following:

- Engineer-specific missions
- Opportunities for combined arms operations (i.e., infantry platoons with engineers during explosive-hazard clearance training to ensure proper execution and enhance individual and collective proficiency)

(U) This type of training should be coordinated during the initial planning conference and includes the Asian/Pacific CIED Fusion Center. Lessons learned from this venture also should be shared with the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Maneuver and Maneuver Support Centers of Excellence.

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